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Most congressional scholarship argues that legislative leaders—majority party leaders 
and committee chairs—are strongly constrained, weak agents of their rank-and-file. 
This study argues that information, and leaders’ ability to control it, is a significant 
and independent source of power for leaders in the House of Representatives. Most 
rank-and-file members of Congress lack the time and resources necessary to track, 
study, or become deeply involved in legislating on most bills considered by the 
House. As a result, they rely on sources that can synthesize the information they need 
to decide whether or not to support the bill, offer an amendment, or take other actions. 
The party leadership and committee chairs, because of their staff and resource 
advantages, are important sources of information for the rank-and-file. However, 
legislative leaders often exploit their informational advantages to help their preferred 
legislation gain easy passage through the chamber. Along with the ability to 
perpetually collect information on rank-and-file preferences, and provide leadership-
  
approved information about legislation, legislative leaders also have an arsenal of 
tools to limit the availability of information including withholding legislative 
language, scheduling votes on short notice, and using large and complex legislation as 
a vehicle. This information control puts leaders in the driver’s seat, allowing them to 
lead the chamber by shaping the information driving the debate on a bill. Thirty 
interviews with members of Congress and congressional staff, along with a unique 
dataset of important legislation considered by the House of Representatives are used 
to support this theory. Leaders are found to employ information control tactics 
strategically, to aid the passage of their priority legislation and in response to the 
potential for significant influence from outside groups. The study, overall, suggests 
that legislative leaders in the House are more influential than they are typically 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Sit down, my son. We don't read most of the bills. Do you really know 
what it would entail if we were to read every bill that we pass?” 
Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), Fahrenheit 9/11 
  
Around 10:30 p.m. on February 12, 2009, House and Senate conferees filed 
the 175,000 word, 1,100 page conference report for the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. By 3 p.m. the next day the report had passed the House and 
was on its way to President Obama’s desk. Minority Leader John Boehner (R-OH) 
was livid over the way the bill had been pushed through the chamber. Speaking on the 
floor during the final minutes of debate, he condemned the expedient consideration of 
the bill: 
“…Here we are with 1,100 pages—1,100 pages—not one member of 
this body has read. Not one. There may be some staffer over in the 
Appropriations Committee that read all of this last night—I don't know 
how you could read 1,100 pages between midnight and now. Not one 
member has read this.” (Boehner 2009) 
 
John Boehner is right. No member of the House of Representatives could have 
possibly read the conference report in the 13 hours that elapsed between the time the 
report was filed and debate began on the floor, even without breaking for food, sleep, 
the call of nature, or to stop and think through its implications. An individual reading 
at 200 words per minute would require roughly 14.5 hours to read the bill from start 
to finish.1 But despite this and the fact that the bill had grown by over 60,000 words 
since it had initially passed the House less than two weeks earlier, the bill cleared the 
                                                 
1 Carver (1992) reports that 200 words per minute is the average reading speed among college students 
aiming to understand enough to pass a multiple choice test on the material being read. Cognitive 
understanding beyond this level may require an individual to read at a much slower pace, as slow as 




chamber by a party-line vote with just seven Democrats opposing the bill and one 
voting present. The overwhelming majority of the 246 members of Congress who 
supported the bill could not have known details about the contents or implications of 
much of the bill, and yet they voted in the affirmative.  
Rather than an aberration from the typical legislative process, the process by 
which the economic stimulus package was passed is part of a larger strategy 
implemented by congressional leaders to lead the legislative process in the House of 
Representatives. The implications of this strategy run counter to the prevailing view 
of leadership in the U.S. House. 
Formally, the Constitutional design of the U.S. House of Representatives 
emphasizes the equality of its members. Each member represents an (relatively) equal 
number of individuals and has equal power (one vote) in determining the outcome of 
questions and legislation brought before the chamber. As Joseph Cooper (1977) 
describes it, “Congress has a low tolerance for hierarchy … Members formally must 
have equal standing and decision making must be collegial…” (p. 147). Unlike the 
executive branch in which a single executive ranks above all other actors, formally at 
least, no one member of the House is more important or more powerful than the rest. 
 Most scholarship on congressional leadership supports this maxim. Typically, 
legislative leaders are seen as agents of their followers rather than independent actors, 
who are directed by the preferences and goals of the rank-and-file. They are 
empowered and serve their posts at the pleasure of the party caucus, the chamber at-
large, or some other group within Congress. Some of the most disparate theories on 




function of the level of agreement among their rank-and-file (Cooper and Brady 
1981; Rohde 1991; Krehbiel 1991; Sinclair 1999, 2007). According to these theories, 
legislative leaders are agents held on a short leash by their principals, with little 
leeway to direct the legislative process, and holding no autonomous powers to shape 
legislative outcomes to reflect their own preferences. All real power rests with the 
rank-and-file. Leaders are, in essence, followers. 
 Building on the work of Richard Hall (1987, 1996; with Deardorff 2006) and 
Randall Strahan (2007), I argue that contrary to this predominant view, legislative 
leaders (in this case both the majority party leadership and committee chairs) have a 
distinct resource and a distinct power that helps them independently lead the 
legislative process. This resource is access to, and the ability to control, information 
about legislation. The typical rank-and-file member has neither the time nor the 
resources to track, study, or fully comprehend the implications of every piece of 
legislation under active consideration in Congress. Rather, they rely on their leaders 
to provide information on legislation that is before the chamber. At the same time, 
leaders have an arsenal of resources to limit the availability of information. They can 
withhold legislative language, schedule votes on short notice, and backload the 
legislative agenda so that a crush of legislation occurs all at once at the end of a 
session, or prior to a recess.  
For leaders, this ability to control information centralizes power in their 
offices, allowing them to lead the House of Representatives, and giving them 
significantly more influence than the typical member of Congress over much of the 




control tactics varies depending on several factors, including the contents of the bill in 
question, control over information is a primary and independent source of power held 
by all legislative leaders and they are able to use it often and effectively to lead the 
policymaking process. The typical member of Congress rarely gets to read the 
legislation that is before the chamber. They need help to understand what is in every 
bill. This is standard operating procedure in the House and is an important function of 
leadership positions. But leaders sometimes choose to exploit their information power 
and it is a powerful and effective leadership tool ever at their disposal. 
‘Information is power’ is a common aphorism, and this is true nowhere more 
so than in the U.S. House of Representatives. In an atmosphere of limited time and 
resources, becoming informed about the multitude of legislation being considered at 
any one time is a challenge. A challenge that empowers legislative leaders as the 
policymaking process unfolds. 
 
Defining ‘Legislative Leaders’ 
An important question that deserves some discussion is: who are the 
“legislative leaders” in the House? Generally, there are two sets of leaders. One set is 
comprised of the members of the majority party leadership. The other set is that of the 
chairs of the standing committees. The latter set is easy to identify. However, the 
former is much less straight forward. Studies of Congress and congressional 
leadership have defined the majority party leadership in numerous ways. Some 
studies focus specifically on the Speaker as the dominant entity in the leadership 




Rosenthal 2010). Others studies have defined the majority party leadership more 
broadly. Ripley (1967), for example, defined the majority party leadership as the 
Speaker, majority leader, majority whip, and caucus chairman. Sinclair (e.g. 2007) 
has also broadly defined the majority party leadership in her work.  
I, similarly, use a broad definition of the majority party leadership. Rather 
than conceptualizing it as a set of lawmakers holding a static set of positions congress 
to congress, the majority party leadership is understood as more fluid. In any 
congress, the set of representatives who comprise the majority party leadership can 
evolve. Certain members, such as the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader, 
are always a part of the leadership. However, the influence of the majority whip, the 
caucus chairperson, the chair of the party’s campaign committee, some deputy whips, 
and even some committee chairs, within the party leadership can vary. Sometimes, 
the leadership table is larger, while other times it is smaller. Sometimes, lawmakers 
selected to traditional leadership positions do not have as much influence as those 
who previously held the post. Roy Blunt’s (R-MO) testy relationship with then-
majority leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) is often cited as evidence that Blunt was less 
influential as a majority whip than previous and subsequent holders of the position.2 
During the 110th and 111th congresses, David Obey (D-WI) was often perceived as 
having an important voice in the Democratic leadership’s strategies on appropriations 
issues despite being a committee chair (National Journal Almanac 2010). 
Thus, for the purposes of this study, the majority party leadership is 
understood as a potentially dynamic set of members that is relatively stable within 
any one congress, but can vary from congress to congress, and even from issue to 
                                                 




issue. Primarily, however, the core of that leadership appears to also be the Speaker 
of the House, the Majority Leader, and the Majority Whip. As a congressional staffer 
I interviewed for this study put it: 
Congressional staffer: The party leadership is Boehner, Cantor, and 
McCarthy. Practically, when people around here say “leadership” they 
mean the Speaker, the majority leader, and the whip.3 
 
It is also important to briefly mention the nature of the relationship between 
the party leadership and chairs of the standing committees. The scholarly literature 
has often portrayed these two sets of leaders as power centers at odds with each other 
in the legislative process. Undoubtedly, this has sometimes been true. Evidence to 
this effect has been well documented from congresses several decades ago (see, for 
example, Jones 1968). In addition, a host of scholarship has pointed to the 
congressional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s as stripping power from committee 
chairs and centralizing it in the party leadership (see, for example, Rohde 1991; 
Sinclair 2007).  
However, leaders and chairs are not necessarily opposing entities. In fact, in 
times of unified parties they should logically find plenty of common ground. Cox and 
McCubbins (2005) portray the members of the party leadership and the committee 
chairs as members of a leadership firm. Like the board of directors in a corporation, 
party leaders and committee chairs share in the profits and damages of the caucus as a 
whole. As such they have incentives to work together to achieve mutual interests. In 
this way we should not necessarily understand these two sets of leaders as competing 
power centers. They may often find as many reasons to work harmoniously as they 
may find to be opposed to each other. 
                                                 




In sum, who exactly are the leaders of the House of Representatives at any 
one time is not clearly defined. However, as will be discussed, the actions and goals 
of these individuals can be understood as distinct. For the purposes of this study, 
understanding the motivations of these legislative leaders is more important than their 
particular identities at any time.  
 
Information and Power 
The idea that information and power are related is not new. Nor is the idea 
that leaders can harness information as a source of power. In fact, that information 
may be a source of power has been suggested by thinkers for centuries. The scientific 
method is rooted in the principle that obtaining information and knowledge can help 
us increase our power over our world. Sir Francis Bacon is often given ownership of 
the phrase “knowledge is power”4; and Thomas Hobbes once wrote, “The end of 
knowledge is power ... the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action 
or thing to be done” (Hampton 1988, 46). In The Prince, Machiavelli suggests that 
the ability of a leader to be deceptive and sly about what he or she knows is an 
effective tool for leaders (Machiavelli 1998); and in the Bible, Proverbs 24:5 can be 
read to state, “A wise man is strong, and a well-taught man is robust and valiant.5” In 
short, having information has long been tied to power in human thought. 
In the field of economics, the power advantages conferred by information 
asymmetries is so established that in 2001 the Nobel Prize in Economics was 
                                                 
4 The exact origin of this phrase is not known, but Bacon is the most commonly attributed owner of the 
aphorism. 




presented to scholars for their research on the influence of these asymmetries on 
market dynamics.6 This line of scholarship suggests that without adjustment 
information asymmetries can empower the position of the actor with an informational 
advantage and bias market outcomes (see, for example, Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973). 
Within the American political system information has been described as a 
potent source of power, as well. Specifically, that the executive branch can use its 
superior expertise and information advantages to avoid effective congressional 
oversight. Weber (1991) was perhaps the first to suggest that the ability to exercise 
secrecy about what it knows is an advantage for bureaucratic units over other 
agencies, the legislative branch, and interest groups. Niskanen’s (1971) model of 
budgetary politics suggests that agencies can leverage their informational advantages 
about the costs of governmental programs and processes to increase the size of their 
operating budgets. While many scholars have noted that Congress can adapt to this 
reality to maintain control over the bureaucracy (see, for example, McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1989), adaptation can be costly. Banks and Weingast (1992), specifically, 
argue that the harder, or more costly, it is to audit an agency’s claims, the more 
political power that agency has. Without constituency incentives Congress is unlikely 
to absorb such costs, providing the bureaucracy with information-based advantages in 
its overall relationship with the legislature.  
The information advantage the executive branch has regarding foreign policy, 
defense, and homeland security issues has received particular attention. Schlesinger 
(1973) in The Imperial Presidency argues that Congress’ inability to properly oversee 
                                                 




actions on these issues allowed numerous presidential abuses throughout American 
history. Rudalevige (2005) argues that president have been able to continue to hold 
these advantages and that public and congressional reactions to the war on terror have 
only increased presidents’ power in this area. 
Ultimately, that the executive branch can leverage its informational 
advantages into power vis-à-vis the legislative branch is an idea that is well 
established and widely accepted. In many ways, legislative leadership offices within 
Congress possess the same advantages as executive offices and bureaucratic agencies. 
Party leadership and committee offices possess far more resources in terms of staff 
and are able to specialize and develop expertise in legislative procedure and in areas 
of policy substance far beyond what can be expected from the staff of a typical 
member of Congress. This allows leaders to accrue and hold more information about 
the legislation before the chamber. Furthermore, the rank-and-file members of 
Congress these leaders work with are the same ones who are often unable to find the 
will to adapt and audit the better informed agents they have empowered in the 
executive branch. Certainly there are differences between executive-legislative 
relations and the relationship between rank-and-file members of Congress and their 
legislative leaders. Most notable is that unlike the executive branch, legislative 
leadership positions result from a reversible, internal delegation of authority. 
However, this does not guarantee that rank-and-file members of Congress are likely 





Yet the logic of arguments about the informational power conveyed on 
executives and bureaucrats in the American political system has never been applied to 
congressional leaders. This study aims to do just that. The ultimate contributions of 
this exercise are to suggest that information is a source of power for congressional 
leaders, just as it is for other actors in the political system, and that through 
employing this power legislative leaders are able to exercise a degree of influence 
over congressional policymaking beyond what is normally ascribed by congressional 
scholars.  
Furthermore, this study contributes by demonstrating a way in which the 
influence of information power can be empirically tested. While much has been made 
of information power, most of the scholarship described above is theoretical or 
qualitative in nature. Here quantitative indicators of information control are 
developed and analyzed. These measures may provide a starting point for developing 
similar measures to understand information-based relationships in other areas of 
American government and politics. 
 
A Word on Information 
One last clarifying point worth making concerns what is meant by 
“information” in this study. Most of the time when this study refers to information it 
means information about what is contained in a piece of legislation, what that 
legislation proposes to do, and what the consequences of that legislation likely will 
be. This type of hard information is what rank-and-file members of Congress lack and 




implies intelligence about the preferences of other actors in the policy process. These 
instances are few and are clearly noted in the text. Generally, the reader should 
understand information as the specifics of a bill. 
 
Overview of the Study 
The following chapters of this study analyze information control in action in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. Party and committee leaders have various 
information control tools in their arsenal they can use to lead the policymaking 
process. In what followers, these tactics are described, patterns of their use are 
explained, and consequences of this legislative strategy are highlighted. 
 The conclusions drawn are based on a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. A lot of what constitutes information control strategies takes 
place behind-the-scenes in ways not perceptible to the public or through typical 
records of congressional activity. Qualitative study of the topic is necessary to 
develop a relatively complete understanding of information control strategies, the 
motivations of the legislative leaders who use them, and the motivations of the rank-
and-file legislators who are subject to them. The qualitative analyses, in turn, are used 
to develop quantitative indicators of information control, and these indicators are used 
to conduct rigorous analysis demonstrating the generalizability of the findings. 
 The qualitative analyses here are interviews with sitting and former members 
of Congress and their staff. In total, 30 individuals were interviewed. Interviews 
within Congress are notoriously hard to obtain (Goldstein 2002; Baker 2009). As a 




sampling” (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Esterberg 2002, 93-94). Beginning with an 
initial set of interviews with individuals in Congress with whom I was already 
acquainted, I asked each interviewee to refer me to others who might be willing to 
talk. Each subsequent interview provided opportunities for more referrals, and my 
access to more potential interviewees “snowballed”. Throughout the process I also 
cold-called (or cold-emailed) the offices of current and former members of Congress 
to request more interviews. While this process to some degree sacrifices the 
randomness that is desirable in sampling, it afforded me access to individuals that I 
would not have had access to had I simply contacted a random sample of 
representatives and staffers. Furthermore, it probably allowed me to interview more 
individuals than would have otherwise been the case. In the end, my sample of 
interviewees was quite diverse and representative of the Congress, at-large. 
 The interviews themselves were semi-structured, consisting primarily of open-
ended questions. In conducting the interviews I wanted to remain relatively free of 
expectation. The first several interviews were the most exploratory. I used these 
interviews to refine the interview process and structure how subsequent interviews 
would proceed. However, each interview was unique. The questions were altered 
depending on the role the interviewee played in the House (party leader, committee 
leader, rank-and-filer, member or staffer) and whether they were currently in or out of 
office. However, each interview aimed at answering the same questions (i.e. how do 
members of Congress obtain information about legislation; how, to what degree, do 




interview process, and the sample of interviewees can be found in Appendix A. The 
evidence from these interviews is used throughout the study. 
 Chapter 2 presents a theory of information control. Setting it within the 
literature on congressional leadership, I show how this study provides a perspective 
of congressional leaders that differs substantially from the norm, but can draw on the 
lessons from some important scholarship on the policymaking process and leadership. 
This chapter provides the expectations for the analyses that follow. 
 Chapter 3 describes information control tactics used by majority party leaders 
and committee chairs. Both leaders have numerous powers and prerogatives through 
which they can influence the contents of legislation and subsequently control the flow 
of information throughout the subcommittee, committee, and floor stages of the 
legislative process. This chapter primarily draws on evidence gathered from elite 
interviews with members of Congress, past and present, and their staff to describe the 
various information control tactics legislative leaders employ, and the effect they 
have on the actions and decision making of typical members of Congress. These 
tactics generally fall into one of three categories: gathering information, restricting 
information, or providing information. Legislative leaders utilize all three types of 
tactics as they attempt to manage the flow of information in their chamber. The 
tactics are numerous and diverse and are found to be used substantially by both party 
leaders and committee chairs. 
 Chapter 4 presents quantitative analyses highlighting the strategic use of 
information control tactics by party leaders. Using a unique dataset of more than 270 




specifically on the decisions of majority party leaders to implement several tactics 
meant to restrict access to information about legislation. The results of several 
multivariate analyses suggest that leaders are most likely to restrict information on 
bills that are of priority to the party leadership or have the highest potential for 
attracting activity from outside interest groups. The results also suggest that leaders 
are less likely to able to implement these tactics when the legislation is something that 
is especially salient with the voting public. 
 Chapter 5 explores the how the use of these information control tactics 
influences the relationship between rank-and-file members of Congress and their 
legislative leadership. Specifically, the chapter argues that the use of these tactics 
generally reduces the amount of trust rank-and-file members of Congress have in 
their legislative leaders. This effect is most noticeable for members out-of-step with 
their party’s ideological mainstream. More generally, the evidence suggests that a 
disconnect exists between what legislative leaders and rank-and-filers value in the 
legislative process. Leaders are more focused on the big-picture—passing a 
legislative agenda at whatever cost—while rank-and-filers find themselves more with 
the details of legislation and how different legislative proposals will affect their 
districts and their reelection chances. The inability of these two groups of legislators 
to reconcile these different perspectives creates a general tension that is only 
exacerbated by the use of information control tactics.  
 Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the study and explores what 
they mean for congressional politics and representation more generally. Broadly, 




and the American political system and what are the detriments? The House of 
Representatives was designed as a representational body that gives an equal voice to 
equivalent constituencies across the country. Furthermore, Americans pride 
themselves on the perceived openness and individualistic nature of their legislative 
system. Are these values compromised by the use of information control tactics? If 
so, what are the tradeoffs? These tactics certainly streamline the policymaking 
process and help the majority party pass its legislative platform. These benefits, 
however, come at the cost of the quality of deliberations and the equality of 





Chapter 2: A Theory of Information Control 
 
 “Scientia potentia est [Knowledge is power].” 
  Anonymous/Sir Francis Bacon 
 
 “Information is a commodity here; perhaps the most valuable one.” 
  Party leadership staffer7 
 
Within political science, leadership is a poorly understood concept. What 
influence do leaders have over their followers? How, and to what degree, do leaders 
influence the policymaking process? Despite decades of interest, we lack an 
understanding of what factors comprise leadership and what sources of power leaders 
can rely on to exercise it. In the words of James MacGregor Burns (1977), perhaps 
political science’s foremost scholar on the topic of political leadership, 
Political leadership is one of the most widely noted and reported and 
least understood phenomena in modern politics. If you doubt this, 
glance at the indexes of any of several hundred works that deal with 
political leaders but have little concept of, or reference to, the role of 
political leadership [emphasis in original] (p. 266).  
 
David B. Truman (1959) provided a similar perspective on the state of leadership 
studies, 
Everyone knows something of leaders and leadership of various sorts, 
but no one knows very much. Leadership, especially in the political 
realm, unavoidably or by design often is suffused by an atmosphere of 
the mystic and the magical, and these mysteries have been little 
penetrated by systematic observation (p. 94). 
 
These words, though published decades ago, ring true today. Scholarly theories of 
leadership in Congress often focus on leaders and their role in modern policymaking, 
                                                 




but these theories tend to emphasize the limits of leadership influence or stress how 
strong or weak leadership reflects systematic underlying factors.  
This chapter lays out a theory of information control in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The foundations of this theory are simple: First, it starts with an 
understanding that information is a valuable commodity in Congress. Before 
legislators can act on legislation—propose an amendment, make a statement on the 
floor, or cast a vote—they have to know what they are amending, debating, or voting 
on. Furthermore, possession of information empowers legislators. The more informed 
a member of Congress is on a bill, the more he or she can be involved in its 
development. Additionally, other members of Congress become reliant on informed 
members, turning to them for information.  
The second foundation is that all members are not equal in the amount of 
information they possess. With limited time and resources, typical members of 
Congress do not have time to become informed on most legislation that is before the 
chamber. Instead they rely on leaders—both majority party leaders and committee 
chairs—to provide the information they need. Leaders have far more staff resources 
allowing them to be both more informed about the contents of legislation and more 
involved in its development and consideration.  
Finally, the third foundation is that leaders have an arsenal of tools to control 
the flow of information about legislation in the chamber, and they use these 
informational asymmetries to lead the chamber. These tools include, but are not 




on short notice, and condense the legislative agenda so that a torrent of legislation 
comes up for consideration all at once. 
Few studies highlight the influential sources of power possessed by leaders, or 
systematically analyze the influence leaders can have over the policymaking process. 
Rather, most theories about leadership power in Congress have taken one of two 
perspectives. Leadership power is either (1) a function of the preferences and goals of 
the flock, or (2) a function of the traits exhibited by the leader in question. Before 
information-based sources of leadership power can be discussed in more detail, these 
other perspectives on congressional leadership should be reviewed. 
 
Weak Leadership in Congress 
The majority of modern theories of congressional politics, at least as they 
relate to legislative leaders, describe leaders as beholden to the preferences and goals 
of the rank-and-file. Perhaps the most comprehensive work expressing this 
perspective is Krehbiel’s (1991) Informational Theory and Legislative Organization. 
According to this theory, congressional delegation to committees, committee leaders, 
and party leaders is done as a division of labor; to create specialization and reduce 
information barriers for the chamber as a whole, and reduce the inefficiencies 
inherent in collective action. Less abstractly, the chamber delegates to committees to 
develop expertise on the subject matter under their jurisdictions and produce expertly 
informed legislation, while committee leaders and party leaders are delegated the 
responsibility of becoming procedural experts and aiding the passage of this 




their delegated agents accountable through various majority-vote check points, 
including approving the memberships of the committees, electing the leaders of the 
chamber, approving the guidelines for debate as established through special rules, 
having the ability to amend all legislation reported from committees, and voting on 
the final passage of every bill (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1991, 1999; 
Dion and Huber 1996; Baron 2000; Martorano 2006). 
The most important aspect of this theory is the ability of the rank-and-file to 
check their agents. Because of the multitude of check-points, it is presumed that the 
chamber should be able to adequately check the actions taken by its delegated agents. 
In other words, legislative leaders are given the authority to act, but they are not given 
power to act independently. If an agent steps out of line, his or her actions can be 
rejected by the chamber, or, even more severely, the agent could even be removed 
from his or her post. In this model, legislative leaders are weak, and legislative 
outcomes are shaped entirely by the distribution of policy preferences and priorities 
among the rank-and-file. 
While other theories disagree with the informational theory in many respects, 
they are in harmony in their perceptions of leadership power. Cooper and Brady 
(1981), paving the way for Aldrich and Rohde’s theory of conditional party 
government, argue that the power of legislative leaders is a function of the 
distribution of preferences within and between the party caucuses. Specifically, the 
more united the members of a party caucus are with each other, and the more they 
disagree with the opposing party caucus, the more power and authority they will 




their fellow partisans allow them (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, 2000b). 
While the focus under this theory moves away from the preferences of the chamber as 
a whole and toward the preferences of the party caucuses, its logic is the same—
legislative leadership, and leadership power, are held in check by the rank-and-file. 
Sinclair’s theory of unorthodox lawmaking further refines this relationship 
(Sinclair 2007, 1983, 1995, 1999). Sinclair’s research on legislative procedure in the 
House emphasizes how the legislative process changed during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. By demonstrating how the traditional “textbook Congress” gave 
way to a new “unorthodox” style of lawmaking, she shows how the role of majority 
party leaders grew dramatically. However, she argues that leadership activism is 
driven and restrained by rank-and-file preferences and expectations. She suggests that 
this more centralized and leadership-led style of lawmaking is a consequence of the 
chamber reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, alterations to the budget process, and the 
polarization of the parties. By reducing the power of committee chairs, the reforms 
left a power vacuum in its wake. Consequently, the “Democrats began to look to their 
party leaders, the only central leaders in the chamber” to counter new organizational 
problems (Sinclair 2007, 112). As the party caucuses further polarized throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, it became more difficult for the lawmaking process to work through 
bipartisan compromise. The central leadership of the parties had to innovate to pass 
their legislative priorities, but only in response to clamoring among the rank-and-file 
for more aggressive strategies. The implication is that leaders can only take these 
aggressive steps when their party acquiesces. Otherwise leaders have no independent 




The other primary thrust in the study of political leadership is to focus on the 
individual in power. Specifically, these studies emphasize how the power of a leader 
is a function of how well his or her traits match the needs of the job, or, simply how 
talented each leader proves to be once in office. The earliest studies of congressional 
leadership employed this approach. Follett’s (1896) study of the speakership is 
perhaps the earliest scholarly examination of leadership in Congress. Follett 
concludes that while the speakership is an inherently powerful office, the degree of 
power wielded at any time is a function of the individual holding the office. 
Specifically, “men of strong character” such as Henry Clay and Thomas Reed, when 
in power, made the speakership very influential, sometimes more influential than the 
President (Follett 1896, 64). Subsequent early studies of leadership in Congress 
followed Follett’s lead, tracing the actions of each individual leader as they ruled the 
House of Representatives (Fuller 1909; Brown 1922; Hasbrouck 1927; Chui 1928).  
Later studies have continued this method, analyzing the impact individual 
leaders such as Clay, Reed, Cannon, and Rayburn had on the House (see, for 
example, Davidson, Hammond, and Smock 1998). Ripley (1967), analyzing party 
leadership as a whole concludes that while environmental and institutional factors 
influence the degree of power leaders wield, the most important factor in leadership 
power is the individual’s propensity to be powerful. This is a sentiment Peters (1997) 
echoes in his extensive study of the House Speaker. He ultimately concludes that, 
“the contextualist view tends to be insensitive to the major differences that the 
personal element of the power equation makes” (Peters 1997, 273). It is how a 




environment that determines how powerful he or she will be during her tenure. 
Though a historian, Caro’s (2002) study of Lyndon Johnson exemplifies this 
approach to leadership studies. Caro describes Johnson’s effectiveness as a Senate 
leader as a function of his mastery of senatorial politics, the personal relationships he 
forged with key senators, his physical stature, his fundraising abilities, and to some 
degree, his good fortune.  
Ultimately, these studies remind us that understanding the individual is 
important to understanding leadership, but they fail to identify systematic sources or 
patterns in leadership power. Considered in tandem with scholarship that portrays 
congressional leaders as beholden to their rank-and-file, we are left with the 
conclusion that leaders are typically weak, but a few, who have the right motivation 
and qualities, can sometimes under rare circumstances make a noticeable difference 
through their leadership. Both perspectives implicitly argue that leaders do not have 
real institutional sources of power or authority. Consequently, this literature tells us 
little about what leaders actually can do, and what influence they actually have 
throughout the legislative process. 
 
Strong Leadership in Congress 
While contemporary scholarly thought on American political leaders tends to 
emphasize the weaknesses of leaders, some perspectives on American politics 
emphasize the importance and influence of leaders. The Founding Fathers, for one, 
were concerned with the influence strong leaders could have over the political 




in the Federalist Papers to discussing the ramifications political leadership could 
have for the burgeoning republic. For both of them, strong leadership could be either 
boon or bane (Strahan 2003). For example, in Federalist 62 Madison argues that 
legislatures are prone to “[seduction] by factious leaders, into intemperate and 
pernicious resolutions” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1999, 377). However, in other 
essays he repeatedly mentions the importance of “fit characters” and politicians of 
“generous principles” to be found and kept working in American government 
(Strahan 2003, 64). Altogether, concern over and respect for the influential nature of 
political leadership spans back to the foundation of the American republic. 
Among recent scholarship of Congress, there are foundations for a perspective 
of strong leadership, as well. For one, Richard Hall (1987, 1996; with Deardorff 
2006) provides an understanding of how legislative leaders could exert independent 
leadership over the policymaking process. According to Hall, the greater interest a 
member of Congress has in an issue, and the greater the resources he or she can 
commit to the issue, the more involved that member is both able to be, and likely to 
be, in legislating on that issue. Interest can arise from a variety of sources, including 
the concerns of their constituents and the personal policy preferences of the member. 
Furthermore, interest is fairly evenly distributed among members of Congress. 
Resources, however, are to a large degree a function of the position a member of 
Congress holds in the chamber. Members in party and committee leadership positions 
benefit from larger staff resources than the rank-and-file. Committee staffers, 
especially, are often more experienced and knowledgeable about the issue areas on 




 Hall’s (1996) exhaustive investigation into participation in Congress yields 
the conclusion that on any bill only a small number of representatives are deeply 
involved in the policymaking process. These individuals are typically those on the 
committee or subcommittee of jurisdiction who have a personal or constituent-driven 
interest in the policy at hand. However, Hall also notes that legislative leaders are 
almost always one of the participants. Committee or subcommittee chairpersons, 
specifically, are always involved in drafting the committee marks of a bill, and if they 
so choose, can use their dedicated and experienced committee staffs, as well as their 
procedural controls over the mark-up, to become even more intimately involved in 
the creation of legislation in their committees. As Hall puts it, committee leaders are 
at “the epicenter of the communications network in which most important legislative 
interactions take place” (1996, 94). In other words, important discussion by 
committee members about the content of committee reports almost always involves 
the committee’s staff, and by extension, the chair. Hall’s research does not explicitly 
discuss party leaders, but his reasons for expecting increased participation from 
committee leaders should apply to party leaders, as well. Majority party leaders also 
have staff resource advantages and procedural advantages that should allow them to 
be deeply involved in legislating. Altogether, Hall’s research strongly suggests that 
the procedural prerogatives and resource advantages enjoyed legislative leaders in 
Congress will both allow and compel them to become deeply involved in the 
policymaking process. 
 Other scholarship has provided perspectives of strong leadership in the U.S. 




legislator preferences as subject to the persuasion of the congressional leaders. 
Through historical case studies of leadership, Strahan documents leaders actively 
shaping legislator preferences, and subsequently altering legislative outcomes. 
Furthermore, the theory suggests that leadership is possible under a variety of 
environmental contexts, not just when followers are united on particular policy 
outcomes. Green (2010), in his recent study of the speakership, similarly suggests that 
Speakers can lead by actively advocating a position or an issue through, among other 
things, speaking and voting on the House floor. Both Strahan and Green argue that 
consequential leadership arises from the goal-achieving behavior of House leaders. 
While they disagree on the specific contents of those goals, they agree that it is in 
pursuing these goals that leadership influences the policymaking process and policy 
outcomes. 
In a different way party cartel theory also provides for strong legislative 
leadership (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). The 
theory argues actors holding key leadership positions in the House of Representatives, 
such as committee chairs and the Speaker, have the authority to use powerful 
institutional mechanisms to control the chamber’s agenda. While the theory argues 
that these leaders will only push legislation that finds widespread support within their 
caucus, this still leaves significant leeway. Especially in times of ideologically 
coherent parties, leaders should have a vast array of issues and policies that they 
could choose from to push. Thus, while Cox and McCubbins’ (2005) first 
commandment of party leadership is, “Thou shalt not aid bills that will split the 




decisions of legislative leaders are less than rigid (see also, Finocchiaro and Rohde 
2008).  
Altogether, legislative leaders in the House have informational and resource 
advantages they can use in tandem with their institutional powers to lead the chamber. 
Rather than follow their caucus or committee, legislative leaders are endowed with 
tools that allow for real leadership. Building off Hall, Strahan, and others, the 
following sections describe specifically how information is power for legislative 
leaders, and to what ends. 
 
Information and Power in Congress 
Legislative leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives, here defined as both 
majority party leaders and committee leaders, have a unique source of power they can 
harness to lead the policymaking process in the chamber. That power is control over 
the flow of information about legislation, or information control for short. Because of 
the needs of rank-and-file legislators, and because of leadership goals and desires, 
legislative leaders use information control strategies to strongly influence 
policymaking in the House. 
 The reasons leaders would want to control information are fairly straight 
forward. The primary job of the majority party leadership and of committee chairs is 
to get legislation passed, specifically legislation agreeable to the leadership or to the 
chair. In controlling information, leaders attempt to avoid controversy arising around 
their legislation. The more individuals and groups that can analyze a specific bill, the 




interpretation of the legislation, or that a specific provision will turn into a political 
issue that could potentially change the level of support for the bill within the majority 
party caucus or become a public embarrassment for the leaders. In controlling what 
information about a bill is public domain, leaders can avoid these controversies and 
pilot an easier path to passage. This gives them more control over the legislative 
process and help legislation pass in their preferred form. 
There are several reasons why leaders can use information to lead the House 
of Representatives, as well. These merit additional discussion. First, members of 
Congress both want and need to be led by their designated leaders. Second, there is 
evidence that members of Congress have general or vague policy preferences, rather 
than clearly-defined preferences that can be influenced. Third, it is unfeasible for the 
rank-and-file to adequately control or check many of the actions taken by their 
leaders. 
 
Congressional Workload and Necessary Leadership 
Perhaps the most important reason that leaders should be able to lead is 
because the rank-and-file need to be led. It is well established that political 
institutions are endogenous entities. Members of Congress create the institutions that 
structure their world in order to aid the achievement of some goal or set of goals 
(Stewart 1987; Binder 1997; Schickler 2001). Leadership positions in the House were 
created, in part, out of a necessity to reduce the inefficiencies that would result from 
every member having to participate in directing the activity of the chamber. It would 




be involved in every one of these actions. The creation and development of leadership 
positions in the House was an attempt to alleviate this problem (Bach and Smith 
1988; Krehbiel 1991; Baron 2000).  
Furthermore, the demands placed on typical members of Congress make it 
impossible for them to be involved, or even informed, on most pieces of legislation. 
Members have neither the time nor the resources to study and analyze each bill 
(Kingdon 1989). A look at the daily schedule of any member of Congress would 
reveal overlapping constituent meetings, caucus meetings, committee hearings and 
mark-ups, floor deliberation and votes, fundraising events, trips to and from the 
district, as well as meetings and briefings with legislative staff. The time that remains 
for members to actually get involved in shaping legislation, much less sitting, 
reading, and thinking about legislation, is by necessity going to be allocated to 
legislation of the greatest importance to the member and his or her constituents. Hall 
(1996) highlights how the demands on the time of members of Congress far exceed 
the time and the resources they have to commit. As one representative told Hall, “I 
feel like I’m spread thin all the time. There’s never any time to read or think an issue 
through or anything like that” (1996, 23).  
 The staffs of rank-and-file members of Congress are spread thin, as well. The 
typical member of Congress has far fewer staff resources than party and committee 
leaders. In 2010, for example, rank-and-file members were limited to hiring a 
maximum of 18 staffers and were allotted an average of $1.5 million for salaries and 
offices expenses. Party and committee leaders, by contrast, have significantly more 




leadership and committee offices between 1998 and 2010. Party leadership and 
committee offices have been routinely appropriated millions of additional dollars for 
salaries and other expenses. In 2010, for example, majority leadership offices were 
provided with $14 million and the typical committee benefited from an additional 
$7.4 million for staff and other expenses, to be at the disposal of the committee chair.  
1 
Figure 2.1: Funds Appropriated to Rank-and-File, Committee, and Majority Party 
Leadership Offices  
 
Sources: Legislative Branch Appropriations, fiscal years 1998-2010. 
Note: Fund appropriated for majority leadership offices include all funds appropriated for the 
Speaker’s Office, the Majority Leader’s office, the Majority Whip’s office, the Chief Deputy Whip, the 
Republican Steering Committee, the Republican Conference, and the Republican Policy Committee 
(when the Republicans are in the majority), the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee and the 
Democratic Caucus (when the Democrats are in the majority), and all cloakroom personnel. Fund 
appropriated to committees are the average funds appropriated to regular standing committees. 
Numbers are displayed in 2010 constant dollars. 
 
The disparity between leadership offices and rank-and-file offices is also 






























funding to personal and committee offices grew at a relatively equal pace, funding to 
leadership offices grew almost twice as rapidly. Over the course of the period 
represented, funds appropriated to members’ personal offices grew 27 percent and 
funds to committees grew 22 percent. Funds to majority and minority leadership 
offices, by contrast, grew 50 percent. These data suggest that not only have legislative 
leaders persistently had more resources with which to write and track legislation, 
research issues, and manage information, but the disparity has grown at least in 
respect to majority party leaders. 
With more funds at hand, party and committee leaders can hire not only more 
numerous staff, but typically more experienced and talented staff who can focus more 
assiduously on fewer issues than the personal staff of rank-and-file representatives. 
Committee staffers, for example, can focus solely on a subset of issues within the 
jurisdiction of the committee. Leadership staffers can focus on narrow areas of policy 
and procedure as well. By comparison, the personal staffers of typical members have 
to work on numerous policy areas and typically have less experience and expertise. 
Altogether, the average member of Congress can only get involved on a small number 
of bills in a small number of issue areas because the time and resources are not 
available to do anything else (Hall 1996, pp. 32-48). On the remainder of issues, the 
rank-and-file must rely on others for information about what is happening on each 
bill. 
This circumstance allows for majority party leaders and committee chairs to 
influence the rank-and-file. Leaders can use their resources to influence the 




Committee staffers, under the direction of committee leaders, are the wardens of 
information about committee drafts of legislation. Members interested in the contents 
of a specific bill may often have nowhere else to turn. Party leaders, similarly, have 
vast whip organizations that not only collect intelligence about the preferences of the 
membership of the party caucus, but are often essential in providing information to 
the rank-and-file about what is in a bill. Altogether, the time restraints and resource 
disadvantages faced by rank-and-file members of Congress empower legislative 
leaders by giving them distinct opportunities for influence. 
 But rank-and-file members not only need empowered leaders but also have 
reasons to want empowered leaders. The creation of strong leaders serves to aid goals 
beyond legislative efficiency. Specifically, partisan leadership positions help the 
party caucus more effectively further their collective policy preferences which, in 
turn, can potentially help everyone in the party at the polls (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Jones 2010). For the majority, this means both pushing legislation the caucus 
agrees upon (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008) and blocking legislation that splits it (Cox 
and McCubbins 2005). For the minority, this means a heightened ability to organize 
obstructionist tactics to either stop the majority from enacting its prerogatives or to 
obtain policy concessions. If the party is successful in its legislative strategies, it 
should help each of the members of the caucus individually.  
 Members of Congress typically want to go along with their party's leadership. 
In the absence of information that may dissuade a member from supporting their 
leadership's position on a bill, for most members the default action is to go along. 




the assumption that they will support the party position and only deviate from that 
position when information regarding the bill would make doing so unpalatable 
(Ripley 1967, 139-59; Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 1989). As Lee (2009) 
has more recently suggested, membership in a party caucus provides numerous 
incentives beyond ideology to go along with the party's positions. These incentives, 
including the image of the party among the electorate, control over the chamber, and 
a mistrust of the opposing party, fuel partisanship in Congress and make going along 
with the party even more enticing to legislators. Altogether, that members will default 
to supporting their leadership in the absence of compelling reason to the contrary 
provides incentives for legislative leaders to control the availability of any 
information that might raise doubts or concerns among the rank-and-file. 
In sum, it is both a necessity and desire among the rank-and-file to empower 
and follow leaders. The typical member simply does not have the time or resources to 
obtain all the information they need about legislation alone and in the absence of a 
compelling reason not to, most members tend to support the party position. 
Empowering leaders helps the party more efficiently and effectively pass their 
legislative platform and, at the same time, it empowers leaders to lead.  
 
Broad Orientations vs. Clearly Defined Policy Preferences 
Information-based leadership is also powerful because there is evidence that, 
rather than clearly defined policy preferences (see, for example, Krehbiel 1998), 
members of Congress may have what would more accurately be defined as “broad 




1986, 2000) that can be molded and influenced by leadership actions. Scholars who 
describe members of Congress as having well defined preferences generally point to 
constituency pressures as the primary constraint (see, for example, Krehbiel 1993, 
1998; Brady and Volden 1998). However, there is a great deal of evidence, anecdotal 
and otherwise, that members have a good amount of leeway in their voting decisions. 
For example, rather than adhering strictly to a set of constituent preferences, the 
representatives Fenno (1978) interviewed indicated that they had leeway as long as 
they could convincingly explain their votes to their constituents or to a large enough 
subset of constituents. 
Arnold (1990) furthered this argument by pointing out that any position can be 
taken on a bill if it can be done so obscurely. For example, if the meaning or 
consequences of a vote are unclear to the public, a member of Congress is able to act 
free of constituent pressures. Furthermore, not every individual in a district needs to 
approve of the policy positions a representative takes. Members only need to please a 
large enough sub-population to secure reelection. Altogether, members of Congress 
are not typically bound to a single position by the preferences of their constituents. 
There is evidence that variation exists in the intensity of policy preferences 
among representatives, as well. Hall (1987, 1996) argues that just as no member 
could potentially be involved on every issue, no member could possibly be intensely 
concerned about every issue before the chamber. This variation in preference 
intensity influences which issues members of Congress get involved in, as well as the 
degree to which their preferences on that issue are more or less clearly-defined. On 




urban district, for example, may not care whether dairy subsidies favor Midwestern or 
Californian farmers. Other times, members may be more apathetic simply because 
they never had time to consider the legislation closely. Regardless of the reason, on 
issues where members have less interest and less of a stake, they are likely to have 
less-defined policy preferences. 
 Even if members of Congress do have solidified preferences on a bill or issue, 
there is evidence that majority party leaders can influence the formation of these 
preferences. Evans and Oleszek (1999) find, for example, that party leaders not only 
respond to the preferences of their rank-and-file on legislation, but actively work to 
shape those preferences. Specifically, leaders make use of the whip organizations to 
influence support for policy proposals and, contrary to the conclusions drawn by 
many other scholars, may actually be most effective in doing so when there are 
“significant pockets of disagreement” within the party caucus (Evans and Grandy 
2009, 197). 
Altogether, the nature of representatives’ preferences leaves significant 
leeway for leaders to lead. According to research done by Behringer, Evans, and 
Materese (2006), it is not just on bills of minor importance that legislators are 
uncertain of their preference for support or opposition. They find that members often, 
even on bills of great importance, remain unsure of how to vote even as they come to 





Problems of Controlling Leadership Action 
Even if the rank-and-file wants to control or check their leadership, there are 
reasons to believe that it is generally unfeasible to do so. This lack of control begins 
with leadership selection. One could argue that the rank-and-file could select leaders 
that have policy priorities compatible to their own. However, there is substantial 
evidence that House leaders are selected primarily on the basis of other concerns. For 
example, there is a strong relationship between candidate-to-candidate campaign 
donations and leadership selection. Typically, members of Congress who donate the 
most to their fellow partisans obtain leadership positions within the chamber 
(Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2006; Green and Harris 2007; Deering and 
Wahlbeck 2006, Cann 2008a, 2008b). Recent evidence bears this out with 
Democratic leaders Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Steny Hoyer (D-MD), and Republican 
leaders John Boehner (R-OH) and Eric Cantor (R-VA), ranking among the most 
prolific candidate-to-candidate contributors in recent elections.8 
Historically, and still to a large degree, the selection of committee 
chairpersons has reflected seniority as well as campaign donations. The importance of 
seniority to legislative organization in Congress has been well documented (Goodwin 
1959; Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist 1969; Hinckley 1971). Although the final 
selection of committee chairpersons may reflect contribution totals, the members who 
comprise the list of possible candidates are largely determined by seniority. Without 
extensive experience in Congress and on the committee in question, a member has 
little chance of becoming the chairperson. This remains true, even though under 
                                                 
8 Analysis of candidate-to-candidate and leadership PAC-to-candidate contributions in the 2010 
election cycle by the Center for Responsive Politics listed these members of Congress as four of the 




Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) seniority was often bypassed in the selection of 
committee chairpersons (Owens 1997; Aldrich and Rohde 2000b). 
Beyond selection, since representatives have limited time and resources and 
tend to be overscheduled, they cannot routinely check the information provided to 
them by their leaders. If members are turning to the leadership for information it is 
probably because they are unable to get the information elsewhere. If they cannot 
collect the information on their own, or from any other sources, they probably do not 
have the time to rigorously check what their leaders have provided them. Even if 
members were able to check their leaders, they would then have to convince a 
requisite number of their fellow rank-and-file that the leadership is being 
misleading—a task that would likely be hard to achieve. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, rank-and-file members may not want to check their leaders much of the time. 
In letting leaders lead, they help advance party-backed legislation over the minority 
and into law.  
Removing leaders from power is also very difficult. Scholars who argue that 
congressional leaders are weak point to the ability of the rank-and-file to remove 
leaders that abuse their power. While there are examples of congressional leaders 
being removed from power in the House of Representatives, these examples are more 
often the exception rather than the rule.9 In fact, once selected to a leadership or 
committee post, it has been historically difficult for the rank-and-file to remove even 
the most irascible agents. One reason is because the longer a member spends on a 
                                                 
9 The most famous story of leader removal is that of Speaker Cannon’s overthrow in 1910. However, 
Cannon’s behavior has to be viewed as the most extreme case of power abuse in congressional history. 
The fact that the Republican caucus stripped him of his powers after such egregious power abuse 
should not be seen as an example of leader removal, but rather a demonstration of just how far a leader 




committee or in a leadership position, the more of an expert they become in their area 
of specialization. To remove such an agent from the chair or a leadership post may 
detrimentally impact how efficient the legislative process would operate. 
Furthermore, once in power, legislative agents act to consolidate power by building 
alliances though striking deals with other members over legislation, distributing 
campaign contributions, and other actions.  There is often no obvious successor to 
whom they can turn, if they remove a leader. 
As an example of how difficult it can be to displace a legislative leader 
consider the 1987 deliberation over Les Aspin’s (D-WI) chairmanship of the House 
Armed Services Committee. Apsin’s conservative stances on military and foreign 
policy issues clashed strongly with the more liberal Democratic rank-and-file after he 
became chairman of the committee in 1985. At the start of the next Congress in 1987, 
House Democrats voted to remove Aspin from his post and select a successor. 
However, nothing in the Democratic Caucus by-laws restricted Aspin from running to 
regain the seat. Along with Aspin, three other committee members were nominated 
for the post: Charles E. Bennett (D-FL), an ethics reformer and political moderate, 
Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), a leading liberal on the committee, and Marvin Leath 
(D-TX), one of the few committee Democrats even more conservative than Aspin. 
Early rounds of voting eliminated Bennett and Marvoules from consideration leaving 
the conservative Aspin to face off against the even more conservative Leath. 
Realizing Leath would be even more troublesome, liberal Democrats swung strongly 




Aspin would hold onto his chairmanship until 1993 when he was appointed by 
President Clinton to become Secretary of Defense.10 
Altogether, checking or removing leaders from power is not an easy task for 
members of Congress. Their limited resources and need for leadership makes it both 
difficult and usually undesirable to remove leaders from power. Historically, only 
extreme abuses of power have resulted in serious consequences. As Nelson (1977) 
demonstrates, serious challenges to party leaders have been relatively uncommon. 
Between 1863 and 1977, there were only six serious challenges to Democratic Party 
leadership posts and nine serious challenges to Republican leadership posts in the 
House of Representatives (Nelson 1977, p. 935). Since the 1970s, leadership 
challenges have neither been more common nor more successful. 
For most members of Congress most of the time, it is simply more rational to 
trust their leaders so their time is free for other activities like campaigning, 
constituent tending, and working on the legislation that is important to their particular 
interests. This arrangement provides leaders with significant leeway within which to 
influence policymaking in Congress. Members of Congress do not always want to 
constrain their leaders, but even when they do it may be onerously difficult to do so. 
 
Leadership Goals and Leadership Action 
Altogether, it is clear that information is a source of power in the House of 
Representatives and that majority party and committee leaders have an abundance of 
it. However, it is important to not view the information-based relationship between 
                                                 




leaders and the rank-and-file as a zero-sum game. Information control is not solely 
negative for the rank-and-file and purely positive for leaders. There are pros and cons 
associated with the relationship for both sets of actors. In some ways, information 
control helps both leaders and rank-and-file members of Congress achieve their goals. 
But in other ways it favors leadership goals over the goals of the typical member of 
Congress. 
Scholarly inquiry into congressional politics over the past several decades has 
generally depicted members of Congress as purposive actors who act in order to 
achieve their goals. Fenno (1973) highlighted three primary goals held by all 
members of Congress—reelection, the development of good public policy, and 
influence within the chamber—though he recognized members could hold other goals 
as well, such as election to positions outside the chamber (see also, Deering and 
Smith 1997). This goal-based approach has been a popular model for understanding 
congressional behavior, with studies highlighting the specific effects of the goal of 
reelection (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989; Stein and Bickers 1994; Adler and Lapinski 
1997), creating good policy (Mayhew 2000), or increasing individual influence (Dodd 
1977). 
However, it is important to consider how the intensity of particular goals can 
vary across legislators. Fenno (1973) argued that members seek committee 
assignments to help them meet their goals, but he also stressed that they adapt their 
goals to the positions they attain. Recent studies by Strahan (2007, 2011) and Green 
(2010) have emphasized how leadership action is driven by several leadership-




completely identical, to those held by the typical member of Congress. In pursuing 
goals, leaders act in ways that aid both themselves and their followers, as well as in 
ways that may benefit only themselves and sometimes at the detriment or the rank-
and-file. Specifically, leaders primarily pursue three interrelated goals: (1) remaining 
in the leadership; (2) winning and holding chamber majorities; and (3) passing 
partisan policy priorities.11 The pursuit of these goals creates a great deal of tension 
around the use of information control strategies as rank-and-file members face the 
prospect of both benefitting and being harmed by their use. 
In the existing scholarship on congressional leaders, the goal of remaining as a 
leader is by far the most prominently discussed. Much like the goal of winning 
reelection to the chamber, leaders cannot pursue any other goals unless they remain 
leaders. As discussed above, it is a focus on this goal that motivates much of the 
‘weak leadership’ perspective on congressional leaders (Cooper and Brady 1981; 
Krehbiel 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, 2000b; Sinclair 1995, 2007). Since party 
leaders and committee chairpersons are elected to their posts by their principals every 
two years, they have to satisfy those principals or endanger being cast off. While 
congressional history is not exactly replete with cases of leaders being overthrown, 
the existence of even a few cases—such as Joseph Cannon’s (R-IL) removal from 
power in 1911 and Gerald Ford’s (R-MI) defeat of Charles Halleck (R-IN) for 
                                                 
11 Stahan (2007) and Green (2010) both discuss goals as motivating factors for leadership action. 
Strahan highlights good public policy, historical reputations, and remaining as a leader as major 
leadership goals. Each of these is included within the discussion of my three categories. Green 
identifies a broader set of goals that also includes reelection to Congress, representation of the 
institution, and support of the president. Leaders’ relationships to the president is subsumed in one of 
my three goals (passing the partisan policy priorities), but I do not explicitly consider reelection to 
Congress or representation of the institution as goals. I bypass these because they are relatively minor 
compared to the other three. Green, himself, points out that leadership in fulfillment of these goals is 




Republican leader in 1965—along with the presence of enough ambitious up-and-
comers—may be enough to often keep leaders on their toes. 
As a consequence of this Sword of Damocles perpetually dangling over 
leaders’ heads, there is a need to be responsive to the desires of the rank-and-file. But 
assuming this is the only consequence of the leadership goal of remaining a leader is 
to see an incomplete picture. Leaders must indeed be responsive to their followers. 
However, the information and resource advantages leaders enjoy allow them 
considerable freedom. The rank-and-file, as discussed, are not checking every 
leadership action. Instead, leaders have significant leeway to act. 
Furthermore, leaders are held responsible not just for being responsive, but 
also for the electoral success and failure of the party caucus. Put bluntly, leaders risk 
losing their power if their party does poorly at the polls. This is the second leadership 
goal—helping their party win and hold chamber majorities. Members of Congress 
want their party to do well in every election. For the typical member, majority status 
means more money for district projects (Balla et al 2002; Levitt and Snyder 1995), 
more institutional power and resources, more campaign cash (Cox and Magar 1999; 
Rudolph 1999), and a better probability of getting their policy initiatives adopted as 
law. For leaders it means all these things and more. For one, in the minority, 
leadership powers are diminished. The majority party leadership sets the agenda and 
schedule of the chamber and of the committees, determines committee seat allocation, 
influences bill referral, and determines the rules by which legislation is considered. 
The minority leadership, by contrast, can only respond to majority leadership action 




chamber majorities aids the job security of leaders. Leaders likely run a much higher 
risk of attracting opposition if the party is struggling rather than winning electorally 
(Peabody 1976). 
The third leadership goal is passing partisan policy priorities. To some degree, 
all members of the party caucus hold this goal. As Cox and McCubbin’s (2005) posit, 
all members of a party caucus have an interest in their party passing legislation that 
creates a positive brand name for the party in the electorate. In short, if the party is 
well thought of by voters, everyone benefits. However, the typical member of 
Congress has many competing interests. For one, the party’s collective priorities and 
the preferences of a representative’s constituents may not always align (Kingdon 
1989; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978). In these instances members have to consider 
district-specific influences on their constituents’ support, as well as the party’s 
reputation. 
Legislative leaders, however, are subject to additional incentives that promote 
the advancement of partisan priorities. As such, leaders tend to prioritize and focus on 
the big-picture of the legislative process and push major tenets of the party’s 
legislative platform. One set of incentives are the previous two leadership goals. 
Needing to build a positive party image, leaders typically focus on legislation that 
achieves the primary aims of the party and helps create a record of success for the 
party to run on (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Helping to cultivate a positive party 
image in turn aids leaders in their pursuit of staying in power and placating most 




Additionally, because of their institutional power, legislative leaders become 
the primary actors on the president’s priority legislation. Because leaders have to take 
the lead on the presidential agenda, they necessarily have to consider party priorities 
more than the typical legislator. The president’s influence on congressional 
policymaking is foremost (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; 
Edwards and Wood 1999). While not able to dictate policy outcomes, presidents 
typically have substantial influence over the final substance of legislation. Perhaps 
more importantly, presidents have substantial influence over the congressional 
agenda, especially the agenda of their own party. To a large degree, legislative leaders 
have to act in response to the presidential agenda. If there is unified government, this 
means leaders often become the chief supporters of the president’s legislation. If there 
is divided government, it means becoming a leader of the opposition. This is 
especially true for party leaders. Modern Speakers of the House feel it is their duty to 
support the President when he or she is a member of their party (Peters 1997; Green 
2010). Peters (1997) also suggests that Speakers feel it is their responsibility to lead 
the opposition when the President was of the opposition party. 
Another incentive for leaders to focus on passing partisan priorities is a 
concern for their historical reputations. Strahan (2007, 30-33) highlights how 
Speakers act, in part, to build historical reputations for themselves around the policies 
passed under their tenure. A concern for such a reputation naturally lends itself to a 
concern over big-picture issues. As Strahan puts it, 
Parochial concerns of rank-and-file legislators may cause them to pay 
insufficient attention to broader, long-term interests, while advancing 
these broader interests is precisely what confers lasting “fame” on a 





In other words, historically prominent statesmen and stateswomen do not gain 
national fame by accruing pork. They do so by influencing the enactment of 
nationally significant legislation. Undoubtedly, this should concern not only 
Speakers, but committee chairpersons and other representatives of significant 
prominence, as well. Much like presidents, each of these actors are likely to be 
concerned with building positive, and national, historical records.12 
Altogether, these three leadership goals make big-picture, partisan priorities a 
more central concern to leaders than they are for the typical member of Congress. 
While most members of Congress support the passage of their party’s platform, as 
discussed above, they have goals and incentives that may push them in other 
directions, as well. Rank-and-file members may be unable to support the party’s 
priorities because of public opinion in their district. Or they may want to amend the 
details of legislation to make it more palatable, or insert provisions that help them 
with their specific priorities. If the rank-and-file have little information about a bill, or 
have limited access to its contents, they will have limited opportunities to influence 
these types of details. And while they will potentially benefit from the passage of 
party prioritized legislation, the bill may contain provisions they consider suboptimal 
and lack provisions they would have ideally included. Thus, the information-based 
                                                 
12 To some degree, developing an historical reputation could also drive leaders in the House to try to 
position themselves to obtain even higher office—the Senate or the even the Presidency. Doing so, 
however, may incentivize self-interested behavior that is contrary to party goals. If a leader has an eye 
towards a state-wide or national election, he or she may support or oppose legislation in a way that 
actually hurts the party caucus. Richard Gephart’s (D-MO) support for the 2002 Iraq War Resolution, 
against the majority of his own caucus, is a prime example. In this instance Gephardt put his own 
presidential ambitions ahead of the good of the party, forfeiting the Iraq War as a political issue for the 




arrangement between leaders and the rank-and-file, in furthering general party goals, 
can be both a boon and a bane for the typical member of Congress. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In sum, information control is a powerful tool for legislative leaders in the 
House of Representatives. It is an independent, institutionally-driven source of power 
that leaders can draw on to lead the chamber. Most theories of congressional action 
that posit leaders to be weak or inconsequential do not give enough weight to the 
inequalities in the information and resources held by leaders and the rank-and-file. 
The typical member of Congress, in terms of resources and information, is rarely on 
equal footing with his or her leaders, and generally does not wish to, and simply 
cannot, consistently check or control leadership action. A realistic understanding of 
the general disparity between leaders and followers in the House of Representatives 
makes it clear that leaders, and leadership, can be consequential. 
 Considered in tandem with the expectation of goal-driven behavior by all 
members of Congress, we can identify clear expectations about what will result from 
this relationship. Leadership goals should generally encourage leaders to use 
information control tactics to further leadership priority legislation, avoiding the 
arousal of controversies that may derail the legislation, or force the leadership to alter 
its contents in a way that makes it less preferable to them. This can be both beneficial 
and detrimental to the rank-and-file. On one hand, information control allows the 
majority party to enjoy more aggregate success than it might otherwise. But on the 




members have fewer opportunities to influence the details of a good deal of 
legislation. 
 The next chapter takes to the task of describing the tools of information 
control. What specifically do committee and party leaders do to control information 
in the House? Evidence from interviews with members of Congress and their staff 
find that leaders have a variety of tactics that they implement. 
 




Chapter 3: The Informational Tactics of Party and Committee 
Leaders 
 
“You have a 1,500 page bill—members aren’t going to read through 
it. You can certainly cherry pick what you give to them.” 
  Staffer in a party leadership office13 
 
 “When it comes down to it, it’s the details that really matter.” 
  Rank-and-file member of Congress14 
 
Information control is a comprehensive strategy, not merely a set of tactics. 
When they wish to control the flow of information in the House about legislation, 
majority party leaders and committee chairs typically attempt to manage it from all 
angles: gathering information about member preferences, restricting access to 
information, and supplying their own censored information. Each specific tactic may 
be classified in one of these three general categories, but is typically used in tandem 
with others. Often times, the information gathered informs what other strategies 
should be used; if, and to what degree, information must be withheld; and what 
information would best help sell a bill to the rank-and-file. 
 This chapter discusses many of the informational tactics used by majority 
party leaders and committee chairs. It draws on evidence from the 30 semi-structured 
interviews described in chapter 1 and in more detail in Appendix A. Despite their 
tremendous advantages in terms of staff resources and information, Leaders can find 
their legislation, and even occasionally their control over the chamber, imperiled if 
the wrong information falls into the wrong hands, or the wrong piece of information 
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becomes the focus of deliberations. Most significant legislation has many facets and 
addresses several issues. The final product is often the result of carefully fashioned 
compromises reached among a handful of important players in Congress and in the 
executive branch. Leaders want to avoid an issue being brought up or a controversy 
being raised that will derail the delicate balance they have struck. As one staffer 
described the general disposition of leaders in communicating with rank-and-file 
offices: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: Their reaction is to say ‘no’ and to not do 
anything to make it easier for people to change the bill that they’ve 
written and the compromises they have carefully made.15 
 
Another staffer described the control committee chairs kept over the process in 
similar terms: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: In a lot of cases it was because legislation 
would probably be controversial and [the committee staff] didn’t want 
to allow the other side, or in some cases both sides, the opportunity to 
offer unlimited amendments that would keep the committee in mark-
up for days on end and change the direction of some of the wishes that 
the chairman might have had on the legislation.16 
 
A committee and a leadership staffer similarly describe the committee’s view of 
changes to the chairman’s mark: 
Committee Staffer: But from our point of view, once people start 
offering amendments it starts messing with the balance in the bill.17 
 
Leadership Staffer: 90-100 percent of the time the chair of the 
committee where a bill originated is going to come to the Rules 
Committee or the party leadership and say, “Hey, what came out of my 
committee stays.” The phrase that everyone likes to use is a “carefully-
crafted balance” and you can’t change a thing or else it will all come 
crashing down.18 
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In all likelihood, most bills will include some provisions and specifics that are 
unpopular to some members of Congress, interest groups, and constituencies. The 
arousal of controversy can have disastrous effects. A major strategy of the minority 
party, and of a bill’s opponents in general, is to raise an issue that will drive a wedge 
into the majority’s vote coalition. In bringing to light an unpopular provision, or 
framing the bill in an unpopular way, opponents can bring it down, alter it in a way 
that is undesirable to the majority leadership or committee chairs, or create an 
effective issue to use in the next election campaign.  
An example of this is the defeat of the bi-partisan assault on the Clean Air Act 
led by Representative John Dingell (D-MI) and President Ronald Reagan in the early 
1980s. Dingell, then chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, with 
support of the Reagan administration intended to ram through a series of amendments 
to the Clean Air Act of 1970 that would reduce emission standards. The bill, with 
broad support from American industry, important leaders in both parties, and a 
powerful Democratic chairman, looked to be a sure bet for passage. However, a 
coalition of members led by Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) was able to stir 
enough controversy to eventually kill the bill in committee. Waxman, representing 
smog-filled Los Angeles, had a strong vested interest in blocking the legislation and 
was willing to allocate significant time and resources to its defeat. As chairman of the 
Environment Subcommittee, Waxman’s staff had strong ties with the Environmental 
Protection Agency. A key moment came when his staff obtained a leak of Reagan’s 
draft recommendations for the bill (Waxman and Green 2009, 80). Armed with this 




unpopular provisions, and successfully offer amendments in committee that resulted 
in Dingell removing the bill from the agenda. 
As will be shown, by influencing what potential opponents know and for how 
long they know it, legislative leaders reduce the quality of opposition tactics because 
opposition leaders are not armed with the information they need to peel away votes, 
and have neither the time nor the resources to obtain this information. These tactics, 
however, have the consequence of not only limiting the information possessed by 
clear opponents of a bill, but of all rank-and-file members of Congress as well. This 
often impedes the ability of even majority party members to offer amendments, fully 
vet the contents of a bill, or become more deeply involved in the policymaking 
process. But for party leaders and committee this means passing their carefully 
crafted bills without inspiring controversy and with as few changes to the bill as 
possible. While sometimes it is not possible to control the flow of information about a 
bill inside and outside of Congress, when it is possible it can be an effective 
leadership strategy and empower leaders to shape and pass the legislation they prefer. 
 
Gathering Information 
Legislative leaders go to great lengths to gather information about rank-and-
file member preferences and their potential valuations of legislation. Uncertainty is a 
failure for party leaders and committee chairs. As one committee staffer described 
their response to unanticipated actions and reactions by rank-and-file members, “If 
we are surprised we’re not doing our job.”19 Leaders want to know how their rank-
and-file are likely to react to legislative provisions so that they can either adjust them 
                                                 




appropriately, or sometimes, keep members in the dark about certain provisions as 
much as possible and focus on aspects of a bill that are more palatable. 
 Committee chairs and party leaders both use similar tactics to gather 
information and make use of their staff and resource advantages in doing so. 
Committee information gathering tends to occur primarily during the early stages of 
the legislative process, while the majority party leadership gathers intelligence 
throughout the process. 
 
Tactics of Committee Chairs 
Committee information gathering often begins even before the drafting of the 
chair’s mark at the subcommittee level. Under the guidance of the full committee 
chair or the subcommittee chair, committee staff work to find out what rank-and-file 
committee members may think about a bill or an issue, and subsequently what leeway 
they may have in writing the bill and who on the committee will be so intensely 
concerned that they will have to be brought into the process and involved more 
intimately in the drafting. This information gathering is done in several ways—
through general outreach, targeted outreach, formal meetings, and discussions with 
minority ranking members and minority committee staff. 
 
 General Outreach 
Committee staffers reach out generally to subcommittee and committee 
members early in, or before, the drafting process to gather information and report 




members about provisions that might be included in a bill. They also want to find out 
if there are specific policy areas planned to be addressed in a bill that some committee 
members may take a special interest in or that may stir-up controversy later on in the 
legislative process. At this point, committee staffers also expect rank-and-file 
members of the committee to come to them directly if they have any special interests 
in a bill that is being drafted, or if they have distinct concerns they would like 
considered. As few staffers described the committee’s perspective on this stage in the 
process: 
Committee Staffer: We solicit. We ask at the subcommittee level, we 
say, “You know, if you’ve got any amendments you better tell us now. 
Let’s talk about it because we’ve done everything we could to 
accommodate you.”20 
 
Committee Staffer: The subcommittee staff is in pretty regular contact 
with the other subcommittee members. … They have certain programs 
they want to plus-up. They obviously have their earmarks that they 
want to fend for. So they will continue to be in touch with the 
subcommittee staff. It’s not a constant thing because other members of 
the subcommittee may have particular parochial, or peripheral, issues 
they are concerned about, particular issues that their boss takes a 
particular interest in, but it’s not going to cover the whole bill.21 
 
Committee members do themselves few favors by trying to surprise their chair 
and the staff. The committee wants to know up-front if there are issues a member is 
going to want to be involved in or if there are things they have strong opinions about. 
Rank-and-file members of the committee are encouraged at this stage to send in 
letters requesting particular policy considerations, or in the case of the Appropriations 
Committee, make specific requests for the funding of projects.22 
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The committee staffers interviewed, however, also made it clear that for rank-
and-file members it is not as simple as ‘ask and you shall receive’. Committee staff 
solicit input, requests, and ideas from their rank-and-file committee members, but 
there is no guarantee that these requests will be included in the bill as drafted or 
addressed in any way. Most committee members are left in the dark about whether 
their requests will have any impact on the final bill: 
Committee Staffer: All [rank-and-file] input, though, is on the front 
end, and not as we are drafting. There is no back and forth—you 
know, we’re thinking about doing this—except at the discussion of the 
staff and the chairman.23 
 
This process of soliciting requests, for committee staffers, is not just about pleasing 
their rank-and-file members and trying to including their wishes in the draft of the 
bill. It is perhaps to a larger degree about knowing what to expect in response to 
certain legislative language, knowing what issues are important to the committee 
membership, and knowing what policy proposals might be popular or unpopular as 
included in the bill. 
 
 Targeted Outreach 
Beyond this general outreach, committee staffers will reach out to specific 
rank-and-file committee members if they know from past experience that particular 
members will be intensely concerned about an issue being addressed in the draft of a 
bill: 
Committee Staffer: If there is something we know [a rank-and-file 
member] cares about and we want to make sure we get it right for 
them, then we may have some back and forth with them on it.24 
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Committee Staffer: It’s usually one discrete program and they’ll let you 
know why it’s important to their boss, or in the member’s case, they’ll 
let you know why it’s important to their district and they hope you can 
do something about it and you may get some follow up and back and 
forth.25 
 
Furthermore, rank-and-file members can indicate that a particular issue is going to be 
very important to them, even if it hasn’t been in the past, through the way they 
approach the committee staff: 
Committee Staffer: The offices who are really serious about things and 
know what they’re doing will write a letter and then follow up at the 
staff level and the member level sometimes and say, “This is really 
important. Is there some way we can work this out?” and then that gets 
our attention and we will focus our limited time and resources on 
trying to deal with those issues.26 
 
Unlike with the interaction generated from general outreach, this type of interaction is 
driven by the intensity of preferences held by the rank-and-file committee members 
and is likely to result in a more substantive give and take between the staffer, or the 
member, and the committee. As this committee staffer indicated, it is also more likely 
to result in the member’s interest being reflected in the final draft of the bill. When 
enough interest is shown, staffers, and the committee chair, are going to do their best 
to be accommodating because they don’t want to risk the issue becoming a problem 
for the bill later in the legislative process. 
But, as one key staffer to a committee chairman indicated, on any bill the 
number of committee members becoming this involved are few: 
Committee Staffer: Most of the members of the subcommittee don’t 
have daily interaction; it’s very occasional interaction.27 
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The limited resources typical members of Congress have would not allow them all to 
be deeply involved at all times. They have to pick and choose their battles, and focus 
on the issues most important to them and their districts (Hall 1996). Furthermore, as 
another staffer indicated, these rank-and-file committee members still lack the 
ultimate authority of the committee chair. If the request runs counter to the overall 
direction of the bill and the compromises crafted, or if the request conflicts with the 
wishes of the committee chair, the request is unlikely to make itself into the bill 
language. Succinctly put: 
Committee Staffer: But it’s not a matter of [the rank-and-file] 
approving what we do. It’s a matter of trying to accommodate them.28 
 
 
 Formal Meetings 
In addition to the outreach described above, committee staffers also hold 
occasional formal meetings with the staff of rank-and-file members as another form 
of intelligence gathering. These meetings, as described in the interviews, take the 
form of a general forum in which the committee staff make a few general statements 
and announcements and then open it up to questions. More than anything, these serve 
as another forum for committee leaders to gauge the opinions of their rank-and-file 
members. 
Usually, the committee or subcommittee chair holds a similar type of meeting 
with majority members of the committee at some point during the process as a form 
of information gathering exercise as well: 
Committee Staffer: Before subcommittee [mark-up], [the chair] has 
generally met with [majority] members of the subcommittee to make 
                                                 




sure they are aware what the priorities he set in the bill are; what the 
potentially contentious issues are; what we have heard from the 
minority and the ways we have tried to incorporate the views of the 
minority; and if there are some particularly contentious issues, to prep 
them to hopefully stand with him when it comes to amendment votes 
and things like that.29 
 
 Discussion with the Minority 
Committee chairs and staff also keep in regular contact with the minority 
ranking members and the minority committee staff throughout the process. They do 
so largely through bouncing ideas off of the minority staff to get an idea of what the 
response might be if such a provision were included in the bill: 
Committee Staffer: The majority writes the bill and we will seek 
[minority] input as we move along and they will provide their input 
and we will try to accommodate them as best we can.30 
  
Committee Staffer: It’s, “let me know what your ideas are on this 
particular issue; what would you suggest for this account; or, is there 
something that is a priority for the minority on this particular 
agency?”31 
 
In addition, on some committees, and depending on how much partisan rancor is 
surrounding the topic of a bill, the chair and the minority ranking member will 
actually sit down and discuss the minority’s priorities. The Appropriations Committee 
is one place where this happens quite frequently: 
Committee Staffer: The ranking member will present his priorities for 
the bill; will present a laundry list of items he’d like to see; accounts 
that he’d like to see plussed-up or brought down; suggestions for 
report language; suggestions for other items, earmarks included; and 
they’ll have a fairly long meeting early in the drafting process where 
they’ll hash these out. After that, I think, the subcommittee staff will 
have regular contact with the minority staff.32 
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 But this type of interaction should not be read to imply that the minority’s 
input is automatically incorporated in the bill text. Instead these interactions are 
meant to help the chair and the majority staff get an idea of what the minority is 
concerned about, what minority members are thinking, and what issues may cause a 
partisan fight in mark-up or on the floor. Even on the Appropriations Committee, 
where partisanship has been noted to be muted in comparison to other committees, 
minority voices still carry very little weight compared to the will of the majority: 
Committee Staffer: Now they’re not helping to draft the bill, obviously, 
it’s being done by the majority staff, but there is some back and forth 
and they’ll communicate on certain issues they’re hearing from their 
side and they want to bounce some ideas of each other on a limited 
basis. But it’s certainly a majority product.33 
 
This same staffer also emphasized that most of the conversations with the minority 
are one-way. Majority staff may ask the minority staff how they might react if a 
certain provision were included in the bill, but they do not tell them which language is 
going to be in the final product, what majority priorities are, or what the majority’s 
final plans will be. Those things are kept close to the vest: 
Committee Staffer: It’s not extremely open. You don’t want to tip 
off…Because there are negotiations to be worked out; because there 
might be things you don’t want out in the public domain—there’s a 
certain level of trust with the minority; you don’t want them to work 
up a bunch of opposition to something you’re trying to do before the 
bill is moving; for a variety of reasons you’re not going to be 
completely forthcoming about what you’re going to do with every item 
in the bill. 
… 
Certainly, input is solicited every step of the way, but it’s not an 
exchange of information.34 
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An interview with a minority committee staffer on the same committee 
confirmed this relationship: 
Committee Staffer: There’s a lot of communication and sharing of 
information at [the pre-drafting] stage in the process. When they are 
actually writing the bill there is a little bit less. So we have our chance 
to provide our input and language suggestions and ideas and make 
clear our positions to the majority sort of before they enter that process 
of marking up.35 
 
Minority committee staffers, under the direction of the minority ranking member, are 
eager to provide their input to the majority staff, but they realize their opinions are 
merely suggestive and that the information they are providing helps the majority write 
a stronger product. Giving the example of the removal of terrorist suspects from the 
Guantanamo Bay prison facility, this staffer also indicated that the majority staff, on 
items of particular sensitivity, will be even less forthcoming than usual with what 
they share with the minority: 
Committee Staffer: A lot of times, in that case, they would probably be 
a lot less willing to include me in on the conversation. A good example 
of that would be the policies and programs related to Guantanamo 
prisoners and detainees. That’s been a huge issue on our bill and—I’m 
not sure the administration is talking to anybody—but to the extent 
that they are they are talking to the majority and I’m not part of that 
planning process because they feel that whatever they want to propose, 
probably rightly, that our side is going to provide opposition to.36 
 
Ultimately, in communicating the minority’s priorities on the bill, the minority staff 
hope that they can gain some concessions out of the majority in terms of language. 
However in the end, these discussions are more informative for the majority staff and 
the chair; helping them understand what issues may prove problematic later in the 
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legislative process and helping them identify if there are any easy ways they can 
avoid costly political fights. 
Altogether, majority committee staff go to great length to gather as much 
information as possible about what their rank-and-file members are thinking about, 
care about, and want to see in the bill; as well as what the minority may care deeply 
about seeing (or not seeing) in the final product. The intelligence gathered can help 
the committee plan its legislative strategy as the process progresses. But throughout 
the process, the majority party leadership is also active in collecting information that 
proves useful for the same purposes. 
 
Tactics of Majority Party Leaders 
Majority party leaders spend just as much time gathering information on 
where the rank-and-file stand, but on a much larger scale. Typically, it involves 
taking the temperature of the entire majority caucus to make sure enough members 
will be on board for passage, or a subset of the caucus that may be crucial to passing 
some particular legislation. Most information gathering is conducted by the party’s 
whip apparatus, but the rest of the party leadership can also get into the act when 
necessary. 
 
The Whip Organization 
The whip organization is the eyes and ears of the majority party leadership, 
and it is relied on heavily for gathering intelligence. The whip’s office has a dedicated 




and down to regional whips that talk to members under their specific jurisdictions and 
find out if they have any concerns with an upcoming bill or issue. 
Whip officers and staffers take several routine steps to survey their caucus. 
The most routine is called the “whip check” which, these days, is done as an e-mail 
from the whip’s office to every member of the party caucus. These e-mails typically 
contain a list of anywhere from one to several bills and amendments, sometimes with 
a brief summary, the party’s recommendation for how caucus members should vote if 
the leadership is taking a position, and a statement from the whip requesting that any 
members who intend to vote against the party leadership’s recommendations to 
respond to the e-mail and let it be known. These whip checks go out to rank-and-file 
members of the caucus anywhere from 3-4 days ahead of floor action to as late as a 
few hours before the vote.37 
However, whip checks are not the only way information is gathered. In fact, 
the information gathering activities of the whip organization often begin very early in 
the legislative process and continue through floor action: 
Leadership Staffer: We’ll start well ahead in advance of any bill text 
and [the content] gets sharper as the bill text develops.38 
 
Leadership Staffer: [Information gathering] becomes key in the 
majority because you are trying to govern. You’re trying to get 218 
votes to govern on a daily basis on the floor. And from that perspective 
you need to constantly be getting intelligence from your members. On 
where they are; on where other members are; on where the minority 
is.39 
 
In the majority you whip them right up to and possibly during the 
votes.40 
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Generally, the earlier the whip organization can begin collecting information the 
better as it gives the leadership an idea of what issues they are going to have to tread 
lightly on, use additional information control tactics on, or gather more intelligence 
on. 
The process of gathering intelligence uses a combination of methods 
comprised of formal means, like whip checks and meetings with sub-caucuses like 
the Blue Dogs and the Congressional Black Caucus, and informal means, such as 
second-hand information about what a certain caucus or rank-and-file member might 
be planning to do, or what the minority party may have up their sleeves.41 Whip 
officers and staffers also employ information gained from past experience to simplify 
the process. On bills addressing issues that have been legislated on in a similar 
manner before, whips and whip staffers know which members and sub-caucuses they 
need to communicate with, who might be problematic to the passing of the 
legislation, and what issues are going to possibly cause snags if they are not 
addressed properly in the bill or through the majority leadership’s legislative strategy. 
As whip staffers explained: 
Leadership Staffer: After a while…I could tell you the political map 
just through the members I had interacted with. Even if I never set foot 
in their districts I knew exactly what it took to motivate them to vote 
for things and what would dis-motivate them to vote for things. … So, 
you kind of know almost ahead of time because of your familiarity 
with the issue areas where pockets of members are going to be on 
that.42 
 
Leadership Staffer: You can narrow it down pretty quickly who your 
problem members are going to be when you’re going to whip a bill.43 
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Giving the example of energy legislation, one of these staffers explained how he 
classified members of the party caucus in groups based on their interests and that he 
could approach information gathering through these informal sets of members: 
Leadership Staffer: Any bill that deals with energy, I automatically 
know I have my solar people I have to deal with and make sure they 
are okay, I know immediately I’m going to have to deal with my oil-
patch members, particularly in the south. So immediately I have to go 
to them to find out what exactly they do or don’t like about this energy 
bill. … Then you have your coal members, who have their own patch 
of issues, and then, of course, you have what I like to call your rate-
payer coalition.44 
 
Based on past experience with energy legislation, the whip office knew who to talk 
to, what to talk about, and even already had an idea of what these groups of members 
might be concerned with within such a bill. 
The whip organizations will also adjust their information gathering strategies 
based on the type of bill and the issue being considered. Specifically, on issues that 
are important to the party leadership, the whip organization will take steps to hear out 
what rank-and-file members are thinking very early, before any other steps are taken 
in the legislative process: 
Leadership Staffer: If we know way ahead of time that this big issue is 
coming down, we will start doing what you could call focus groups. 
Basically you get groups of members together and sometimes it can be 
regionally oriented, sometimes it can be because they are already 
organized as a caucus, and kind of hear them out.45 
 
On major legislation whip organizations typically allocate far more time and 
resources into gathering intelligence for the leadership. Along with focus groups, 
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whips go directly to members to find out what they are thinking on specific issues and 
specific legislation. 
Leadership Staffer: You’re spending more time on the floor actually 
having to go member to member and asking the way they feel about X 
bill or Y bill and those kind of things and seeing where you are at the 
end of the day if you can bring the bill up or not. 
… 
I spend a good amount of time coming in and saying, “congressman so 
and so,” if it’s to the congressman or congresswoman directly or it’s to 
the staff who are responsible for educating that member directly on the 
issue, “I understand your problem with it,” or “tell me what the 
problem is.”46 
 
Of course lawmaking is a fluid and dynamic process and requires the whip 
organization to constantly react to changes in the political environment and changes 
to legislation and continue to collect information and adapt their strategies. As deals 
are struck among major players, or as the leadership adjusts the timeline for 
consideration of the bill,  
Leadership Staffer: A lot of times things get compressed. The whip 
office moves at the speed of agreement or disagreement, and that 
happens pretty radically. … Sometimes because of the political 
pressure that we might be feeling because a recess is coming up and 
members want to have something to go home and talk about, that can 
be condensed to a [one] day whip.47 
 
And sometimes, despite the best laid plans, some issues and some bills are simply 
difficult to get a read on. Some legislation is so broad, and sometimes the politics is 
so unpredictable that the whip office, and as a result the party leadership, just might 
not be sure what their caucus is thinking, or only have an educated guess about 
certain members. As one staffer put it, bluntly, 
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Leadership Staffer: There’s going to be some issues you come across 
that are going to be so nuanced that you are not going to know.48 
 
Other times, there are issues that are changed by the political context and force the 
whip organization to throw out what they think they know about an issue’s dynamics 
within their caucus:  
Leadership Staffer: Sometimes the progression of an issue changes the 
landscape dramatically. Issues like that would be more like your social 
issues that tend to be really tough. For instance, issues around ‘Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell’, or gay marriage, and that kind of stuff. I could have 
told you what the political landscape was two cycles ago and that’s 
radically different from the cycles now.49 
 
Leadership Staffer: Once and a while a piece of legislation would 
come up that we wouldn’t think would really cause that much trouble 
and then something obscure would come up that we weren’t aware of 
that would affect a member’s district and then the flow would be from 
the member to the whip’s office. That way we would learn and would 
know of that next time something would come around that was trade 
related, or that was water related. We knew that in that district it would 
really affect that member no matter who sat in that seat.50 
 
But the whip organizations is constantly trying to keep a read on things, looking for 
activity early in the legislative process that may signal trouble down the road. 
Contentiousness at the committee-level, across parties or within the party caucus, on a 
particular issue may signal a bigger fight on the floor; so might public statements by 
members of Congress, or the attempts of an outside group to get involved on part of a 
bill. Whips and their staffers keep an eye on these developments and adjust their 
intelligence gathering accordingly. 
Generally speaking, the whip organization, as the dedicated eyes and ears of 
the majority party leadership is constantly gathering information on the opinions and 
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preferences of the members of their party caucus and reporting back to the leadership 
so the proper legislation and the proper legislative strategies can be developed. 
 
Information Gathering by Other Leadership Offices 
Even though they rely heavily on their whip apparatus, other leaders, 
including the Speaker and the Majority leader and their staffs, also spend time 
gathering intelligence about their rank-and-file’s opinions, preferences, and potential 
actions. They do this largely through direct contact with members and sub-caucuses, 
and through both formal, expected lines of communication, and informal discussion. 
 The leadership spends a good amount of time calling and talking with key 
members or key groups in their caucus. Much like the whip organization, the rest of 
the leadership will follow a very similar tact. They will bounce ideas around and get a 
feel for what the response to different things might be. This commonly happens with 
sub-caucuses within the majority conference. In these discussions there can be a bit of 
a back and forth, but the goal for the leadership is just to find out how a group of 
members might react. A staffer with one such caucus provided an example of this 
kind of interaction: 
Caucus Staffer: We pitched to them an idea of what the next 
continuing resolution should look like, and they called said, ‘you 
know, we got some feedback on that. We have a variation on it, what 
do you think?’ And so we we’re talking it through and it sounded 
pretty good, actually.51 
 
If the leadership can get an idea of how a subset of their membership is likely to react, 
they can feel more confident moving forward with a bill. This same staffer summed 
up the relationship they have with the leadership in this regard: 
                                                 




Caucus Staffer: [Our caucus is] kind of like a wild horse. You know, 
approach slowly, soft voices, don’t SPRING! WOW! You know if 
they spring something on [us] we tend to react negatively.52 
 
But as with before, this is not about the leadership seeking tacit approval for 
their plans and policy priorities. As with the committees and the whip organizations, 
it is about temperature taking. Making sure what they are putting forth sounds good in 
principle and that the bill they will eventually bring to the House floor is not likely to 
easily stir controversy, at the very least, within their own caucus. 
 
Discussion 
The above demonstrates how committee and majority party leadership offices 
commit significant resources toward gathering information on the opinions and 
potential reactions of rank-and-file members to legislation being written and 
considered. Committee chairs and staffers solicit their members generally, and 
sometimes specifically, to find out what they have a deep interest in, what provisions 
they might have strong objections to, and what additional policies they might want 
included in the committee draft of a bill. Additionally, they hold formal meetings and 
briefings with rank-and-file members of the committee and their staff, and talk 
regularly with the ranking member and minority committee staff, to ascertain what 
pitfalls may arise during bill mark-up, or even later during floor consideration. Party 
leaders similarly use their whip organization to more broadly measure their caucus’ 
feelings about a bill or issue and to find out trouble spots that may emerge later. 
 In completing the first stage of information control—gathering information—
party and committee leaders can decide how to proceed. Sometimes the consequence 
                                                 




of this information gathering enterprise is a changed bill. This is what a former whip 
office staffer described as a “policy fix”. He gave an example from a stimulus bill 
considered during his tenure: 
Leadership Staffer: The bill was to give rebate checks to tax payers 
and there was a huge concern among a group of members in my 
caucus about rebate checks going to people who are undocumented. … 
There the policy solution was to put in a statement, what we call a 
“rule of construction”, in the bill that basically said that no checks 
shall go to undocumented people, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah; and 
penalties will be enforced if any undocumented people, or what not, 
were to receive checks unlawfully or whatever, blah, blah, blah, 
blah.53 
 
Other times the majority party leadership does not have a formulated plan for the bill, 
and instead whips their caucus membership for an idea of how the bill should be 
written in order for it to pass. 
Leadership Staffer: We normally call that process “whipping to write”. 
Meaning that you whip your members on certain issues, find out where 
the collective masses are, and then write that policy. That’s not always 
the best policy, but it’s the policy that passes.54 
 
In instances like these the leadership decides that the simplest and most effective 
solution to a potential problem with the bill is to change or write the bill to address 
the problem. Sometimes the best course of action for a committee or for the majority 
party leadership to acquiesce to the preferences of a subset of their rank-and-file, or 
the opposition to a bill, in order to guarantee a winning vote coalition in committee 
and on the floor. This is what now infamously occurred with the Bart Stupak (D-MI) 
amendment regarding abortion funding to the Health Care bill forwarded by President 
Obama and the House Democrats during the 111th Congress. The majority leadership 
could not keep the abortion issue from arising during the consideration of that bill, 
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and so acquiesced to allow an amendment, sponsored by a member of their own 
caucus, to be considered and passed on the floor of the House restricting funding to 
abortion services. 
 However, not all potential pitfalls are addressed in this way. Others are solved 
through the use of information control tactics that restrict access to the information 
available to rank-and-file members, the minority party, and other outside groups, and 
vigorously sell the bill through controlled messaging on the part of committee 
staffers, chairs, and the majority party leadership. In taking this kind of an approach, 
the provocation of potential problems is avoided altogether, and leaders are able to 
pass bills as they have crafted them with a few major players in the policy sphere. 
 
Restricting Information 
Information control hinges on the ability of party and committee leaders to 
limit the information to which members and staffers, as well as outside advocacy 
groups, have access. When legislative leaders cannot control what information is in 
the hands of other players in the policy process, the information they provide to their 
rank-and-file is just another voice among the cacophony of voices expressing 
opinions and analyses on legislation. Leaders do not attempt to tightly control 
information on all legislation that is before the chamber. Some legislation is routine 
and other legislation requires more delicate deliberations. But both party leaders and 
committee chairs choose to restrict information often, and when they do they find 





Tactics of Committee Chairs 
Committee chairs and their staffs have information restriction tactics that they 
carry through the committee stages of bill consideration and beyond. Building on the 
intelligence gained through their information gathering tactics, they know if there are 
aspects of a bill that may be troublesome or even kill the bill if the debate focuses on 
them. When committee leaders choose to restrict information they do so by 
controlling the drafting process, and controlling the release of information about the 
chairman’s mark. 
 
Controlling the Drafting Process 
Committee chairs and staff keep tight control over the drafting of the 
chairman’s mark. All bills that either originate in the committee or are referred to it 
after introduction by another member can be marked up by committee staff under the 
guidance of the chair. The resulting product is known colloquially as the ‘chairman’s 
mark.’ There are few rules limiting the extent to which the chairman can alter a bill 
through the mark, but it would be rare for a chairman to change the core concept of 
the bill. Nevertheless, the committee may change language to put proposed policies 
more in-line with party interests or the interests of the chair. 
Generally, very few individuals are brought into conversations that direct the 
drafting of the mark. With bills that originate with the committee (as opposed to bill 
introduced by a rank-and-file member and referred to the committee), discussions 
over draft contents involve primarily the committee staff, key personal aides to the 




Committee Staffer: The way it usually works is staff will develop 
recommendations for both policy and funding and then we will sit 
down with whoever the chairman is for a long time—this takes a 
while, it’s over the course of several weeks, each staff member will 
come in and talk about their part—and go over all the major policy 
issues, all the funding levels, and get sign offs from him or changes if 
he wants something changed. So, it’s a matter of us drafting things and 
coming up with recommendations based on our analysis of the budget 
and bringing those recommendations to him for approval or change.55 
 
A personal aide to an Appropriations subcommittee chair described it very similarly: 
Committee Staffer: Prior to drafting we spend two hours for every 
component agency. It could be, in some cases, more than two hours 
where subcommittee staff and I will be with him going through line by 
line what we call out in terms of dollar amounts in the bill. All the 
grant programs, administrations, any other issues, earmarks of course. 
So we’ll go through that and he’ll sign off on amounts that we call out 
in the bill and the report. And we go through that through all of the 
portions of the bill. So that is prior to putting the legislative language 
together. Obviously [the committee staff] come here with 
recommendations. So they’ll have a packet of recommendations for 
the amounts for each account and we’ll go through all of those. And 
sometimes they’ll be minor tweaks here or there. … Then he’ll 
eventually see all the report language before the end of the process.56 
 
If the bill originates with another member of the committee, however, that 
representative will also play a major role in these draft discussions. The intelligence 
gathering conducted by committee staff will indicate if there are other intensely 
interested rank-and-file members that should be brought into the intimate fold, as 
well. The more people that are brought into the discussions the harder it is to control 
information about what is being discussed and what is being drafted. Unlike bills 
originating with the committee, bills proposed by rank-and-file members that 
originate in a personal office before being sent to the committee automatically 
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represent a loss of control over information from the start. According to a staffer of 
one rank-and-file member of Congress: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: Most bills that originate in the Science 
Committee come from members of that committee. And if that’s the 
case, I usually know what’s going on with the bill a fair amount in 
advance. And as the bill is being written I will talk to [my] 
congressman. And if there are points that he’d like to make in the bill I 
will work with the committee staff and other offices to get them in 
there before it becomes public in a mark-up form. So usually by the 
time it comes up at a mark-up we’ve talked about it, he knows about 
it.57 
 
From the perspective of the chairman and the staff, the more people involved in the 
drafting process the tougher it will be to control. With more principals it is harder to 
control the secretive nature of the drafting. For committees, the fewer principals 
involved in drafting a bill, the easier to is to keep information under wraps. In these 
instances, compromises can be more easily drawn and information can more easily be 
held close to the vest when necessary. 
 Ultimately, the interviews provide ample evidence that the chairman’s mark is 
closely held, that information about it is withheld from most committee members 
until shortly before the mark-up, and that even when the text become available, 
access to it is typically limited. For bills that originate within committee office doors, 
this information management is easiest. The chair and the staff can control who is 
talked to about the bill and who is brought into the negotiations over draft contents. 
For bills that originate with a rank-and-file member, information management can be 
more difficult depending on the cooperation of that representative. But the more 
control the committee can keep over the drafting process, the easier it will be to 
control what information is released after the draft is completed. 
                                                 





 Controlled Release of Draft Contents 
Eventually, the contents of the mark have to be released, but even when this 
moment arrives, most committee chairs and staff will jealously guard copies of the 
bill. In fact, committee staff go to great lengths to exercise control over the release of 
bill contents, if and when they are actually made fully available. From the perspective 
of the chair and the staff, such action is a necessity. The unrestricted release of a bill’s 
contents could land it in the hands of the wrong individuals or outside groups. If the 
opponents of a bill were able to analyze draft language early in the legislative 
process, they could begin developing a sophisticated and effective legislative and 
communications strategy to build opposition to the bill, or build support for making 
drastic changes to its content. Such a result is disastrous for a committee leadership 
that is trying to craft a bill that meets its legislative goals. As one committee staffer 
explained it, “It’s purely a matter of, once you let somebody walk out of here with 
that paper, it’s out there.”58 Once someone has that text, committee control over the 
bill is over. 
 From the perspective of rank-and-file committee members, however, the tight 
control committees place over bill drafts can be a source of frustration. Members are 
concerned, especially when in the majority, of seeing that bills going to mark-up 
address issues in a way that meets their interests and the interests of their constituents. 
At the very least, members want to avoid taking blame down the line for supporting a 
bill containing a provision unpopular with their constituents (Arnold 1990). Limited 
time and access to draft contents can make it difficult for rank-and-file members to 
                                                 




adequately vet the legislation. Furthermore, if a member has an interest in offering an 
amendment to a bill, limited time and access can make doing so tricky. 
Each committee has specific rules and norms governing the release of 
information about items to be considered in committee meetings. Table 3.1 presents 
these formal rules of each committee during the 109th and 110th congresses. 
Specifically, it shows how long before mark-ups each committee requires bill drafts 
to be made available to committee members, and how long before mark-up sessions 
rank-and-file members are required to submit proposed amendments.59 There is 
substantial variation in these formal requirements. Regarding the release of draft 
contents, some committees have no requirements at all. Some committees, such as the 
Committee on Agriculture, are only willing to go as far as to require the chair to 
announce the agenda of upcoming meetings as far in advance as is reasonably 
possible, and provide no requirements for the availability of bill text. Rule language 
like this gives committee chairs and their staff great leeway over when and how they 
release information about draft contents, and just exactly what information is 
released.  
 Other committees have formal requirements listed in their rules, but many of 
these rules are qualified. In the 110th Congress for example, the Committee on 
Natural Resources required information on bill contents to be made available to 
committee members 48 hours in advance of any mark-up sessions; however, the rules 
state that only a “summary of the major provisions” need be made available. The  
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Bill Text Must be 
Made Available 
 
Time Before Markup 
Amendments Must be Submitted 
110th 109th   110th 109th 
      
Standing Committees      
Agriculture -none- -none-  24 hrs. 24 hrs. 
Appropriations 3 days 3 days  -none- -none- 
Armed Services -none- 3 days  -none- -none- 
Budget 6 hrs. 4 hrs.8  -none- -none- 
Education and Labor 48 hrs. 48 hrs.  "timely manner" "timely manner" 
Energy and Commerce -none- 36 hrs.  -none- -none- 
Financial Services 2 days 2 days8  -none- -none- 
Foreign Affairs 24 hrs.1 24 hrs.1  -none- -none- 
Homeland Security 24 hrs.2 -none-  -none- -none- 
House Administration -none- -none-  "when requested" "when requested" 
Judiciary -none- -none-  -none- -none- 
Natural Resources 48 hrs.3 48 hrs.  -none- -none- 
Oversight and Gov. Reform 3 days 3 days  -none- -none- 
Rules -- --  -- -- 
Science, Space, and 
Technology 48 hrs.
4 48 hrs.4  24 hrs.
4 24 hrs.4 
Small Business -none- -none-  -none- "when requested" 




6 48 hrs.6  -none- -none- 
Veterans' Affairs -none- -none-  -none- -none- 
Ways and Means 2 days 2 days  -none- -none- 
      
Select Committees      
Intelligence -none-7 -none-7  "timely manner" "timely manner" 
Energy Independence and 
Global Warming -none- --  -none- -- 
            
Sources: Published committee rules for each committee in each congress. 
1 Rule qualifies this requirement with "whenever possible". 
2 Requirement can be waived by the Chair with advance notice to the Ranking Minority Member. 
3 Rule refers specifically to making a "summary of the major provisions" of a bill available. 
4 Rule qualifies this requirement with "to the maximum extent practicable". 
5 Standards of Official Conduct has unique procedures as a result of its unique jurisdiction. 
6 Can be unilaterally waived by the chair. 
7 The Select Committee on Intelligence has lengthy and varying rules regarding the availability of 
sensitive materials. 




Committee on Science, Space, and Technology likewise had a 48-hour requirement 
during both the 109th and 110th congresses, but qualified these requirements with the 
addition of, “to the maximum extent practicable.” Other committees like the 
Committee on Homeland Security during the 110th Congress, allowed chairs to 
unilaterally waive these requirements. 
 Only a few committees had completely unqualified requirements listed among 
their official rules; however, all committees have a propensity to bend or ignore these 
statutes when necessary, and exercise broad interpretations of the meaning of 
‘availability of contents’. It seems that a rather typical process for the release of bill 
contents is to make a copy of the bill report, and sometimes the full bill text, available 
for viewing by rank-and-file staffers for a limited number of hours, usually the day 
before the mark-up is scheduled. Copies of the report, bill, or both, are held for 
viewing in the subcommittee office, but are not to be removed. Personal staff can 
come in and look at them and take notes, but that is as far as it goes: 
Committee Staffer: His subcommittee always makes everything 
available to staff before mark-up. They can’t take it out of the room, 
but they’ll say, ok, starting the morning of the mark-up, or sometimes 
the day before, at that time you’ll have access. Every office has their 
own copy of the bill and a copy of the report and it’s marked. It’s not 
supposed to leave the room. You can take whatever notes you want 
and go.60 
 
Committee Staffer: Probably a day before the subcommittee mark-up 
we will have staff in here and give them probably not the actual bill 
and report, but we will make it available for them to look at. … So, we 
will make it available for them to check things they are interested in 
and have a chance for them to ask questions of staff about what’s in 
there.61 
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Committee Staffer: We usually make the bill and reports available for 
associate staff to view and members if they’d like to, the day before 
the subcommittee mark-up. But only in the subcommittee offices, they 
can’t take it back with them. So they’ll be given a number of business 
hours before the subcommittee mark-up to view the product and to see 
the particular priorities that their boss has and be able to brief their 
boss on what is included in the bill before the subcommittee mark-
up.62 
 
Rank-and-File Member: Usually we would have an opportunity to 
review a chairman’s mark the day before legislation was brought 
forward.63 
 
The lengths the committee staff will go to in keeping bill reports and drafts from 
slipping out of the room borders on comedy. Staffers will often be placed at all doors 
to the committee office to make sure no one tries to slip out with a copy under their 
arm or in their briefcase. Other staff will be assigned to closely watch incoming 
staffers to make sure everything is kosher. As the first quote above indicates, each 
copy of the bill and report are marked with the name of the office they are intended 
for. This is done so that if a copy is missing at the end of the day, it is clear who the 
culprit is. 
While this type of procedure appears to be standard practice, a few 
committees seemed to be more liberal about distributing bill drafts. A staffer for a 
member of Congress sitting on the Budget Committee described a more open process: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: We’re normally notified by an e-mail saying 
that the legislation has been posted to the website or they will send it 
internally. 
… 
Typically [we get] the full text in that time frame. Sometimes we’ll get 
a report or a summary a little bit earlier and then we’ll get the final 
text. But normally we get the final version within 24 hours.64 
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Nonetheless, this process still describes a very controlled release. While the actual 
contents are posted and fully available to the members, they are still done so very late 
before mark-ups, giving rank-and-file members very little time to vet the bill, and 
giving opponents very little time to develop an opposition. 
 Most of the interviews with rank-and-file members of Congress or their staff 
indicated that they find this process to be problematic and frustrating. The 
transcription below was rather typical of the interviews conducted with rank-and-file 
legislators and their staffs: 
JC: For the typical amount of time you have between when you might 
receive the draft of the bill and the mark-up, is it an adequate amount 
of time to acquaint yourself with its contents? 
Rank-and-File Staffer: In general, no.65 
 
A common refrain was that sometimes the short amount of time was adequate, but 
with bills that were technical, complex, or lengthy, or with bills that covered an issue 
that had not been extensively legislated on before, it was not enough time at all: 
Rank-and-File Member: For the way, particularly…I mean, it depends 
on the subject matter. If you’re talking about a tax provision, 
sometimes this would be really pushing it. If you’re talking about a 
broad social security policy or a broad human resources issue, 
probably it was enough time to consider.66 
 
Rank-and-File Staffer: It depends on the size of the bill. It also 
depends on if the bill is something we have gone through before. If so, 
less time is needed to understand it.67 
 
Rank-and-File Staffer: In the case of massive pieces of legislation, not 
really [enough time]. In a lot of cases, while we might not have had the 
final text we knew pieces that were going to be incorporated into it 
before hand and a lot of time we’re using language that has been 
previously used and we know that’s going to be there so we can start 
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before we have the final version. But it would certainly be more 
helpful to have notices more than 24 hours in advance.68 
 
Although, one staffer disagreed that the technical nature of a bill was the most 
important variable:  
Rank-and-File Staffer: It’s not a matter of how technical the 
information is. It’s a matter of how much time you have to gather it. … 
Ultimately you have to make something of a judgment call that isn’t 
perfectly well-grounded because the information isn’t there.69 
 
Restricted access to bill contents can also make proposing and getting 
amendments to the draft accepted at mark-up sessions difficult, if not impossible. 
Proposing an amendment that fits with the bill text is time consuming. Members of 
Congress and their staff have to find where their amendment can fit in the bill, draft 
proposed language, and then turn that draft over to the committee staff for it to be 
technically edited so that the language is adequate. While an office could have an idea 
of what kind of amendment they may like to offer to a committee bill, they cannot 
formally create it until they are briefed on that bill’s contents. Several members and 
staffers lamented this problem during the interviews: 
Rank-and-File Member: Sometimes drafts come up less than 24 hours 
before the mark-up. It makes it very hard to offer amendments.70 
 
JC: Were there any instances where you had intended to offer an 
amendment to a bill and because of the short time frame you were not 
able to? 
Rank-and-File Staffer: Yeah. There certainly were.71 
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One staffer shared an anecdote about a bill before the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology that exemplifies how committee chairs and staff can control the 
release of bill drafts to keep the bill they have crafted in-tact: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: After the oil spill, a bill came forward 
addressing natural resource policy, and the rules say drafts have to 
become available 48 hours before mark-up—they gave it to us 15 
hours before. We had an amendment ready to go, but it was already 
obsolete—the deadline is 24 hours. We got it to them in 2 hours and 
they pushed back. They said, you know, we don’t have enough time to 
work through this. So that is what can be frustrating for a personal 
office.72 
 
The impression from many of the interviews was that occurrences like this were not 
out of the ordinary. Committee leaders can often game the process to make it 
impossible for rank-and-file members to have significant influence in the process. 
Some interviews suggested that the control over information varied based on 
who the chair was. Some chairs were dedicated to a more open process than others 
whether because of their philosophy of how the House should operate or because the 
issues they were dealing with required it. As one rank-and-file staffer succinctly put 
it, “It all depends on the chairman. And a lot of times the staff will reflect the 
chairman and the way that the chairman wants to operate.”73 
One former member of Congress was very forthcoming in his assessment of 
some of the committee chairs of his time. He singled out a few as particularly 
frustrating when it came to gathering information: 
Leadership Member: They really didn’t want everybody to fully 
understand what was going on. When Jamie Whitten was chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee he spoke with a deep, Mississippi 
accent and people clearly could not understand what he was saying 
and I think he used that to his advantage. But I remember one time 
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when he came into the Rules Committee and he really wanted us to 
understand what he was saying and spoke very clearly. I understood 
every word that he was saying when most of the time you couldn’t 
understand him because of his accent. 
 
When Dingell was chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, 
he would speak in generalities. He didn’t give you a lot of information. 
He wasn’t misleading, but he would speak in generalities … He didn’t 
make an effort to go into the real specifics of the bill. 
 
[Bill] Thomas was devious. And so I think Thomas did it intentionally. 
I’m not sure about the others.74 
 
Another staffer was equally critical of certain chairs, again noting Bill Thomas 
specifically: 
 
Leadership Staffer: Chairman Thomas was very much in the camp 
of—my product is perfect and I’m working in the tax code and 
therefore you shouldn’t be doing anything to it. There are times we 
pushed back on that. I still have scars from him yelling at me.75 
 
This serves as a reminder that the degree to which information is controlled by the 
committee is not just a function of the bills being considered, but also of the person in 
charge. 
 Altogether, it is clear that committees go to great lengths to control what 
information about their bill marks is released and how. From the moment a bill is 
referred to a committee, or is begun in the committee, the process is controlled. 
Information on legislative language is held tightly by just a few principal actors until 
very late in the process. When committees are finished, however, the process does not 
necessarily become more open. Rather, the majority party leadership often continues 
to restrict rank-and-file access to information. 
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Tactics of Majority Party Leaders 
Once a bill is passed by committee the majority party leadership formally 
takes control of its consideration. At this stage, the majority party leadership can 
decide—as a result of its own extensive information gathering as well as what it 
observed to have occurred in committee—whether information restricting tactics 
should be employed in further consideration of the bill. Majority party leaders have 
numerous ways they can restrict the information the minority party and rank-and-file 
members of their own party have on a bill draft, but the process is not as easy as it is 
for committees. By rule, bills passed by committee have to be made public, usually 
within three days. Additionally, any member of the chamber can pick up a copy of the 
passed bill from the committee, and in a reasonable amount of time the text of the 
legislation is publically made available in electronic form through the Library of 
Congress, the Government Printing Office, and other governmental organizations. 
Furthermore, the fact that the bill has already gone through a committee process 
means more details about the bill are likely known compared to when the bill was 
sitting in a committee office, prior to mark-up. As such, party leaders have to be more 
open and responsive to their rank-and-file than committee leaders. Nevertheless, party 
leaders still have numerous tactics they can employ, including restricting bill layover, 
self-executing the bill in the Rules Committee76, back-loading and front-loading the 
legislative agenda, and throughout, taking advantage of the size and complexity of 
some legislation. 
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 Restricting Layover 
A major strategy used by majority party leaders to restrict access to 
information about legislation is to reduce the amount of time that legislation is 
available before it is considered on the floor of the House. The rules of the House 
state that all bills must “layover” for three calendar days after committee passage 
before they can be brought before the Committee of the Whole for consideration 
(Rybicki 2005). However this rule is far from restrictive. First, “three calendar days” 
does not mean 72 hours. If a bill passes committee at 1 a.m. with the House 
adjourning shortly after and reconvening at 6 a.m. the same morning, one calendar 
day is considered to have passed. Thus those calendar days can pass much quicker 
than 72 hours. But more importantly, layover requirements are almost always waived 
via language in special rules providing for the consideration of legislation. Whether 
the special rule is open, closed, or modified, language similar to the following is 
typically included at the start of the rule: 
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order 
to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3996) to amend the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to extend certain expiring provisions, and for 
other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are 
waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI 
[emphasis added].77 
 
The italicized clauses in the above passage effectively sidestep layover requirements. 
If a member of Congress were to raise a point of order against the consideration of 
H.R. 3996 on the basis that it had not been laid over for three calendar days, the chair 
of the Committee of the Whole could dismiss the point of order on the basis that its 
special rule waives “all points of order against its consideration.” As one former 
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leadership staffer explained it, “the leadership had finessed the rules so that it wasn’t 
that you could make a point of order against the rules.”78 
 Layover requirements are frequently bypassed, even on important legislation 
(see chapter 4 for data on this point). For rank-and-file members of Congress, less 
layover time makes it difficult to adequately vet bill contents. Many of the rank-and-
file members interviewed lamented the difficulty of doing their job under such time 
restraints: 
Rank-and-File Member: There were a number of occasions when we 
voted on things on the floor and there were details included that we 
were not properly exposed to.79 
 
Rank-and-File Member: Without going through regular order you have 
to do a lot more work. It was a lot more difficult.80 
 
Just as in committee, some members and staffers indicated that it was especially 
problematic when the legislation in question happened to be lengthy, technical, or 
something that had not been legislated on before: 
Rank-and-File Member: If it requires a great deal of detail—an 
extended appropriation, a major deregulation or reauthorization—and 
if it’s brought to the floor on an expedited basis, that typically creates 
problems. That’s probably the case where if it’s being brought to the 
floor for the first time as an issue, this is probably the area where you 
are most likely to find abuse and members not being given enough 
time to consider the details. For example, clearly at the beginning of 
last year when the stimulus legislation was brought to the floor there 
was a great deal of detail in there that I don’t think rank-and-file 
members had an opportunity to review. I view that as problematic. 
There have been other instances where I have seen major statutory 
overhauls come through and that would be expedited.81 
 
                                                 
78 Interview 1 
79 Interview 6 
80 Interview 14 




Rank-and-File Member: Large, omnibus, appropriations bills were a 
problem. You could only look at the parts that you cared about to look 
for problems.82 
 
For minority party members it is most difficult to get a gauge of exactly what 
a bill is going to do. With less time to analyze it, it becomes more difficult to 
orchestrate effective opposition to the bill, challenge some of its provisions, or 
conduct a public relations campaign against it. As a minority leadership staffer put it: 
Leadership Staffer: Where we can be given notice of a bill, and 
sometimes a pretty substantial bill, that is coming to the floor the next 
day, we get that notice the night prior, sometimes at midnight or 
something like that. In that case we’re really scrambling. So the 
information that we are coming up with, one, we don’t have access to 
it, two, we don’t have time.83 
 
Consequently, this staffer continued, the minority can only take a rather general 
stance against the bill rather than something more specific or effective: 
So we’re usually using a tactic that’s much more generalized with your 
members. We’re saying, ‘well, we know there are tax increases in this 
bill so it’s a tax increase bill, it’s a job killer’—stay top of the line with 
your members with the message. But you can’t get it as specific in that 
case. And that’s really the minority’s burden.84 
 
 For both majority and minority members of Congress, limited time to access a 




Another tactic the majority party leadership has to restrict access to 
information is to self-execute, or change the contents of the bills, in the Rules 
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Committee. The leadership can insert language into the special rules defining the 
rules of floor debate for a bill that add to, subtract from, to simply change various 
provisions of the bill in question. In doing so, the majority party leadership makes it 
even more difficult for rank-and-file members to vet the legislation, as its final 
contents are not known until the special rule has come to the floor, which is often the 
day of, or the day before, the bill is brought forth for consideration. Self-execution is 
not a new development in congressional legislating, but its usage has changed 
dramatically since the 1980s. As one former leadership staffer explained: 
Leadership Staffer: It started out harmlessly enough many years ago as 
just a way to make corrections without having to have a formal 
amendment to vote on it. But then the Democrats, when they were in 
the majority especially under Jim Wright, would use that more and 
more to make substantive changes in the bill.85 
 
In fact, use of self-executing provisions has grown dramatically. Figure 3.1 presents 
the frequency of use of self-executing provisions between the 101st and 110th 
congresses.86 In the 101st Congress less than 6 percent of all special rules included 
self-executing provision. By the 110th Congress nearly one in three special rules self-
executed some legislation. 
 Self-execution is not used solely as a means of amplifying the informational 
asymmetries in the chamber. It is often a way of “fixing” legislation in a way that 
makes it more palatable to the majority caucus before it gets to the floor: 
Leadership Staffer: I think it’s usually a matter of having late warning 
in the game, so it couldn’t be corrected at the committee level 
anymore, and how do we correct something so we don’t have this 
political problem on the floor. So, it was usually done with that in 
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Special Rules Containing Self-Executing Provisions, 101st to 
110th Congresses 
 
Source: Data on the use of self-executing provisions taken from the “Survey of Activities of the House 
Committee on Rules” published semi-annually in the United States Congressional Serial Set. 
 
These types of fixes are usually done at the behest of the chair of the committee of 
jurisdiction, but other times, the leadership uses their ability to self-execute to make 
very large changes to a bill so that it better reflects their interests, with the added 
benefit of doing so with little time left for the chamber to catch up. This same 
leadership staffer continued: 
It’s with the complicity of the chairman of the committee. Although, 
Lee Hamilton … has said when he was Foreign Affairs Committee 
chairman he would take a little ten-page bill to the Rules Committee 
and it would emerge a 30-page bill because they would self-execute 
other stuff into it.88 
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One party leadership staffer put it bluntly: 
Leadership Staffer: Until you bring that bill to the floor you can 
change it as much as you want to and you can change it for the 
betterment of certain members. … But, you know, not only do you 
have the schedule as a real advantage there because you’re controlling 
the information in the majority, but you also have the legislation itself 
that you’re controlling is in your hands and you can tweak as much as 
you want until the moment it’s brought to the floor, basically.89 
 
 For rank-and-file members of Congress, self-execution can obviously be 
problematic, especially if it is extensive. It often means they will be coming to the 
floor to vote on something they do not have full information on and that has only 
been in their possession for a short period of time. Even if members had a good idea 
of what the bill was doing before self-execution, they often have no idea afterwards: 
Rank-and-File Member: It makes it much more difficult to have 
information because you don’t really know what’s in the final bill. 
Often times the bill is very large and when it comes down to it, it’s the 
details that really matter. So while the bill may have been out there for 
a long time and the committee may have been doing a lot of work in 
public. When it’s re-written you don’t really know the details.90 
 
 In some ways self-execution is more restrictive for rank-and-file members 
than reduced layover because it both changes the bill and limits the amount of time 
before floor consideration. Most bills come to the floor the day of or the day after the 
passage of its special rule. When this is the case, if a bill is self-executed, rank-and-
file members will have typically less than 24 hours to assess what the changes mean. 
 
 Back-Loading and Front-Loading 
Another strategy the majority party leadership has under its control is to back-
load or front-load the legislative agenda. In condensing the agenda and bringing 
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bundles of legislation to the floor in rapid succession, the leadership makes it even 
more difficult for rank-and-file members to vet the bills they are going to cast votes 
on. Back-loading, specifically, is not always done purposefully, though sometimes it 
is.  In either case, the party leadership is willing to take advantage of the situation. A 
leadership staffer concisely put it: 
Leadership Staffer: People tend to wait until the last minute to get 
things done, but obviously from a strategic standpoint, the leadership 
is advantaged if they wait until the last minute to get important things 
done because then members are more likely to go along with it.91 
 
The idea that the majority leadership will control the schedule to their advantage is 
not new (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a; Sinclair 2007). With control over what to bring 
to the floor, and when, the leaders can make sure the timing is just right. In bulking 
up the agenda just prior to a recess, leaders can pressure their members to support the 
legislation so they will have something to tell their constituents about when they get 
home. If it is before the end of a session or a congress, the leadership can tell their 
rank-and-file it is their last chance to get something passed. Otherwise they have to 
go face their constituents having failed: 
Leadership Staffer: We don’t want to have a black eye as we’re going 
out the door because we’re going to have to go home and face our 
constituents now and, so, I think both elements are there.92 
 
 Front-loading is just as powerful a tool for the majority party leadership as 
back-loading. The Democrats handling of their ‘Six for 06’ agenda at the start of the 
110th Congress is an archetypical model of its execution. During the 2006 
congressional elections, the Democrats’ coordinated campaign focused on six pieces 
of priority legislation that they promised to pass if they took control of Congress. This 
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agenda, formally called “A New Direction For America” consisted of a “phased 
redeployment” of American troops from Iraq, implementation of the 9/11 
Commission’s national security recommendations, a labor bill to raise the minimum 
wage and punish companies that exported jobs overseas, an education bill to make 
college more affordable for students through increasing access to loans and 
expanding grant programs, energy legislation to invest in renewable energy and end 
tax breaks for oil companies, health care legislation aimed at lowering costs of 
medication and ending the ban on stem cell research, and a promise to stop any plan 
to privatize or endanger social security.93 
 After winning majorities in the November general election, the Democratic 
leadership huddled to write legislation addressing these points. During the first 10 
days of the new congress, the majority leadership brought forth bill after bill to 
address these priorities, bypassing regular order, and passing them at a frantic pace 
(Peters and Rosenthal 2010, 86-88). While the generalities of these priority bills had 
been known since the 2006 campaign, the specifics of the legislation were crafted at 
the leadership table. By front-loading the agenda, the Democratic leadership 
overwhelmed the chamber with major legislation and made it difficult for anyone 
outside a small circle of leaders to actually vet the details of what was being 
considered and passed. 
 Rank-and-file members of Congress interviewed emphasized the difficulties 
front-loading and back-loading creates for obtaining adequate levels of information 
                                                 






about legislation. One sitting member of Congress typified the feelings of the rank-
and-file: 
Rank-and-File Member: Late in session, right before a recess, a lot of 
legislation is passed. There is a deadline. Leadership has the 
opportunity to push bills through with less information being out there. 
They aren’t doing this to pull one over on the members. Like I said, 
there is no such thing as a perfect bill. There are always things to 
oppose. The less information that is out there in the public, it makes it 
easier to pass legislation.94 
 
As with each of the information restriction tactics, having less information 
available makes it easier to pass bills. By limiting access to the details of legislative 
language, leaders can prevent small provisions from being made into large problems 
that can derail a bill, delay its passage, or require fundamental changes to the bill on 
the floor, outside of the control of the leadership. 
Interesting in the above quote is that the congressperson did not perceive their 
own leadership as trying to trick the party membership. This was a common feeling 
among the rank-and-file members of Congress and staffers interviewed. Nearly all of 
them found leadership tactics that restricted information to be frustrating, but most 
were understanding of their leadership’s decision to employ them. This is a topic 
discussed in much more detail in chapter 5. 
 
Discussion 
Over the course of the conversations I had with members of Congress and 
their staffs, one individual summed up these information restriction tactics rather 
adroitly: 
                                                 




Leadership Staffer: Now, they tend to go along, the majority does, 
with their leadership when a decision like that is made. “Well, we’ve 
got to get this done before such-and-such a date,” or, “there is a 
deadline and we didn’t have the time to go through the full process.” 
But other times I think it’s, frankly, done to make sure people don’t 
have too much time to look at it. It’s an old political trick. If you’ve 
ever attended, even, a Young Democrats or a Young Republicans 
meeting and the leadership of that organization wants to put something 
through quickly, they don’t give their members a day or even a few 
hours to look at something they’re going to put to a vote. They’ll pass 
it out and say, “oh yeah, by the way, here’s an amendment, any 
discussion?” You know, people are trying to read it the same time 
they’re asking for discussion. But, it’s an old trick—the element of 
surprise.95 
 
Restricting information is the crux of information control. While gathering 
information and subsequently providing information are no doubt important, limiting 
what information is available to members of the chamber is what makes the 
information gathered and provided useful and important. Restricting information 
keeps the minority party, and any other opposition groups inside or outside of 
Congress at bay, limiting the effectiveness of the opposition tactics. 
 Committee chairs restrict information by keeping the drafting process under 
lock-and-key and subsequently releasing information about chairman’s marks late in 
the game, and in a controlled manner. Likewise, party leaders  have a variety of 
tactics with which they limit access to information. Specifically, they limit the 
amount of time rank-and-file members have to read and vet legislation by reducing 
layover times, self-executing, and front-loading or back-loading the legislative 
agenda. Again, in doing so they limit what kind of tactics the opposition to the bill 
can use. 
                                                 




Some interviewees suggested that controlling information might be most 
important for party and committee leaders on the most contentious and most partisan 
bills. It is on these bills that they have the most to risk from information leaks. As one 
member put it, “You want more information on the more contentious issues,” because 
those are the issues that you are most likely to find some reason to be in the 
opposition.96 This is exactly what leaders are trying to avoid. If members are 
predisposed to go along with their leadership in the absence of compelling 
information to do otherwise (Ripley 1967, 139-59; Matthews and Stimson 1975; 
Kingdon 1989; Lee 2009), limiting that compelling information is key to holding 
together a majority voting coalition. 
Some interviewees indicated that they found the information they had about 
legislation to be adequate. One former member of the Financial Services Committees 
provided a typical positive response: 
Rank-and-File Member: Yes, there was usually enough time. No 
surprises on the committees I was on. The chairman let you know what 
was in it. It was like reading a computer program, but the language 
was dense and hard to understand.97 
 
Others also felt satisfied, most of the time, with the amount of time they had in the 
process: 
Rank-and-File Member: You know, we were sufficiently specialized 
on the committee that we could usually ask questions, and approaching 
it as a team, we would have enough of a division of labor that we 
always know who to ask. And we have an opportunity informally to 
make that ask in advance.98 
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Others still indicated that they would have liked more time to review legislation, but 
they found the time they had was adequate: 
Rank-and-File Member: I was there during one of the busiest 
congresses of all time. Of course I would have liked more time. But I 
understand the leadership did the best they could.99 
 
Leadership Member: You could always use more [time], but generally 
the people that I had on my legislative staff were pretty good and 
could boil it down for me and get me the information I needed.100 
 
That there is some variation in member’s satisfaction with the amount of information 
they had is not surprising. Some committees surely were more restrictive than others, 
either through their formal rules and their adherence to them or because of the 
personality of the chairman. Furthermore, members of Congress bring different 
orientations to the job and to the role they should play vis-à-vis the leadership. Some 
are more willing to go along with their leadership and others are more distrustful. 
This is a topic that is raised in more detail in chapter 5. 
Ultimately, the balance of interview evidence suggests that party and 
committee leaders actively look to restrict information on some legislation and that 
this process makes it more difficult for the minority leadership, minority caucus, and 
outside groups to effectively oppose, change, or understand the bill. Furthermore, it 
puts legislative leaders in a position of authority with their own rank-and-file. In 
restricting what information is out there, leaders can say to their rank-and-file 
membership, ‘trust me, this bill achieves our party goals, and there is nothing in it that 
will embarrass us later. Let’s get it passed before the minority has a chance to derail 
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it.’ This process of filling the information void they have created with their own 
leadership-approved information is what this chapter turns to next. 
 
Providing Information 
Providing information is the final act of the information control strategy. After 
having gathered information about their members’ opinions, and kept tight-lipped 
about the development and contents of legislation, both party and committee leaders 
provide information designed to keep their members on-board with the bill. In giving 
away just certain details of legislation they can focus the discussion and debate—both 
inside and outside of Congress—on the aspects of the legislation they think will be 
most favorable. In doing so, they can stunt the growth of effective opposition 
strategies before they even get started and keep the bill on track to passage and their 
party on the road to reelection. 
 
Tactics of Committee Chairs 
As discussed above, at some point in the process, the committee has to inform 
its members of what is included in the chairman’s mark. However, committees have a 
great deal of leeway over what exactly they provide. Some committees provide just 
the report on the bill, while other committees provide the actual bill draft. Most 
committees also provide additional summaries of provisions through documents they 
circulate among members of the committee. These documents strongly reflect the 





Rank-and-File Member: On a markup – the chair might put out a paper 
with a description of each amendment and the chair’s position. Other 
committees they don’t print out anything but the chair makes his 
position known as the amendment is offered.101 
 
The information included on these documents is far from straight forward. Careful 
thought and planning is put into what will be said about the bill and about 
amendments. The goal is to provide the information that best sells the bill and 
obscure details that might be controversial. One personal staffer gave an example of 
how this could be done: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: There will be some information given out about 
the bill that is more detailed and less accessible. On things they might 
not want you to understand because you might vote against, it will be 
less clear. And on things that they are full-throatily behind and the 
[majority] on the committee will be behind they will be more clear.102 
 
 The committees will also provide some information during briefings hosted by 
staff and attended by personal office staffers. These are the same briefings that 
committee staffers use to gather feedback from members of the committee, but they 
also serve as opportunities to provide information. 
Committee Staffer: There is a process that the majority conducts where 
they will call in all the associate staff of the subcommittee on a bi-
partisan basis and brief them on the contents of the bill.103 
 
From the point of view of rank-and-file staffers, the information provided in these 
meetings can be limited. Committee staff are unlikely to delve into details of 
legislation that they may consider sensitive or that may arouse disapproval from the 
minority or some other faction on the committee. Generally the information provided 
is fairly prosaic. One staffer provided a fairly adept analysis: 
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Rank-and-File Staffer: There is usually a formal briefing held once a 
week by the subcommittee staff. Usually they read you something and 
ask if there are any questions. And if you ask questions they won’t 
give you a real answer. If you actually had important questions you 
couldn’t ask them in that forum anyway, because it’s a bipartisan 
briefing. These meetings are set up in a way not to answer questions. 
Sometimes you have to ask just on general principal but you know 
you’re not going to get any answers. Usually it’s, ‘we’re working on it 
and we’re going through negotiations with leadership.’ You could 
have predicted it, but you had to ask.104 
 
As this staffer suggests, part of the reason that the information provided is so 
mundane is the presence of the minority in the meetings. The committee leadership 
certainly does not want to share anything more than the basic details of legislation in 
front of a group of members that are inclined to oppose it. However, in meetings just 
among majority members, the information sharing isn’t exactly free-flowing, either. 
The same staffer describes what happens to a majority staffer who asks tough 
questions during a bi-partisan briefing: 
Sometimes staffers will ask tough questions during the bipartisan 
briefing, and then afterwards, in the Dems only meeting they will get 
castigated for asking tough questions.105 
 
The opinion of the committee leadership is that majority members shouldn’t be 
asking probing questions about the committee’s decisions. Rather, they should be on 
board. Furthermore, what was not said to these inquisitive staffers is equally telling. 
Rather than giving an explanation or answering the question, there was 
admonishment. Rank-and-file staffers often leave these meetings with little additional 
understanding of the details of piece of legislation. 
 Some, though not all, committee chairs hold similar meetings with the rank-
and-file members of the committee prior to a mark-up. These meetings are generally 
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partisan in nature with the chair meeting with the majority members, only. Some 
minority ranking members do the same with the minority members. The degree to 
which these meetings occur depends on a number of things. For some committees, the 
large size of the membership makes these meetings impractical. On these committees 
the meetings are more likely to be held by subcommittee chairs before the 
subcommittee mark-ups. Whether or not these meetings occur can also depend on 
how busy everyone is, and also just the personal nature of the chair. Some chairs are 
more inclined to these types of face-to-face meetings than others. One staffer for a 
subcommittee chair described these meetings: 
Committee Staffer: Before subcommittee [mark-up] he has generally 
met with Democratic members of the subcommittee to make sure they 
are aware what the priorities he set in the bill are; what the potentially 
contentious issues are; what we have heard from the minority and the 
ways we have tried to incorporate the views of the minority; and if 
there are some particularly contentious issues, to prep them to 
hopefully stand with him when it comes to amendment votes and 
things like that.106 
 
The last part of this statement is the most enlightening. The goal of these meetings is 
for the chair to convince his or her fellow partisans to stand together and support the 
bill as it was crafted. The information provided is the last step in the information 
control strategy employed by the committee to pass the bill as they would like to see 
it passed. 
 Of course rank-and-file members of committees, and their staffers, are not 
fools. They know that the information provided to them by the committee is often 
inadequate, biased, and crafted to sell the bill. The problem is that this meager 
information is often all they have to work with. Given their limited time and 
                                                 




resources, rank-and-file legislators have to prioritize which bills they dig into 
independently, and which bills they do not. Most bills cannot be prioritized and on 
these bills members have to rely on the information the committees have given them, 
and the limited analyses their staff can provide. One member of Congress provided a 
rather succinct description of a rank-and-file member’s plight: 
Rank-and-File Member: I rely a lot on material the committee 
produces. ... On my major committees my staff provides unique 
analysis. They use their judgment on whether the committee materials 
are accurate, or complete.107 
 
The key for members of Congress to really getting information from 
committees is to be persistent with the staff. Let them know if something is really 
important and follow up. Better information comes from asking things directly of the 
committee staff rather than sitting back and waiting for it to be provided. For those 
who sit back, the information will be incomplete. But by being direct and persistent, 
most staff will be helpful and will provide more information. Reducing the 
information disparity typical members live with requires allocating time and staff 
resources. On most legislation this simply cannot be done, so rank-and-file members 
focus on the legislation that is most important to them. For most members much of 
the time, the information provided by the committee will be all that is available. 
 
Tactics of Majority Party Leaders 
The majority party leadership is also actively involved in providing 
information to its rank-and-file, though the nature and content of this information is 
different from that provided by committees. If members of Congress find committee 
                                                 




information to be sometimes lacking in policy detail, they often find party-approved 
information to be barren of specifics. 
 As with information gathering, the whip organization is deeply involved in 
providing information. The onus for providing information falls on that apparatus, but 
the rest of the majority party leadership gets involved, as well. A lot of information 
providing is relatively informal and can be initiated by the members looking for 
information.  
Rank-and-File Member: Members would go to the whip organization 
and raise the issue. A whip organization is important not only for vote 
counting, but also to be a source of information for rank-and-file 
members. We always had a local whip who would reach out to me, 
typically on general issues.108 
 
Leadership Staffer: A lot of times members are looking for 
information. They want to answer the questions they are getting back 
in their districts.109 
 
But more often than not, the leadership actively provides information to their 
members. From a strategic standpoint it is important to get out there and set the tone 
of the debate over the bill; to provide the information that convinces their own rank-
and-file members to support the bill, and to avoid giving the minority or any 
opposition outside of Congress the opportunity to develop an effective opposition. 
Leaders know that their resources and control over the policymaking process give 
them an opportunity to set the tone and try to make the debate over the bill revolve 
around themes and provisions that are favorable. 
 One whip staffer was especially forthcoming about this information-providing 
strategy. The way he explained it, the leadership can take advantage of their 
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information and resource advantages as well as the pace of the legislative process in 
“cherry picking” the information they relay to their rank-and-file. 
JC: Do you take some leeway in terms of what information you sell 
the bill on? 
Leadership Staffer: Sure. Absolutely. You have a 1,500 page bill—
members aren’t going to read through it. You can certainly cherry pick 
what you give to them. Maybe that’s intellectually dishonest or 
something, but you really don’t have the benefit of time if this thing is 
moving quickly. So you need to get out the information you want them 
to know. And that’s usually the worst hits or something. We often 
cherry pick the information.110 
 
This pattern is not entirely leadership driven. As this same staffer clarified, the rank-
and-file expect the information they get from the leadership to be short and sweet. If 
they had time for lengthier or more complex analysis they would read the bill. They 
are turning to their leaders precisely because they do not have this kind of time: 
Leadership Staffer: They want to know what is in it and why it’s bad 
[or good]. And they are not going to do the homework on their end. 
They have a lot less resources than the leadership does. They are going 
to rely on us to give them that information, and it usually falls to the 
whip office to give them the most timely and accurate information and 
certainly the other leadership offices do a good job of disseminating 
information. 
 … 
Even if [the rank-and-file] could read a bill [they] wouldn’t understand 
it. So this whole ‘read the bill’ stuff is almost a little bit disingenuous. 
Because reading five lines referencing some part of the code isn’t 
going to help you at all unless you are a committee staffer that wrote 
the damn thing. So they are relying on us for those big pieces that are 
moving to tell them exactly what’s in the bill, and if you’re in the 
minority, why it’s bad.111 
 
When the leadership chooses to actively provide information to their 
membership, they do so primarily in two ways. First, they occasionally hold formal 
meetings—sometimes hosted by the whip’s office, sometimes by the conference 
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chair, and sometimes by other members of the leadership—where information is 
provided directly to members or their personal staff, and some questions are fielded. 
One staffer described this process: 
Committee Staffer: On major bills, there’s a chief of staff meeting 
every Friday and a whip-staff meeting and a press secretary-staff 
meeting every Monday afternoon. … We get information about the 
schedule and what’s coming up this week and next week. And we get 
the political lay of the land. There’s a lot they won’t have. But in terms 
of getting the basics on, well, this is in the bill and this is out. You 
know, they’ll sort of give a layout. And when they can they’ll say, 
‘Week three is going to be a jobs week so we might do unemployment 
extension or something else’. So they’ll just give you sort of an 
idea.112 
 
Beyond these formal meetings, the whips and the whip staffers will begin actively 
seeking out members directly at the start of the policymaking process. Like with 
information gathering, the whip office often knows ahead of time which members, or 
group of members, may need more convincing. Sometimes these appeals last right up 
through the vote.  
Leadership Staffer: In the majority you whip them right up to and 
possibly during the votes. The best example of that would have been 
Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage for seniors. That vote was 
whipped all the way up to the vote, during the vote, and for three hours 
during that vote on the floor.113 
 
Activity on the floor is more important than it might seem. Even on important 
legislation, many members of Congress come to the floor either ambivalent or unsure 
of what they are going to do regarding amendments, and sometimes even the final 
vote (Behringer, Evans, and Materese 2006). A whip organization armed with 
information can be very influential here. Members crave information about what is 
going on, and whips and their staff are happy to oblige: 
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Leadership Staffer: On a more day-to-day level, [the job of the whip] 
is serving almost as a concierge for the members on the House floor. 
So my staff is in charge of informing the members when they’re 
voting, what they’re voting on; the mundane to the larger issues.114 
 
 By providing the information, leaders set the debate and can appeal to aspects 
of the bill their membership may find palatable and easy to support. A whip staffer 
gave an idea of the kinds of information the leadership provides to their members to 
get them on board. Along with the standard party line about why the legislation is 
good, the leadership will draw on outside sources as well and show, whenever 
possible, how the bill is popular with the voting public. 
Leadership Staffer: You’re also trying to provide them, and we do this 
in the minority too, with public polling and outside political expertise. 
This is what Democrats were doing a lot during Health Care. You saw 
that the bill was opposed by a majority of Americans. But then they 
would break down certain issues so they could tell their members, 
‘well, preexisting coverage polls at 75 percent.’ And they would break 
down the issues so they could tell their members, ‘yeah this whole 
thing has been kind of demonized, but when you break down the 
popular provisions and when you go out and start selling that when it’s 
being implemented and people realize that they are getting this new 
benefit it’s going to be quite popular.’ So public opinion polling, that 
stuff, is quite beneficial.115 
 
As mentioned above, focusing the debate on this friendly information helps suppress 
opposition, as well. The minority leadership does not have access to the same amount 
of information as the majority. Furthermore, the minority can only react to the 
majority’s actions and the information the majority is putting out there. When the 
majority speeds up the legislative process, it is more difficult for the minority to 
develop an effective and coherent opposition strategy, and to inform their members. 
The same staffer described what this is like in the minority: 
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In the minority you’re reacting to the majority schedule. And we find 
ourselves here, a lot of times, not getting that information until literally 
the last minute. … So at that point in the minority you’re just trying to 
feed your members information: ‘Listen, here is what it does on a 
substantive basis, and we defer to the committees on that, and here’s 
the political dynamic on that.’ And a lot of members already know that 
because if it’s of some consequence to the outside—to the business 
community for instance—they’ll be hearing from the Chamber of 
Commerce. They’ll probably already have that information but it’s our 
job to make sure if they want it on the floor they can get it from us and 
the committees are prepared to tell them about it.116 
 
Basically, there is no time to provide a comprehensive and organized set of talking 
points on which to oppose the bill. Instead they give their members some basic 
information to attack the bill and hope some other actors may have something more 
effective. The majority leadership hopes whenever possible to keep the minority—
and any other potential opposition—on its toes in this regard. Doing so may prevent 
more controversial aspects of a bill becoming the focus of the policy debate. 
 From the interviews, it appeared there were a variety of opinions among rank-
and-file members of Congress and their staff about the quality of information 
provided to them by the leadership. Some indicated that the information was pretty 
straight forward, but usually not very in-depth: 
Rank-and-File Member: The information is pretty good. They have 
meetings and hand out sheets with information. They don’t always 
give us all the information. You need to ask them. But they were 
promoters. They knew I probably wouldn’t be with them most of the 
time.117 
  
Rank-and-File Staffer: The stuff that comes before the floor, 
leadership gives more information through caucus meetings and whip 
meetings. Those are two places that members get a lot of updates on 
what’s included. That’s not always the case. Not every piece of 
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legislation is brought up in the course of those meetings. A lot of times 
major legislation will be.118 
 
One staffer indicated that the quality of information varied quite a bit depending on 
the bill. On some bills the information is very top-line, basic, or unsatisfactory. Other 
times, the leadership feels that they need to go into some detail about the legislation 
to keep the caucus on-board. This is what happened with the health care overhaul 
considered throughout the 111th Congress: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: In the case of the health care bill in the last 
congress they went through section by section of the bill explaining 
what each section does and members could ask questions throughout. 
If you add it up there were days of just caucus meetings where they 
went through and talked about the bill after all the committee meetings 
had occurred on it. A lot of times it will be just a summary of the 
legislation. At times there’s guidance as to where leadership thinks 
you should be on certain legislation.119 
 
Members and staffers, like the ones quoted above, find leadership information 
to be somewhat adequate even if they wished they had more. Other members, 
however, are much more skeptical of the information the leadership provides. They 
often describe leadership information as even more inadequate, misleading, or biased 
than their colleagues: 
Rank-and-File Member: I am always suspicious of the information that 
comes from the party. One of the most difficult parts of being a 
member of Congress is not being able to get enough information on 
how to cast a vote. You know information from each party is tilted, but 
there are not many independent sources out there.120 
 
Rank-and-File Member: I was skeptical of information provided by 
party leadership. Leaders put out information to try to get the response 
they want from their members. It was valid information, but one-sided. 
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You can play with language like that. I was more skeptical because my 
district required me to be.121 
  
Rank-and-File Member: Mostly vote recommendations and talking points; 
 less substance.122 
 
Rank-and-File Member: One of the biggest complaints you run into is 
that whip materials sometimes turn out to be inadequate and even 
sometimes misleading. Without a partisan bent on this, it happened on 
a number of occasions when Mr. DeLay was whip, although, I 
generally was very positive on the whip organization. I think the same 
complaint was levied against the whip organization under the 
Democrats in the last few cycles I was in Congress.123 
 
Other members of Congress found leadership information to be almost 
completely useless. They found the information to be little more than talking points 
that they could not even use back in their districts. These members suggested that the 
information was especially useless for representatives in moderate, or swing, districts. 
The information has such a partisan slant to it that it was helpful, probably, to only 
the most partisan districts. The irony is that representatives in very partisan districts 
probably have less need for detailed information about the policies under 
consideration. The most orthodox members of a party caucus from the most orthodox 
districts can afford to trust their leadership’s priorities, opinions, and goals as they 
probably match their own. It is those members representing moderate districts that 
need to be most vigilant. These members need to find out if there are provisions in a 
bill that may embarrass them later, or if there are compelling reasons for them to join 
the opposition. The relationship between a member’s ideological orientation relative 
to their party and its influence on their opinions of leadership supplied information is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
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 Altogether, whether or not the information provided by the majority party 
leadership is found to be extraordinarily useful by the rank-and-file, it is often the 
only information available in the short period of time a bill is being considered. That 
being so, members of Congress have no choice but to pay attention to what their 
leadership is telling them and consider it when casting their votes on the floor. If the 
leadership is successful they will keep the debate focused on favorable issues and 
themes and will keep a majority voting coalition together. If they are unsuccessful, 
the bill will fail or be tarnished in the act of its passing. 
 
Discussion 
The majority party leadership, in tandem with tight-lipped committee leaders 
and staff, work hard to make sure their message and their information dominate 
discussions on legislation. Having gathered information on the opinions of their rank-
and-file and of the minority in advance, they have an idea of what information will 
highlight the most palatable aspects of the bill. Having restricted access to the details 
of the bill, their voice will be the one of the only ones out there. 
 For members who trust their committee and party leadership, this information 
will be influential. Even for those who have less trust, it may still be the only 
information they have access to in the short period before it is time to vote. In either 
circumstance, providing information is the final act of information control. If the 
leadership has been successful the bill will pass without controversy and the majority 





Summary and Conclusions 
To summarize, information control strategies used by majority party and 
committee leaders in the House consist of three types of tactics: those aimed at 
gathering information, those aimed at restricting access to information, and those 
aimed at providing information. By gathering information about rank-and-file 
preferences and concerns, legislative leaders can anticipate what problems may arise 
later in the legislative process and try to avoid them through their legislative strategy, 
through bringing more actors into the policy building process, by changing the bill in 
question, or by implementing further information control tactics. These tactics include 
both limiting the access rank-and-file legislators have to bill language and limiting the 
amount of time they have to vet legislation that is being considered. Additionally, 
having reduced the amount of information available on a bill and having limited the 
number of actors who have seen the bill, leaders can provide their own limited 
information that highlights the more palatable aspects of the bill to fill the 
information void. Having done so, they can focus the debate and the communications 
strategies on themes and provisions that benefit them and their party, aid the passage 
of the bill, and perhaps help the party in the next election. 
 Obviously, all these strategies are not used on every bill considered by the 
House of Representatives. First, a lot of legislation considered by the chamber is 
relatively minor. On these bills, there is no need for party or committee leaders to 
take this much control over the process. On important legislation, the calculations are 
different because the stakes are much higher. On many of these bills, party and 




Whether or not they implement tactics to restrict information or provide information 
will vary, depending on a number of factors including the importance of the bill to the 
party or committee leadership, the issue topic of the bill at hand and how long that 
issue has been on the chamber’s agenda, the salience of the bill with the voting 
public, and the potential influence of outside interest groups on the deliberations. It is 





Chapter 4: Strategic Use of Information Control Tactics 
 
 
House leaders cannot use information control tactics all the time. Such a 
strategy would alienate rank-and-file legislators, spur outrage among the minority, 
and be impossible and undesirable for a number of additional reasons. Instead, leaders 
use this source of power on legislation they consider the most important. As discussed 
in chapter 2, leaders should be most likely to lead in order to pass the partisan 
legislation that they prioritize. But as indicated in chapter 3, leaders use information 
control tactics for other ends, as well, including keeping information out of the hands 
of unfriendly actors during deliberations. Using a unique dataset of important 
legislation considered by the House of Representatives between 2001 and 2008, this 
chapter empirically tests these claims.  
To do so, this chapter develops several empirical measures of information 
control. While other scholars have theoretically identified information as an important 
source of power for political leaders, few attempts have been made to empirically 
measure information-based power sources and show how they affect specific actions 
within a political or social context. This chapter does just this in developing three 
indicators of information control for congressional policymaking: the layover time of 
legislation, the use of self-executing provisions in special rules, and bill complexity. 
Additionally, new issue-based measures of leadership priority legislation, potential 
interest group influence, and a bill’s public salience are developed and used in the 




information control tactics on leadership priority legislation, on bills subject to 
intense interest group involvement, and on legislation that is less salient with the 
general public. 
 
Measuring Information Control Tactics 
As discussed in chapter 3, legislative leaders have numerous information 
control tactics they employ to lead the legislative process, and measuring many of 
them can be difficult. Some tactics are simply not measurable. For example, it is 
difficult to quantitatively assess when party and committee leaders provide members 
of Congress with censored information, revealing positive aspects of legislation while 
obscuring negatives. Some tactics, however, can be empirically measured and tested 
and as suggested in chapter 3, the use of one tactic is often related to the use of others. 
For example, when leaders choose to restrict access to legislative language, they often 
subsequently provide their own summaries of the legislation to the rank-and-file. 
Thus, if we find that leaders implement some tactics in support of leadership priority 
legislation, we should infer that they probably use others, as well. 
 The specific hypothesis that legislative leaders will use information control 
tactics more often in support of leadership priority legislation will be tested on two 
specific tactics: (1) restricting access to legislative language; and (2) exploiting the 
complexity of legislation. But how do we define “restricting access”? And what is 
“complexity”? Furthermore, how is “leadership priority legislation” defined? The 
sections below will deal with these matters of definition and others, and provide the 





Bill Sampling and Issue Content Coding 
The sample of bills used in this chapter is meant to capture all important 
legislation considered by the House of Representatives during each congress between 
2001 and 2008. Many minor and trivial bills are considered by Congress each year. 
Understanding how bills like these are considered is neither important nor interesting. 
However, understanding how leaders influence the consideration of important 
legislation tells us something more substantive.  
Scholars have used a number of methods to categorize legislation as important 
or major. Mayhew (1991) analyzed New York Times and Washington Post wrap-ups 
of congressional activity to determine which legislation could be considered major 
temporally and retrospectively. Through these sweeps he categorized roughly 12 bills 
a year as major legislation. Sinclair (2007), looking to develop a more inclusive 
collection of important legislation, used the bills listed in CQ Weekly’s weekly list of 
important bills (see, also Taylor 1998). This section has most recently been titled 
“Bills to Watch”, but at times it has also been known as “This Week in Congress”, 
and “What’s Ahead.” Regardless of name, between 40 and 50 bills are noted 
annually. 
 I use Sinclair’s method for a couple of reasons. First, it is more inclusive, 
allowing the data analysis to pertain to more legislation. Second, it is primarily 
temporal in that it captures legislation that was considered important by actors in the 
legislative process at the time of consideration. It is this level of importance that 




were added to the sample. Appropriations bills are important simply because they 
fund every program created by law. Furthermore, they often involve long and 
contentious battles in the House of Representatives. Full details on the bills and 
resolutions included in my sample can be found in Appendix B.124 
 After assembling the dataset, each bill had to be coded for its issue content. 
The issue content of each bill could in turn be used to determine whether or not it was 
a leadership priority. Political scientists have used numerous issue coding schemes for 
congressional legislation. Lowi’s (1964) typology defines legislation as distributive, 
regulatory, or redistributive. Clausen (1973), and later Sinclair (1977), use a five issue 
area classification, classifying legislation as related to government management, 
international involvement, social welfare, civil liberties, or agricultural assistance. 
Both of these typologies, while enlightening, are too broad for the purposes of this 
study. Instead, I use Baumgartner and Jones’s (2009) typology, which has been made 
available as part of the Policy Agendas Project.125 This typology makes use of 19 
major issue areas and a total of 225 specific topics. Using their codebook, each bill in 
the dataset was coded in two ways. First, each bill was coded for the issue topic it 
primarily addresses. Second, because a significant amount of legislation deals with 
multiple issue topics, each bill was also coded for all of the major issue areas 
addressed in its text. These two issue classifications were used as the basis for several 
other variables. The issue topics each bill was coded as primarily addressing can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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Defining Leadership Priority Legislation 
Determining what legislation is a leadership priority is difficult. While chapter 
2 suggests that leaders will focus on partisan legislative priorities, there is no single 
way to quantitative assess what issues and what legislation this includes. For that 
reason, two indicators are used and tested. Each, however, is based on the issue 
content of the legislation. 
 One way to code legislation as a leadership priority is to assess the issue 
content of bill numbers reserved for the Speaker of the House. Each congress, the first 
several bill numbers (i.e. H.R.1—H.R.10) are reserved for the Speaker to use as he or 
she sees fit. The bills inserted into these slots typically represent issues that are 
important to the party leadership and the mainstream of the party caucus. For each 
congress, the major issue topic and subtopic of bills inserted into these reserved slots 
was assessed. Then each bill introduced during that congress that primarily addressed 
those Speaker’s issues was coded as a leadership priority bill. Thus, if one of the 
Speaker’s bills primarily addressed ‘higher education’ (issue code 601), all bills 
appearing on CQ Weekly’s list of important bills during that congress that primarily 
addressed higher education would be designated as leadership priority bills. 
 For the 110th Congress, the bills identified as addressing speaker’s issues 
included all the bills on the Democrats’ ‘Six for 06’ agenda.126 However, it included a 
number of other bills, including legislation addressing amendments to the Federal 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, numerous renewable energy bills, numerous high 
education bills, and legislation addressing national security issues including the war 
                                                 




on terror and the war in Iraq. Appendix B has more information on the specific bills 
designated at Speaker’s issues in each Congress. 
 A second measure of leadership priority recognizes the president’s importance 
as a partisan leader and legislator-in-chief. The president is a major agenda setter for 
Congress, especially during times of unified government. As discussed in chapter 2, 
legislative leaders in the House have numerous incentives to become champions of 
the president’s agenda, or lead the opposition. One way to identify Presidential 
priorities is through the issue content of State of the Union addresses. For 2001-2005, 
the Policy Agendas Project has coded each sentence in each address for its issue 
content. Following their coding scheme, the 2006-2008 addresses were similarly 
coded. For each year, the number of times each issue topic was mentioned during the 
address was calculated. Each bill was then coded as a presidential priority based on 
the number of times the issue topic it primarily addresses was mentioned during the 
speech. So, for example, in 2001, President Bush made eight statements related to 
‘health insurance reform, availability, and cost’ (issue code 302) in his State of the 
Union address. Thus, every bill in 2001 primarily addressing this aspect of health care 
policy was assigned a value of eight. Appendix B indicates the number of State of the 
Union mentions relevant to each bill in each Congress. 
The use of these two separate measures give us two ways to test the effect of 
leadership priorities on the use of information control tactics—one focusing on the 
priorities the party and the party leadership in the House and the other focusing on the 




second measure may be more important during times of unified government than 
during divided government. 
 
Restricting Access to Legislation 
As discussed in chapter 3, legislative leaders can restrict access to legislative 
language in a number of ways. In committee, chairs can keep draft language under 
lock and key until just prior to the mark-up and instruct their staff to remain tight 
lipped about its contents. After committee consideration, party leaders can bring 
legislation to the floor quickly, change the contents of legislation in the Rules 
Committee, or front- or back-load the agenda. For a couple of these procedures we 
can develop measurable statistics to observe patterns in their use. Specifically, we can 
measure (1) how quickly party leaders bring legislation to the floor, and (2) when 
party leaders choose to use self-executing provisions to alter legislation in the Rules 
Committee. 
 The amount of time a bill is available to the rank-and-file determines how 
much time they have to vet its contents. In a literal sense, the less time a bill is 
available the less time rank-and-file members have to understand it. Layover, in 
House parlance, is the time that passes between when a bill is reported by the 
committee(s) of jurisdiction and when the bill is brought up for debate on the floor. 
According to House rules, bills must “lay over” for at least three legislative days after 
reported from committee before they can be brought up for debate on the floor 
(Rybicki 2005). As discussed in chapter 3, however, these rules are quite often 




when the bill was reported from the last committee to take action on it until it was 
brought up for debate on the floor. This layover time can be viewed as a conservative 
estimate of how much time a typical members of Congress had to understand the bill 
and decide how to act because it is unlikely that on most bills members vet a piece of 
legislation the minute it is reported by a committee. 
Figure 4.1 shows the average amount of time bills laid over for each measure 
of leadership priority legislation between 2001 and 2008. For the Presidential priority 
measure, dummy variables were created that indicate if the issue addressed by the bill 
was mentioned at all in that year’s speech, or not. Additionally, the measure of 
presidential priority was analyzed separately for times of unified government (107th-
109th congresses) and divided government (110th Congress). Regardless of measure, 
leadership priority legislation typically laid over for less time. The presidential 
priority measure results in the most dramatic findings. During unified government, 
legislation that primarily addressed issues mentioned by the president in the State of 
the Union were available, on average, for less than one-sixth the amount time of bills 
that did not. The results are dramatic for the Speaker’s issues as well, with leadership 
priority bills being available for half as long, on average, as non-priority bills. 
Additionally, all of the differences presented in Figure 4.1 are statistically significant 
(p≤.05). 
The layover times of some of these leadership priority bills, furthermore, were 
incredibly short. For example, in the 110th Congress, the Democratic leadership 
brought to the floor the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 





Figure 4.1: Leadership Priority Legislation and Availability of Bills, 2001-2008 
 
N = 275 
 
of promoting renewal energy and energy conservation. Despite the bill’s complexity, 
it laid over for just two minutes before floor consideration began and ended hours 
later in a party-line vote. During the 109th Congress the Republican leadership pushed 
the Estate Tax and Extension of Tax Relief Act of 2006 to the floor. This bill was 
created in the Rules Committee by combining several difference tax measures—none 
of which ever received significant committee action—and was brought to the floor 
after just a four hour layover.  
A second way we can measure restricted access to legislation is by tracking 
the use of self-executing provisions. As discussed in chapter 3, self-executing 
provisions are language added to special rules that change the content of the bill in 
question upon the adoption of the rule by the full House. For leaders, self-executing 



























changes to legislative language in the Rules Committee. Second, they increase 
leadership control over information about legislation. Because the details of the bill 
are changed in the Rules Committee, rank-and-file members do not get a chance to 
see the final bill language until after the special rule has been brought to the floor or 
passed. This gives a typical member even less time to understand the final product 
before votes are taken. 
Bills were coded as having been self-executed if the rule reported by the 
Committee on Rules for consideration of the bill included at least one self-executing 
provision.127 Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of bills on which leaders used self-
executing provisions for leadership priority and non-priority legislation. Across the 
board, leaders are more likely to use self-executing provisions on legislation 
addressing leadership priority issues. Depending on the measure, leadership priority 
bills are between 65 percent and 77 percent more likely to be self-executed than non-
priority bills. For the bill numbering and presidential priority measure during unified 
government, the differences between priority and non-priority legislation are 
statistically significant (p≤.08). 
Self-executed bills are often bills that had been considered in committee for a 
significant amount of time before being reported. Take, for example, the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act, a major transportation 
authorization bill considered during the 109th Congress. This bill spent a month 
before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. However, the evening 
after being reported the Rules Committee brought a special rule to the floor that  
                                                 
127 Special rules were determined to have done this if they were indicated to have by the “Survey of 






Figure 4.2: Leadership Priority Legislation and the Use of Self-Executing Provisions, 
2001-2008 
 
N = 275 
 
amended the contents of the bill. The bill was brought up for debate on the floor the 
very next morning. 
 Altogether, there is substantial preliminary evidence suggesting leaders 
restrict access to legislative language more often on leadership priority legislation. On 
legislation that addresses leadership priority issues, leaders reduce the amount of 
layover a bill has before it is brought up on the floor for debate and are more likely to 
employ self-executing provisions to alter language after committee consideration. 
These results suggest that leadership goals play a role in leadership strategies and that 














































The Complexity of Legislation 
As well as restricting access to legislative language, leaders also control 
information via the complexity of legislation. Defining and measuring complexity can 
be difficult. There is no single definition of what comprises a complex bill. Krutz 
(2001, 44-46), in his study of omnibus legislating, however, provides a compelling 
definition: “Omnibus bills differ from typical major bills in their scope (number of 
substantive policy areas spanned) and their size, and following from scope and size, 
their complexity (2001, 46, emphasis in original). While Krutz’s goal is to create a 
systematic definition of omnibus legislation, in the process he provides a good 
definition of bill complexity: size and scope. I use these two measures, size—in terms 
of word length—and  scope—in terms of the number of major issue topics the bill 
addresses—as measures of bill complexity. 
 As discussed in chapter 3, complex legislation is by definition more difficult 
for members to analyze and understand. Leaders understand this and find that on 
complex legislation their rank-and-file are more reliant on them for information. By 
addressing leadership priority provisions in complex bills, party leaders reduce the 
risk of rank-and-file members finding compelling reasons to oppose the bill or 
potential opponents finding provisions to develop effective opposition strategies 
around. Figure 4.3 shows the average size of bills, in words, for leadership priority 
and non-priority legislation. For presidential priority bills during unified government, 
and for Speaker’s issues, priority bills are, on average, much longer than non-priority 
bills. For each measure, non-priority bills are about two-thirds the length of priority 





Figure 4.3: Leadership Priority Legislation and Bill Length in Words, 2001-2008 
N = 275 
 
divided government (the 110th Congress), the opposite relationship is found as 
presidential priority bills are actually far shorter than non-priority bills. This, 
essentially, may have been a strategy by the leadership in the House to hinder the 
ability of the president’s policy measures from receiving support. Many of these bills 
may have been brought to the floor as standalone provisions to receive votes of 
disapproval from House majorities. Altogether, these bills were, on average, about 
one-fourth the length of non-priority bills and this difference is statistically 
significant, as well (p≤.05). 
Measuring complexity in terms of scope (the number of major issue topics 
addressed) results in similarly compelling findings. As shown in Figure 4.4, bills 
addressing leadership priority issues typically address more total issue topics. This is 






































Figure 4.4: Leadership Priority Legislation and Number of Issue Topics, 2001-2008 
 
N = 275 
 
typically address an additional 1.5 major issue topics (t=-3.63, p<.001). The 
Speaker’s issues measure similarly shows that priority bills tend to be larger in scope. 
Specifically, these bills, on average, were larger by half an issue topic (t=-1.51, 
p=.067). During divided government, again, presidential priority bills were typically 
smaller in scope. This again may suggest that the House leadership was often 
bringing the president’s legislative provisions to the floor for a clear vote of 
disapproval. 
Altogether, there is substantial preliminary evidence that legislative leaders in 
the House use information control tactics, both in terms of restricting information and 
using bill complexity, to advance leadership priority issues and legislation. However, 









































and others. The next section discusses some of the external factors that influence the 
use of information control. 
 
Other Factors in the Use of Information Control Tactics 
While, as demonstrated above, congressional leaders use information control 
to advance leadership priority legislation, there are several other factors that play into 
the decision to, and the ability of leaders to use these tactics. These factors are 
primarily related to external and environmental contexts than influence congressional 
action and policymaking.  
 
Interest Group Influence 
Interest group activity can strongly influence when leaders use information 
control. As highlighted in chapter 3, leaders are not the only potential sources of 
information for members of Congress. Seeking to learn more about a bill and its 
potential consequences if made into law, members will seek analysis from numerous 
other actors, including interest groups. In this way, lobbying functions as a form of 
legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Interest groups seek to form 
relationships with members of Congress sympathetic to their goals, providing them 
with information and additional resources that help balance the disparity between the 
rank-and-file and their leaders. 
 For leaders hoping to control the flow of information, these are potentially 
dangerous arrangements. Interest groups can provide other perspectives and voices on 




narrative. For some members, interest groups can be more trustworthy sources of 
information than the party leadership, a committee chair, or committee staff. This is 
especially true among moderate members of a caucus whose policy priorities and 
preferences often conflict with those of the leadership. As discussed in chapter 3, part 
of the reason leaders restrict access to information is to reduce the influence of these 
other voices. While some interest groups would likely provide information to support 
leadership positions, there are a great many groups in the pressure system, and it is 
likely some of them, if not most, will find reasons to object to at least some of a bill’s 
provisions. If leaders want to control the information available about a bill then they 
will want to keep the bill and its contents out of the hands of interest groups and 
lobbyists. Some bills have the potential to draw the attention of more organized 
interests than others. We should expect on bills with the potential to attract more 
interest group activity, leaders will restrict access to information more so than on bills 
with less potential. 
 I developed two issue-based measures to approximate the amount of potential 
influence interest groups could have on each bill in my dataset. The Center for 
Responsive Politics records the total amount of spending, as well as the total number 
of lobbyists employed, by interest groups representing more than 100 industries each 
year. These 100 industries, grouped into 13 sectors, were matched to the Policy 
Agendas Project’s 19 major issue topics on the basis of the issues that industry would 
be most concerned with influencing. Most of the industries were assigned to just one 
issue topic. However, 30 industries were coded as having a strong interest in two 




lobbyists employed by industries concerned with each issue topic (in each year) were 
then assigned to each bill on the basis of each of the major issue topics it addressed. 
So, for example, if a bill dealt with both health care and education in 2006, the 
proportion of all interest group spending during 2006 spent by industries concerned 
with either health care or education—roughly 19.5 percent—was assigned to the bill. 
Similarly, the total number of lobbyists employed by industries concerned with health 
care or education in 2006—4,927—was also assigned. These values serve as proxies 
for the lobbying potential for each bill in the sample. For more details on the 
matching of the issue coding to the issue industries, see Appendix C. 
 Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between the spending potential of groups 
and the length of layover for bills between 2001 and 2008. Examining layover times 
by each tenth percentile, there is a generally negative relationship between the 
spending potential of interested groups and layover time. Leaders restrict access to 
legislation the most on bills where lobbying potential is most intense. Altogether the 
25 percent of bills subject to the most potential interest group spending were laid over 
for an average of 102 hours. By comparison, the remaining 75 percent laid over for an 
average of 255 hours. The difference between those numbers is statistically 
significant (t=2.41; p<.01). 
 Figure 4.6 presents the relationship between the lobbying potential (in the 
number of lobbyists employed) and bill layover. Just as with interest group spending, 
there is a negative relationship between the number of employed lobbyists and 
layover time. Leaders restrict access the most on bills where interest group influence 





Figure 4.5: Potential Interest Group Spending and Bill Layover Time, 2001-2008 
N = 275 
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Figure 4.6: Potential Interest Group Lobbying and Bill Layover Time, 2001-2008 
 





































































potential lobbying to the remaining 75 percent of bills, the same differences in 
layover are found as was the case with interest group spending. The top 25 percent 
were laid over for an average of 102 hours, while the remaining bills were laid over 
for 254 hours (t=2.39, p<.01). 
 Altogether, there is substantial preliminary evidence that leaders react to the 
potential of interest group involvement in the legislative process by restricting access 
to legislative language. In this way, they can safeguard their control over information 
within the chamber. With fewer outside sources of information available to rank-and-
file members of Congress and opposition leaders, they will be less likely to find 
something objectionable about the legislation on the table. 
 
Public Salience 
The use of information control tactics is also sensitive to the salience of issues 
among the public. Rank-and-file members of Congress, concerned with their 
reelection, are going to be more cautious about legislation that addresses topics 
salient with their constituents. District-specific salience is likely to motivate members 
of Congress to try to get involved with the legislation early in the process. As Hall 
(1996) describes, there is an “intensity bias” in participation in congressional 
policymaking. Members of Congress who have a particular interest in a bill—often in 
the interest of their reelection—are more likely to commit time, attention, and 
resources to that bill from the early committee stages forward. Individual members 




their districts, making it easier for them to overcome the informational disadvantages 
their offices face (Krehbiel 1991). 
 As discussed in chapter 3, committee chairs and party leaders are less likely to 
attempt to, or be able to restrict information from members who have a strong interest 
in a particular bill. Legislative leaders know these members need to be brought into 
the decision-making fold in order to approve the likelihood of the bill passing the 
committee or chamber, unscathed. But by bringing more members into the fold, 
leaders lose some control over the information that is out there. Generally, the 
salience of an issue can reduce the resource and information disparity between leaders 
and rank-and-file legislators by altering the intensity level and involvement of the 
typical member of Congress. 
 The national salience of issues is potentially even more important for the use 
of information control tactics. Widespread salience of a bill or issue changes the time 
and resources even more members allocate towards the bill than just local salience. 
On a vote of some importance that will likely become an issue in the next election, 
members of Congress are likely to allocate more of their time and staff resources to 
researching and analyzing the bill. With members’ interests primed, it will be more 
difficult for the leadership to successfully restrict access to information. In these 
circumstances, members will remain in tune with the bill as it moves through the 
stages of the legislative process, and be persistent in asking questions and demanding 
answers from committee and party leaders and their staffs. As described in chapter 3, 




that members can overcome their resource and information disadvantages on a 
specific bill. 
 Measuring the national public salience of a bill or issue is a difficult task. 
Scholars have used a number of methods to measure issue salience. One method is to 
use responses to survey questions asking what they believe to be the nation’s “most 
important problem” (Miller, et al. 1976; Burden and Sanberg 2003). The problem, 
however, with this measure is that it could bias responses toward issues respondents 
view negatively. An individual may think an issue is very important, but if they 
approve of government action and performance on that issue, they may not see it as a 
“problem” (Wlezien 2005). Other measures have been tried, as well. One method 
scholars have had some success with is using newspaper articles and editorials to 
estimate the salience of issues among the public (Epstein and Segal 2000; Binder 
1999). Research shows that the public’s attention towards political issues is strongly 
related to the amount of coverage it receives in the news (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 
1982; Page and Shapiro 1992, 12-13; Pew Research Center 1999; McCombs 2006). 
Mayhew (1991) and Binder (1999) both use New York Times editorials as a basis for 
determining the salience of issues, and subsequently, legislation. I similarly rely on 
New York Times editorials.  
I used a sample of 10 percent of all editorials that appeared in print in the 
Times between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2008. Each editorial was coded for 
the issue topic and subtopic it most directly addressed. For each year, the number of 
editorials on each issue topic was summed. This value was then divided by the total 




salience for each issue area for each year.128 Bills were then assigned a value based 
on the salience of the issue it primarily addressed. For example, in 2008, 8 editorials 
in the sample addressed the ‘U.S. banking system and financial institution regulation’ 
(issue code 1501). A total of 116 editorials that year were coded to have contained 
issue content. Consequently all bills that primarily addressed the banking system and 
the regulation of the financial institution in 2008 were assigned a value of 6.9 percent. 
Given that the most salient bills will draw the most attention from rank-and-
file members of Congress throughout the legislative process, we should find that 
leaders will be less able to use information control tactics on these bills. Figure 4.7 
shows the relationship between the public salience of bills using the New York Times 
based measure described above and layover times. Bills with salience scores above 
the average were coded as highly salient while all other bills were coded as less 
salient. Altogether, bills addressing highly salient issues have, on average, much 
longer layover times than bills addressing less salient issues. Specifically, highly 
salient bills were laid over for an average of 308 hours compared to 186 hours for less 
salient bills. In other words, salient bills were laid over 40 percent longer than less 
salient bills, although the difference between these averages is not statistically 
significant (p=.203). 
 Altogether, there is evidence that interest group influence and public salience 
influence the strategic choices of congressional leaders. The next section considers 
these factors and others in a multivariate setting.  
                                                 
128 To ensure that the 10 percent sample closely approximated the results of a 100 percent of the 
editorials, I also coded every editorial for the last three months of 2008 and compared the results to a 
10 percent sample of those cases. The values for each issue area were not substantively different 





Figure 4.7: Public Salience and Bill Layover Time, 2001-2008 
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Multivariate Analyses 
The primary hypotheses in this chapter are that leaders will use information 
control to further leadership priority legislation, that they will protect their control 
over information when the potential for interest group influence is high, and will be 
less able to restrict information on the most salient legislation. Preliminary evidence 
of these relationships was presented above. But fully understanding the relationship 
between these factors and information control tactics requires the use of multivariate 
regression analysis. 
 Multivariate tests are done on the two types of information control tactics that 
measures were developed for: restricting access to legislation, and using the 























bill layover time and the use of self-executing provisions. For complexity, the 
dependent variables are the size of the bills and their scope. Bills addressing 
leadership priority issues should have less layover time, be more likely to be self-
executed, and be more likely to be large or complex in terms of size or scope. 
Similarly, bills with the potential for the most lobbying should be laid over for less 
time, self-executed more often, and be larger and more complex. Finally, the most 
salient bills should be laid over for longer periods, on average, should be less likely to 
be self-executed, and be smaller and less complex than other legislation. 
 
Restricting Access to Legislation 
The first set of tests analyzes the total layover time a bill received. The 
dependent variable here is layover time in hours. To test the impact of covariates on 
this dependent variable, the best tool is a duration model. Duration models assess the 
impact of covariates on the likelihood of an event occurring. These models are quite 
common in medical studies, modeling likelihood of the occurrence of death among 
patients. For this reason they were often termed “survival models”. However, 
duration models have expanded in recent years into political science and have been 
used to analyze numerous political phenomena such as congressional retirements 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997), and policy adoption and repeal (Berry and 
Berry 1990; Ragusa 2010). These models are useful for testing layover times as they 
literally are testing the duration that a bill is laid over. 
 For this dependent variable, specifically, I use a Cox Proportional Hazards 




models are typically used to make predictions about the specific duration times of 
individual cases by assuming some general distribution in the data, such as a Weibull 
or Log-Normal distribution. However, the assumption of an unknown distribution can 
lead to false inferences (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). For the purposes of this 
chapter, I am most interested in understanding the impact of covariates on layover 
times, rather than predicting the layover of specific bills. The CPH model is best for 
this because it does not assume any distribution. The downside is the inability to 
estimate specific layover times, but the benefit is deriving more accurate estimates of 
the impacts of the covariates.129 
 The primary independent variables in this model include the measures of party 
leadership and presidential priority, lobbying potential, and public salience that were 
discussed in the above sections. Additionally, several other control variables are 
included that could impact layover times. These variables can be grouped into three 
general types: contentiousness, procedure, and legislation type. Specifically, there are 
two variables for contentiousness: vote margin, and whether or not the final passage 
vote was a party vote. The logic behind including these variables is that it may be the 
potential contentiousness of the deliberations and vote on a bill that are driving the 
leadership to reduce access to information rather than the issue content or outside 
interest. These measures control for that possibility. Specifically, vote margin is 
                                                 
129 CPH models also require that the proportional hazards assumption is met. This assumption requires 
that the impact of covariates on the hazards do not vary over time. In other words, the impact of 
covariates does not increase or decrease as the duration of time studied continues. There are several 
tests of this assumption. Two prominent tests are the link test and Harrell's ρ test. The results of these 
tests for each covariate and for the model cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proportion hazards 
assumption holds for either model presented in this chapter. Schoenfeld residuals were also plotted and 
do not show any signs that the assumption does not hold. The results of these diagnostics can be found 
in Appendix D. See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for more on the proportional hazards 




calculated as the absolute differences between the yea and nay votes for the bill and 
party vote is a dummy variable indicating if the final passage vote featured 90 percent 
of one caucus voting against 90 percent of the other. While party leaders clearly do 
not know what the exact outcome of final passage votes will be on bills before they 
occur, as discussed in chapter 3, they use their whip organizations to make an 
educated guess, and rarely bring bills to the floor without some idea of the magnitude 
of support for them. It is also true that the use of information control tactics likely 
alters the contentiousness of the final vote. If party leaders are successful at 
controlling information they may reduce the contentiousness of final deliberations. 
Nevertheless, these measures should be seen as a rough approximation of the 
contentiousness of the bill and issues under consideration. 
Among procedural factors there is one important variable: a dichotomous 
indicator of whether or not the bill was considered under suspension of the rules. 
Bills considered under suspension pass through the chamber rapidly. For this reason 
we should expect that this variable to have a strong, negative impact on layover time. 
 Two control variables deal with the type of legislation. The first is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the bill dealt with appropriations. With 
appropriations bills, the majority party feels a great deal of pressure to get them 
passed. Without passing an appropriations package, Congress runs a risk of a work 
stoppage. But more importantly, appropriations bills allow the majority to influence 
the enactment and enforcement of every law on the books. While repealing a specific 
public law may be too cumbersome, Congress can cut spending. While passing new 




programs can achieve some similar ends. As a result, I expect that the majority 
leadership will bring appropriations bill to the floor more quickly than typical 
legislation.130 
 The other variable controls for Congress’ need to respond quickly to national 
emergencies. In 2001, Congress was faced with an external shock requiring quick 
action: the September 11th terrorist attacks. A dichotomous variable is included that 
indicates if the bill was part of an immediate response to the event. These bills should 
have come to the floor much quicker than the average. 
 Finally, variables are included to deal with temporal aspects of the data. First, 
a dichotomous variable is included that indicates if a bill was introduced during the 
second session of a congress. Bills introduced during the second session should be 
more likely to move through the legislative process quickly simply because there is 
less time to pass the bill. Additionally, dichotomous variables are included for the 
108th, 109th, and 110th congresses to control for the possibility that there are congress-
specific patterns in layover times. Furthermore, these variables ensure than the rest of 
the coefficients are not influenced by congress-specific patterns. 
 Table 4.1 presents the results of the regression analyses. The coefficients in 
this model predict the impact of the covariate on the likelihood of layover ending. A 
positive coefficient means that an increase in the independent variable increases the 
likelihood of an abbreviated layover period. Two different models are presented. 
Model #1 controls for lobbying potential using the spending measure and Model #2  
 
                                                 
130 Additionally, all the models in this chapter were run excluding appropriations bills. The results were 





Table 4.1: Determinants of Reduced Layover Time on Important Legislation, 2001-2008 
 Model #1  Model #2 
  coefficient std. error p   coefficient std. error p 
        Leadership Priority Bill        
Speaker's issues 0.526 0.190 <0.01  0.526 0.190 <0.01 
Presidential priority –  
   unified Gov. -0.006 0.010 0.26  -0.006 0.010 0.26 
Presidential priority –  
   divided Gov. 0.024 0.010 0.01  0.023 0.010 0.01 
        External Factors        
Lobbying potential –  
   Spending 0.792 0.288 <0.01  -- -- -- 
Lobbying potential –  
   Number of lobbyists/1k -- -- --  0.036 0.013 <0.01 
Public salience -0.056 0.037 0.07  -0.056 0.037 0.07 
        Contentiousness        
Vote margin -0.001 0.001 0.16  -0.001 0.001 0.18 
Party vote -0.275 0.225 0.11  -0.273 0.224 0.11 
        Procedure        
Considered under suspension 0.383 0.236 0.05  0.388 0.236 0.05 
        Legislation type        
Appropriations bill 0.273 0.164 0.05  0.261 0.164 0.06 
September 11th bill 2.694 0.758 <0.01  2.680 0.759 <0.01 
        Session        
Second session 0.208 0.136 0.06  0.217 0.136 0.06 
        Congress        
108th Congress -0.229 0.188 0.23  -0.233 0.188 0.22 
109th Congress -0.300 0.190 0.11  -0.330 0.191 0.09 
110th Congress -0.335 0.188 0.07  -0.375 0.189 0.05 
        N 272  272 
AIC 2492  2491 
                
Note: Coefficients were fit with a Cox proportional hazards model. Positive coefficients indicate an 
increased "hazard", or, an increased likelihood of an abbreviated layover period. P-values are one-
tailed for all independent variables except the congress indicators. 
 
controls for lobbying potential using the number of lobbyists measure. Both models 




First, leadership priority bills have a much higher, statistically-significant 
likelihood of being laid over for shorter amounts of time. Hazard ratios can be 
calculated from the coefficient estimates. The hazard ratios can be interpreted as the 
changes in likelihood that an event will occur—in this case that the duration of 
layover time will be cut short—given an increase in the independent variable in 
question. Figure 4.8 shows hazard ratios presented as percent changes in likelihood 
for select variables in the regression. Values were calculated using the coefficients in 
Model#1.131 These predictions indicate that Speaker’s issues bills were almost 70 
percent more likely to have reduced layover times than all other bills. Similarly 
striking, an increase in one standard deviation in the number of times a president 
mentioned an issue during the most recent State of the Union address, during times of 
divided government, resulted in an almost 31 percent increased likelihood of reduced 
layover. Interestingly, results for presidential priority bills are only found during 
divided government, suggesting party leaders in the House restrict information on 
issues important to opposition presidents to control the deliberations and perhaps 
bring these bills to the floor for a quick vote of disapproval. These results strongly 
suggest that legislative leaders restrict access to legislation more often on bills that 
are party and presidential priorities than on other legislation. 
The results also suggest that potential interest group influence has a strong 
effect on layover. Increases in both the spending potential of interest groups and the 
number of lobbyists employed by interest groups that might be interested in a bill 
relate to a decrease in layover time. The hazard ratio for lobbying potential predicts 
that a one standard deviation increase in spending potential results in a nearly 50  
                                                 





Figure 4.8: The Influence of Select Variables on Layover Time 
Note: Values are predicted hazard ratios from Model #1 of Table 4.1 interpreted as percent changes in 
likelihood that layover will be reduced. 
 
percent increase in the likelihood that layover will be cut short. Altogether, these 
results suggest that the potential of interest group influence causes leaders to more 
tightly control access to information in the House. Public salience also significantly 
influences the layover of important legislation. The hazard ratio suggest a one 
standard deviation increase in the proportion of Times editorials dedicated to an issue 
results in a 17 percent decrease in the likelihood of a bill having a shortened layover 
period. Leaders have a more difficult time controlling information on salient 
legislation than on legislation less important to the public. 
Several of the control variables significantly influenced layover times, as well. 


















after an abbreviated layover period. This reflects the importance that leaders place on 
the passage of spending bills. Additionally, legislation passed in the aftermath of the 
September 11th attacks were laid over for far less time than most legislation. This 
outcome, if nothing else, suggests that Congress can be responsive to the public’s 
perceived demand for action. However, it also may say something about propensity of 
leaders to take advantage of opportunities. Members of Congress risked great harm to 
their political careers in opposing any legislation that responded to the attacks. 
Leaders no doubt knew this to be the case and, similarly, no doubt knew that 
opposition to such legislation on the basis of procedure—specifically the length of 
layover or the availability of legislation language—would fall on deaf ears with the 
American public. In pushing this legislation through the chamber expediently, the 
leadership advanced preferred legislation without allowing for objection on the part 
of the rank-and-file or the minority party.  
Additionally, the session in which a bill is considered is important and the 
impact follows expectation. Bills introduced during the second session of a congress 
were significantly more likely to have their layover reduced. Finally, as expected, 
bills considered under suspension were more likely to layover quickly. 
A second set of tests investigates the use of self-executing provisions. The 
dependent variable for this regression is a binary indicator (equal to one) if the bill in 
question was self-executed using a special rule. Since the data are binary, logistic 
regression was used to calculate regression coefficients. The primary independent 




the bill, and the public salience of the legislation are the same as in the previous 
models. 
In addition, several variables are controlled for. As in the previous models, the 
controls for contentiousness—vote margin and party vote—are included. Again, these 
variables control for the possibility that self-execution is a strategy used because of 
the potential contentiousness of the deliberations, rather than the concerns 
hypothesized about. The dichotomous measure of appropriations bills is included. 
Appropriations bills are typically considered in a relatively open process. As a result 
we should expect appropriations bills to be far less likely to be self-executed. Just as 
in the previous models, control variables are also included for temporal aspects of the 
bills’ consideration. A dichotomous variable is again included indicating if the bill 
was considered during the second legislative session. It is likely that bills considered 
in the second session of any Congress are more likely to be self-executed because 
there is less time to get the bill written and passed in the second session than there is 
in the first. Finally, dummy variables for each congress (with the 107th Congress 
excluded) are included in the regression to control for congress-specific effects on the 
estimations. 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the analyses. Again, the table shows two 
models—one measuring lobbying potential using spending and one measuring it 
using the number of employed lobbyists. The results between the models are very 
similar. In general, there is strong evidence that leadership priority bills—as 
measured using the Speaker’s issues variable—are much more likely to be self-





Table 4.2: Determinants of Self-Execution on Important Legislation, 2001-2008 
 Model #1  Model #2 
  coefficient std. error p   coefficient std. error p 
        Leadership Priority Bill        
Speaker's issues 0.599 0.426 0.08  0.598 0.426 0.08 
Presidential priority – 
unified Gov. 0.014 0.028 0.31  0.014 0.028 0.31 
Presidential priority – 
divided Gov. -0.025 0.024 0.15  -0.025 0.024 0.15 
        External Factors        
Lobbying potential – 
spending 0.498 0.751 0.25  -- -- -- 
Lobbying potential – 
number of lobbyists*1,000 -- -- --  0.023 0.000 0.23 
Public salience 0.024 0.060 0.34  0.024 0.059 0.35 
        Contentiousness        
Vote margin -0.004 0.001 <0.01  -0.004 0.001 <0.01 
Party vote 0.480 0.458 0.15  0.482 0.458 0.15 
        Legislation Type        
Appropriations bill -0.338 0.420 0.21  -0.352 0.423 0.20 
        Session        
Second session 0.178 0.345 0.30  0.179 0.345 0.30 
        Congress        
108th Congress -0.837 0.519 0.05  -0.839 0.518 0.05 
109th Congress -0.069 0.456 0.44  -0.092 0.458 0.42 
110th Congress -0.215 0.447 0.32  -0.245 0.453 0.29 
        constant -0.639 0.680 0.35  -0.636 0.679 0.35 
        N 272  272 
ePCP 0.704  0.704 
                
Note: Coefficients estimated using logistic regression. P-values are one-tailed tests for all variables 
except the congress indicators and the constant. 
 
and statistically significant. The measures of presidential priority bills, during unified 
government, comes close to conventional levels of statistical significance suggesting 




 Figure 4.9 presents predicted changes in the likelihood of self-execution for 
the primary independent variables in the models. The first bar shows the percentage 
change in the likelihood of self-execution when the bill addresses a Speaker’s issue 
compared to when it does not. These leadership priority bills have an almost 30 
percent chance of being self-executed while non-priority measures have a 20 percent 
chance.  
11 
Figure 4.9: Predicted Effect of Variables on the Use of Self-Execution, 2001-2008 
Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated using the coefficients in Model #1 in Table 4.2. Values 
represent the mean percentage change in likelihood of self-executing. For the bill numbering variable, 
this change is as the values moves from 0 to 1. For the other variables the change represents a one 
standard deviation increase in the variable.  
 
This difference means that bills addressing leadership priority issues are, on 
average, 48 percent more likely to be self-executed than non-priority bills. For 


















statistically significant. The predicted effects, however, show that on average, 
presidential priority bills are almost 10 percent more likely to be self-executed than 
non-priority bills during unified government and 20 percent less likely during divided 
government. This conforms to expectation. Leaders, to some degree, self-execute bills 
of same-party presidents to obtain the same advantages as with other leadership 
priority bills. By contrast they are more likely to bring the priorities of opposition of 
presidents to the floor for a straight up or down vote allowing the House majority 
party to create a record of opposition to the president. 
 The models do not find potential interest group influence to have any 
significant effects on the use of self-executing provisions. The coefficients for both 
measures are positive suggesting that an increase in lobbying potential increases the 
likelihood of self-execution, but they are both statistically insignificant and the 
substantive effects are small (see Figure 4.9). The public salience of a bill also did not 
significantly affect the likelihood of self-execution. Among the controls, the most 
notable effect is that for vote margin. Bills with smaller margins are significantly 
more likely to be self-executed than bills with larger margins. This suggests the 
potential contentiousness of bills is an important motivating force for party leaders 
when they choose to self-execute. Leaders are more likely to use this tactic if they 
think a vote will be close. 
Altogether, the regression models in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide support for 
the hypothesis that legislative leaders will use information control tactics primarily to 
advance leadership priority legislation. Bills addressing leadership priority issues are 




Additionally, leadership priority bills are more likely to be self-executed, especially 
using the Speaker’s issues measure. The results of the analyses also provide some 
mixed evidence on the influence of interest group involvement on Capitol Hill. On 
one hand, heavy interest group involvement appears to be perceived as a threat by 
legislative leaders and they restrict access to legislative language in the face of it. On 
the other hand, the likelihood of self-execution is not significantly affected by the 
potential for interest group influence. Public salience appears also to only affect 
leaders’ use of restricted layover reducing the likelihood that leaders will use this 
strategy. These results, generally, may suggest that reduced layover is a more central 
to information control than self-execution. Self-execution, as discussed, achieves 
more than just restricting access to information. It also allows the leadership to 
substantially alter the substance of legislation. As such, other factors may play into 
the decision to use this tactic. One controlled for in the models—contentiousness—
appears to be a major consideration. The next section analyses leadership use of bill 
complexity as an information control tactic. 
 
Complexity of Legislation 
Legislative leaders use both the size and the scope of legislation as a form of 
information control. The first test analyses the use of the scope of legislation. Scope, 
again, is measured as the number of major issue topics a bill addresses. Within the 
dataset, this ranges from a minimum of one to a maximum of fifteen issue topics. 




on scope.132 The measures of leadership priority legislation are the same here as in 
the above models, as is the measure of public salience. Unfortunately, we cannot test 
the possibility that leaders respond to lobbying potential by utilizing the scope of 
legislation because legislation that is larger in scope, by definition would potentially 
attract more interest group involvement. The expectations are that bills addressing 
leadership priority issues are more likely to be large in scope as leaders take 
advantage of the rank-and-file’s inability to digest the contents of these bills quickly 
and efficiently; and that bills addressing salient issues will be less likely to be larger 
in scope. 
 The control variables from the previous models for contentiousness are 
included in this model, as well. Additionally the dichotomous appropriations variable 
is also included. Appropriations bills routinely address multiple issue topics and 
should be larger in scope. Additionally, the temporal aspect of the consideration of 
the bills is controlled for using dummies for each congress (excluding the 107th 
Congress) and for the second session. 
 Table 4.3 present the results of the analysis. The results suggest that bills 
primarily addressing leadership priority issues are typically larger in scope. The 
Speaker’s issues variable is statistically significant and indicates that these bills are, 
on average, almost one issue area larger in scope than non-priority bills.133 During 
times of unified government, presidential priority bills are also significantly larger.  
                                                 
132 An argument can be made that a count model would be best for estimating these effects. However, 
count models add additional assumptions that are problematic for this data. A poisson regression 
model was estimated anyway, and its findings corroborate those of the OLS model. Since the OLS 
model is simpler to interpret, its results are presented here. 
133 The poisson model estimates a similar substantive impact, estimating that leadership priority bills 









std. error p 
    
Leadership Priority Bill 
   Speaker's issues 0.967 0.499 0.03 
Presidential Priority - Unified Gov. 0.048 0.028 0.04 
Presidential Priority - Divided Gov. -0.026 0.024 0.15 
    
External Factors    
Public salience 0.076 0.066 0.13 
    
Contentiousness    
Vote margin -0.002 0.001 0.07 
Party vote 0.290 0.588 0.31 
    
Legislation Type    
Appropriations bill 1.685 0.391 <0.01 
    
Session    
Second session 0.175 0.366 0.32 
    
Congress    
108th Congress 0.500 0.488 0.15 
109th Congress 1.000 0.494 0.02 
110th Congress 1.046 0.487 0.02 
    
constant 1.161 0.729 0.06 
    
N 272 
adj. R-square 0.074 
        
Note: Coefficients estimates using Ordinary Least Squares regression. P-values are one-tailed for all 
independent variables except the congress indicators and the constant. 
 
Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in the number of mentions an issue 
receives in a State of the Union address equates to a one-half issue area increase in 
the scope of related bills. It appears leaders use large bills as vehicles for leadership 
priority legislation. The use of complex bills imposes more time and resource costs on 





 The results for public salience are less impressive. More salient bills are 
slightly larger in scope, on average, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Unlike with layover, it appears the salience of legislation does not hamper the 
decision of leaders to use bill complexity as a form of information control. 
Contentious bills, in terms of vote margin, by contrast, are significantly larger in 
scope when the vote is closer. Appropriations bills, as expected, also address more 
issue topics than typical legislation. On average, the typical appropriations bill 
addressed an additional 1.7 issue topics. This reflects the often complex jurisdictions 
held by Appropriations subcommittees as well as the prevalence of omnibus 
appropriations bills in recent congresses. There is also evidence that legislation in 
general, is becoming more complex. The dichotomous variables controlling for 
congress-specific effects are in the positive direction and in the 109th and 110th 
congresses have statistically significant impacts. Specifically, the coefficients 
estimate that bills in the 109th and 110th congresses, all else equal, were typically one 
issue topic larger than bills in the 107th Congress. This result suggests complex 
legislation is increasingly becoming a norm in congressional policymaking. 
 The next analysis addresses the size of bills. Size, here, is measured as a bill’s 
word length. The longer a bill, the longer it should take a rank-and-file member of 
Congress to vet. Just as with scope, the expectation is that leaders will exploit the 
time and resource problems faced by typical legislators by using the size of bills as a 
vehicle for leadership priority measures. Specifically, bills containing leadership 
priority issues should be, on average, longer than those that do not. Because of the 




analysis. Leadership priority bills are measured here the same way as they were in the 
above models. The control variables in this model are the same as those in the model 
for scope, but lobbying potential could be included in this model, as well. 
 Table 4.4 presents the results of the analysis. The results present some support 
for the hypotheses. The coefficient for Speaker’s issues bills does not reach a 
conventional threshold for statistical significance. However, during unified 
government presidential priority legislation appears to be significantly longer, all else 
equal. Specifically, retransformed estimates indicate that during unified government, 
a one standard deviation increase in the number of State of the Union mentions of the 
issue primarily addressed by a bill results in a 44 percent increase in word length. 
During divided government, the opposite relationship is apparent. Presidential 
priority bills are significantly smaller during divided government than non-priority 
bills. A one-standard deviation increase in the number of State of the Union mentions 
results in a 26 percent decrease in word length.  
Neither lobbying potential nor public salience significantly influences the 
word length of bills. Both have positive coefficients, and lobbying potential comes 
close to statistical significance suggesting that bills with the potential for more 
interest group involvement tend to be longer, but the relationship is not strong. As 
with scope, vote margin is significantly related to word length. Longer bills typically 
pass by smaller margins. This suggests again that bill complexity may be affected by 
the contentiousness of the deliberations. 
Appropriations bills are, all else equal, significantly longer than typical bills. 






Table 4.4: Determinants of the Size of Important Legislation, 2001-2008 
  coefficient robust  std. error p 
    
Leadership Priority Bill 
   Speaker's issues 0.057 0.299 0.43 
Presidential priority - unified gov. 0.035 0.017 0.02 
Presidential priority - divided gov. -0.024 0.015 0.05 
    
External Factors    
Lobbying potential - spending 0.605 0.473 0.10 
Public salience 0.020 0.040 0.30 
    
Contentiousness    
Vote margin -0.001 0.001 0.08 
Party vote 0.016 0.341 0.48 
    
Legislation Type    
Appropriations bill 0.704 0.235 <0.01 
    
Session    
Second session -0.061 0.215 0.39 
    
Congress    
108th Congress 0.516 0.290 0.04 
109th Congress 0.332 0.293 0.13 
110th Congress 0.452 0.291 0.06 
    
constant 8.797 0.444 <0.01 
    
N 272 
adj. R-square 0.039 
        
Note: Coefficients were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression. Coefficients indicate the 
impact of covariates on the natural log of the word length of bills. P-values are one-tailed for all 
independent variables except the congress indicators and the constant. 
 
frequency at which appropriations are passed as omnibus packages. Like with scope, 
there is some systematic evidence that bills are getting longer over time. The 
coefficient for the 108th and 110th congresses indicates that bills in those congresses 




also in a positive direction, but is not statistically significant. Still, this suggests bills 
are getting somewhat longer over time. 
 Altogether, there is significant evidence that leaders use the complexity of 
legislation as an information control tool. The analyses find evidence that leaders use 
both the scope and the size of legislation. Specifically, leaders appear to use scope on 
both leadership priority and presidential priority bills, and size on just presidential 
priority bills. By increasing the complexity of these bills leaders make it more 
difficult for the typical member of Congress to become informed on their contents, 
and subsequently become involved in shaping the bills. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the analyses in this chapter strongly suggest that information 
control tactics are implemented by legislative leaders as a form of goal-achieving 
behavior. The evidence here demonstrates that priority bills often have their layover 
times reduced, are more likely to be self-executed, and are more likely to be 
considered as complex legislative packages. Each of these actions makes it even more 
difficult for the typical member of Congress to overcome the information and 
resource disadvantages they face throughout the policymaking process. 
 Additionally, there is evidence that leaders use information control in 
response to external pressures. When there is a greater potential for interest groups to 
influence the content of legislation, party leaders are more likely to restrict access to 
legislative language. This disables an alternative source of information for members 




information. Furthermore, salience of bills with the public can also affect the use of 
information control tactics. Specifically, party leaders are less able to restrict layover 
times on bills that are salient with the public. 
 Finally, this chapter introduced several new measures and tests for 
congressional studies. First, a measure of bill layover was developed to gauge the 
availability of legislative language. Until these analyses, this remained an un-studied 
aspect of congressional politics. Second, analyses were done on the use of self-
executing provisions. This also has been an understudied and poorly understood 
aspect of congressional policymaking. Third, this chapter makes broad use of the 
Policy Agendas Project’s issue classifications, leveraging them into measures of 
leadership priority legislation, interest group influence, and public salience. The 
results demonstrate that an issue-based approach to coding aspects of congressional 
action can provide a great deal of insight. 
 Ultimately, the results of this chapter further highlight how information 
control is used as a source of leadership power for legislative leaders in the House of 
Representatives. It demonstrates that information control tactics are used strategically 
by leaders on important legislation to achieve identifiable goals, and provides 
systematic and quantifiable context for the findings in chapter 3. But it also hints at 
how these tactics can be both beneficial and detrimental to the typical member of 
Congress. In helping pass major tenets of the party’s platform, these tactics facilitate 
goal achievement for all or most members of the majority caucus. However, restricted 
access to legislative language and the expedited consideration of important, and often 




details of the legislation even when they want to be. The next chapter highlights the 
tension that information control creates between leaders and the rank-and-file 







Chapter 5:  Information and Trust in Legislative Leaders 
 
“If you don’t trust the information they [committees and party leaders] 
are giving you, it’s a problem.” 
  Rank-and-File Staffer134 
 
“Who you trust to tell you what is going on is what is relevant.” 
 Leadership Staffer135 
 
Information control tactics give legislative leaders in the House of 
Representatives great influence over the chamber. The previous chapters indicate that 
leaders can effectively gather, restrict, and provide information to lead the legislative 
process, and that they use these tactics strategically, focusing primarily on their 
priority legislation and to some degree on the bills with the potential for significant 
outside influence. But not all the effects of information control are intended. While 
leaders can use these tactics in support of partisan priority legislation, they can also 
cause some damage to their standing with the rank-and-file in the chamber. 
Specifically, where information control tactics run up again the goals of rank-and-file 
members of Congress they create tension and undermine the trust legislators have in 
their leaders. 
The amount of civility in Congress has generally eroded since the 1980s 
(Uslaner 1993; Jamieson and Falk 2000). Partisanship has been a scapegoat for the 
decline of trust and civility, but it does not explain the existence of distrust within 
party caucuses. The use of aggressive leadership tactics, like information control, is 
likely to create tension among co-partisans and members of a committee. 
                                                 
134 Interview 22 




This chapter examines the influence information control tactics have on the 
trust between legislative leaders and the rank-and-file. Drawing upon the interviews 
conducted for this study, I find that information control tactics cause rank-and-file 
members of Congress and their staff to be more skeptical of leaders and the 
information they provide. This is especially true of members and staff out-of-step 
ideologically with the mainstream of the party caucus. More generally, the different 
goals held by leaders and the rank-and-file in Congress create a disconnect within the 
House that is only exacerbated by the use of restrictive tactics. Ultimately, the 
evidence suggests information control tactics may be a powerful tactic for legislative 
leaders, but their use is not without consequences. 
 
Trust, Leadership, and Information 
Most congressional scholarship on member’s approval or disapproval of their 
legislative leaders focuses on leadership selection and retention (see, Jessee and 
Malhotra 2010). However, there are numerous other aspects of leadership/rank-and-
file relations worth understanding. For example, for leaders to be effective they have 
to enjoy the general support and trust of their rank-and-file. Without such trust, 
followers are unlikely to follow and leaders unlikely to be able to effectively lead. 
While political science has paid relatively little attention to the importance of trust 
and good standing regarding the relationships followers have with their leaders, other 
fields including psychology, sociology, and organizational leadership have developed 




Literature on leadership trust largely highlights trust as either a function of the 
traits of the truster (follower) and the trustee (leader), or of the actions of the leaders 
(Burke, Sims, Lazzara, and Salas 2007). While traits undoubtedly are important, they 
are largely static. Relative to the topic at hand is how leader actions influence the 
level of confidence placed in them by their followers. A review of scholarship on the 
antecedents of trust shows that there are a number of factors in its development, but 
that information sharing and communication can play a major role. 
The literature on trust in leadership identifies numerous antecedents to its 
development. The influential model of trust developed by Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman (1995) categorized its antecedents into three broad leader traits or 
behaviors: benevolence, integrity, and ability. Much of the literature on antecedents 
falls under one of these overarching categories. 
Benevolence concerns the degree to which leaders show respect or concern 
for their followers. This antecedent is closely tied to the literature on transformational 
leaders who take action to gain the trust of their followers so they can achieve desired 
outcomes. Among the steps these types of leaders take is to consult with subordinates. 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, and Fetter (1990) argue that leaders can gain trust 
from their followers by consulting with them on important decisions and allowing 
their opinions to have an impact on decision outcomes. In doing so, leaders 
demonstrate they respect the opinions of their followers. Leaders can also gain trust 
simply by showing general concern for their followers (Jung and Avolio 2000). 
Integrity, or the perceived fairness of leadership actions, is also important to 




followers or their ideas over others risk alienating the less favored groups (Whitener 
1997). Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that the procedures leaders use to 
make decisions, and the perceived fairness of these procedures, have a large influence 
on the trust developed (Konovsky and Pugh 1994). 
The ability of a leader to produce results and achieve successes also has an 
influence on the development of trust. Robinson (1996), for example, argues that the 
amount of trust placed in a leader is influenced by the ability of that leader to meet 
the expectations of their followers. Ahearn, et al (2004), in a different way, find that a 
leader’s political skill, or ability, can influence trust. They contend that leaders with 
more political skill are able to successfully mask any ulterior motives and encourage 
their followers to believe they are successfully achieving the goals of the team. In this 
way, ability is tied back to a leader’s benevolence and integrity. 
Beyond benevolence, integrity, and ability, there are a few other factors that 
are presumed to have some influence on how much confidence followers place in 
their leaders. The length of the relationship between a leader and a follower is likely 
to be positively related to trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Essentially the longer the 
relationship, the more interaction the actors have presumably had. Generally 
speaking, followers will become more accustomed to the way their leaders act as time 
progresses and have a better understanding of leadership motives. However, it is also 
entirely possible that familiarity may breed discontent, as well.  
The organization leadership literature also suggests that congruence of values 




and opinions, the more likely they are to trust their actions (Govier 1997; Jung and 
Avolio 2000; Sitkin and Roth 1993). 
Information sharing and communication is another factor often mentioned as 
an antecedent to trust (Whitner, Brodt, Korsgaard and Werner 1998; Zaccaro et al. 
2001; Burke, Sims, Lazzara, and Salas 2007). Leaders who appear to be forthcoming 
and accurate with information have been shown to engender more trust among their 
followers (Roberts and O’Reilly 1974; O’Reilly 1977; O’Reilly and Roberts 1977; 
Yeager 1978). Similarly, followers are more likely to see their leaders as trustworthy 
when they provide adequate explanations for their actions (Folger and Konovsky 
1989; Konovsky and Cropanzano 1991). Dirks and Ferrin (2002), in a meta-analysis, 
find that followers’ confidence in their leadership is correlated with belief in the 
information provided by leaders. Perhaps most important for the topic at hand, a 
number of studies have found that open communication between leaders and 
followers enhances the level of trust found among all parties (Butler 1991; Farris, 
Senner, and Butterfield 1973; Hart, Capps, Cangemi, and Caillouet 1986). 
 Altogether, the development of leader/follower trust is complex. Identified 
here are six potential antecedents: leadership benevolence, integrity, and ability, 
length of the relationship between leader and follower, congruence of values between 
leader and follower, and the quality of information sharing and communication. 
These factors are far from distinct. Rather, one can see how the willingness of a 
leader to openly share information would affect followers’ view of his or her 




leaders and followers could influence how openly leaders share information with their 
followers. 
 
Trust and Congressional Leaders 
The above discussion provides a general overview of how trust develops 
among leaders and followers. To understand how the use of information control 
tactics may influence the relationship between legislative leaders and rank-and-file 
members of Congress, we must consider how these antecedents fit within the specific 
context of the House of Representatives. The first two antecedents—benevolence and 
integrity—are difficult to discuss in any detail because of the broad meanings of the 
concepts. However, the remaining four: leadership ability, the length of relationship 
between leader and follower, congruence of values between leader and follower, and 
the quality of information sharing and communication, can be discussed with some 
care. Each of these factors may have some influence on the amount of confidence 
rank-and-file members of Congress have in their leadership. Investigating each in 
some detail will provide some specific hypotheses about why trust or distrust may 
form between legislative leaders and the rank-and-file. 
 
Leader Ability 
A leader’s ability to get things done has been shown to have some influence 
on the rank-and-file’s trust in and approval of his or her leadership. There is some 
evidence that a leader’s ability to be successful at leadership tasks, such as building 




1976; Canon 1989; Sinclair 1995). In the realm of elections, successes or failures can 
also influence how the rank-and-file view their leadership. Parties that sustain heavy 
losses in an election are likely to lose some trust in the abilities of their leadership. 
Conversely, leaders or parties that gain seats in an election rarely suffer from any 
uprising in their ranks. 
 Cox and McCubbins’ (2005) influential theory also suggests that leader ability 
can influence a leader’s standing with the rank-and-file through accruing legislative 
accomplishments and subsequently bolstering their electoral fortunes. The rank-and-
file delegate powers to their leaders in order to achieve successes that benefit the 
group. If these successes are not achieved, leaders will lose the faith of their rank-
and-file. 
 Altogether, the ability leaders demonstrate in office will affect how they are 
viewed by their fellow partisans. Skilled leaders are likely to gain the faith and trust 
of their followers, while less skilled leaders are apt to lose it. We should expect rank-
and-file members of Congress to have less trust in their legislative leaders when they 
are failing legislatively and electorally than when they are succeeding. 
 
Length of Relationship 
The above literature also suggests that the length of time leaders and followers 
have been together can positively influence the amount of trust in the relationship. 
Within the scholarly literature most studies of congressional tenure relate to benefits 
members gain through increased seniority (see, for example, Goodwin 1959; 




Congress (see, for example, Theriault 1998; Wolak 2007). However, there is some 
evidence that congressional familiarity may engender trust. 
For one, the longer a member of Congress remains in the House of 
Representatives, the more likely he or she is to become a committee leader or part of 
a the party leadership. Regarding committees, although the final selection of 
chairpersons may reflect a number of factors, the members who comprise the list of 
possible candidates are largely determined by seniority. Without extensive experience 
in Congress and on the committee in question, a member has little chance of 
becoming the chairperson. With party leaders, the selection process tends to identify 
members of the caucus who are among the ideological mainstream of the party 
(Jessee and Malhotra 2011), and those who are among the most prolific donors of 
fund to their fellow partisans (Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2006; Green and 
Harris 2007; Deering and Wahlbeck 2006, Cann 2008a, 2008b). However, it is 
exceedingly rare for a member of the House to rise to a leadership position without 
having accrued a significant tenure in the chamber. Altogether, one reason longer 
tenures may engender more trusting relationships with legislative leaders is that 
longer tenured members are more likely to hold a leadership position. 
Even if a member does not enter a leadership position, as his or her tenure 
advances, he or she is more likely to have developed close relationships with people 
who are leaders. Kingdon (1989) indicates that senior members of Congress are more 
likely to turn to other members for advice and information than junior members (p. 
93). This is in part because these members have more time to develop trusting 




primarily turn to members of at least the same level of seniority as themselves for 
advice, we should find that more senior members of Congress have developed more 
of these relationships with those in leadership positions. 
The above evidence, though limited, suggests that the length of time an 
individual spends in Congress may be positively related to his or her trust in 
legislative leaders. At the same time, however, we should consider how the opposite 
could be true. Namely, a member of Congress who makes a career out of being 
contrary to his or her legislative leaders, no matter how long of a tenure is accrued, is 
unlikely to develop trusting relationships with these leaders. A member of Congress 
like Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), for example, is unlikely to develop a trusting 
relationship with the Democratic Party leaders he often finds himself in conflict with, 
no matter how long he remains in the chamber. So while tenure in office most likely 
increases the likelihood a member of Congress develops trusting relationships with 
legislative leaders, this is probably truer for some members than for others. 
 
Congruence of Values 
A number of scholars have highlighted how a congruence of values among 
members of a party caucus can increase the trust placed in leaders. Cooper and 
Brady’s (1981) theory of leadership power and Aldrich and Rohde’s (2000a, 2000b) 
theory of conditional party government highlight how rank-and-file members of 
Congress will entrust their leaders with more power over the legislative process when 
they are more unified in their preferences and when the opposition is polarized from 




to trust their leaders to take aggressive actions when there is widespread agreement 
about what should be pursued. Generally, it seems increased congruence among 
opinions will increase the trust placed in leaders. 
 At the same time, there are reasons to believe legislative leaders will often 
have different values than the rank-and-file. As discussed in chapter 2, leaders and the 
rank-and-file are likely to hold and pursue different goals. Recall that leaders’ goals 
drive them to focus on the big legislative picture and the passage of major partisan 
priorities into law. By contrast, rank-and-file legislators are primarily concerned with 
their reelection; they are more likely to be focused on the details and minutiae of the 
legislation being considered. While both of these statements are simplifications, they 
suggest when legislation is being considered, leaders and rank-and-file legislators are 
likely to value different things. We should expect to find this incongruence to foster 
distrust. Specifically, when the different goals of legislative leaders and rank-and-file 
legislators do not align, distrust and discontent will form. 
 Similarly, we should expect that ideological incongruence to foster discontent. 
While the parties have become increasingly cohesive since the mid-twentieth century, 
there is still ideological variation within the caucuses. Party leaders, for various 
reasons, typically emerge from the mainstream of their party’s ideology (Jessee and 
Malhotra 2010).136 Among committee chairs there are typically a wider array of 
                                                 
136 There has been substantial debate over the typical ideological location of party leaders in Congress. 
The debate has centered primarily on whether party leaders are usually ideological extremists or 
“middle-men” (see, Truman 1959; Clausen and Wilcox 1987; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Grofman, 
Koetzle, and McGann 2002). Jessee and Malhotra (2010) have recently shown that the truth is likely 
somewhere in the middle as most party leaders are selected from close to the party median but 
typically to the extreme side of that median (the ideological left for Democrats and the ideological 




ideologies represented as the selection of chairs is more idiosyncratic.137 Those in the 
caucus similar in ideology to their leaders should find less reason to be frustrated by 
leadership action. In other words, those in the mainstream of the party will typically 
be more pleased when leaders take aggressive action to pursue the policy goals of the 
party’s mainstream. Those to the moderate and extreme wings of the party, however, 
should more often be frustrated by such leadership action.  
 
Quality of Information Sharing and Communication 
The primary hypothesis of this chapter is that communication and information 
sharing has a strong influence on the trust rank-and-file legislators have in their 
legislative leaders. To that end, the above factors could be viewed as counter to that 
theory—that factors other than communication and information sharing, such as the 
party’s legislative and electoral success, a member’s familiarity with his or her 
leaders, and the ideological congruence of the caucus or the specific member, 
primarily determine the degree of trust present. However, reality is more complex 
than that. What is more likely is that we will find the influence of information to be 
tied up in these other factors. In other words, the influence the use of information 
control tactics has on the trust and approval members have in their legislative leaders 
is likely to be conditioned by these existing factors. 
 An important part of the story is how value congruence interacts with the use 
of information control tactics. For example, a moderate member of a party’s caucus is 
like to have his or her trust eroded more so than a mainstream member of the caucus 
                                                 




when the leadership restricts access to information because that member is less likely 
to agree with the ends pursued using this tactic. Leaders will see the restriction of 
information, for example, as necessary to passing legislation over the objections of 
the minority. Rank-and-file members of the caucus or committee, however, are likely 
to see the restriction of information as action by their leaders that impairs their ability 
to understand and influence the details of legislation that may impact their reelection 
efforts. 
 However, information control is likely to have its own independent influence 
as well. The way leaders use information control tactics is likely to have some effect 
on the level of trust found among the rank-and-file. For example, when legislative 
leaders are gathering input from their rank-and-file on legislative issues, the sincerity 
with which they appear to listen to the preferences may influence how much trust is 
placed in leadership actions later in the process. Conversely, if the rank-and-file 
repeatedly feel the information supplied by their leaders is misleading, trust is likely 
to erode, regardless of other factors. 
 
Hypotheses 
From the above discussion a number of hypotheses can be tested regarding the 
development of trust and contentment in legislative leaders. However, the scope of 
the evidence available limits the hypotheses to be evaluated. Specifically, hypotheses 




the interviews conducted precludes it.138 Instead the remainder of this chapter focuses 
on the influence of value congruence and use of information control tactics on the 
trust and distrust apparent in the House, and potential consequences of its 
development. 
 Regarding the use of information control tactics, the specific hypothesis to be 
evaluated is as follows: 
Information Control Hypothesis: The use of information control tactics 
by legislative leaders will reduce the trust placed in them by the rank-
and-file. 
 
In other words, we should find evidence in the interviews that the use of information 
control tactics harms the relationships between rank-and-file members of Congress 
and their committee and party leaders and impairs the trust the rank-and-file have in 
their leadership.  
Regarding value congruence, there are two specific hypotheses to be 
evaluated. The first relates to the divergent goals held by legislative leaders and the 
rank-and-file: 
Goal Divergence Hypothesis: The legislative leadership’s lack of 
concern with legislative details will be a source of distrust and 
frustration among rank-and-file members. 
 
In other words, we should find frustrated rank-and-file members of Congress 
repeatedly mentioning their inability to understand and affect the details of legislation 
                                                 
138 Many of the interviews were conducted either with members of Congress or staff after their 
retirement from the House, or with sitting members or current staff about events in the past. For these 
reasons it would be impossible to isolate the influence of factors such as their party’s past electoral or 
legislative success and failure, or the length of the subject’s relationship with their leaders from a time 
in the past. Rather than risk drawing inappropriate conclusions with the evidence present, these 




while leaders should demonstrate their overwhelming focus on the big picture. The 
second hypothesis relates to the ideological dispositions of the members: 
Ideology Hypothesis: Rank-and-file members of Congress further from 
their party’s ideological mainstream will be less trusting of and more 
frustrated by their legislative leaders.  
 
In other words, among the interviewees we should find less trust and more conflict 
between leaders and rank-and-file members from the moderate wings of each party 
and from the ideological ends of each party. 
 Perhaps most important, however, is that we should find that all three of these 
hypotheses interact. When leaders resort to information control tactics, we should 
find that the rank-and-file members most frustrated by their use are those looking to 
affect the details of the legislation and those most ideologically dissimilar from the 
mainstream of the party. Similarly, it is these members who should demonstrate the 
least trust in their legislative leaders. Conversely, members of the mainstream of the 
party who are less detail oriented should prove less frustrated by the process and more 
trusting of their leaders. The following section evaluates these hypotheses using 
evidence from the interviews conducted with members of Congress and their staff, 
past and present.  
 
Interview Evidence 
Finding evidence for or against the above hypotheses required careful 
evaluations of the interview evidence. The interviews conducted were often quite 
lengthy and touched on a number of different topics.139 Each rank-and-file member or 
                                                 




staffer, after discussing their perceptions of the availability and quality of information 
they received from their party and committee leaders, was asked to describe how the 
use of these tactics influences their view of the legislative process and of their 
legislative leaders. Since the interviews were only semi-structured the initial 
responses to these questions were often followed by a different array of follow-ups.  
 In evaluating the responses to these questions, I had to look at more than just 
the words. Often the body language of the interviewees and the tone of their voices 
conveyed as much as the words. Since these questions were always asked near the 
end of the interviews, I had typically been able to assess something about the 
personality of the interviewee by the time we broached the subject. As some 
interviewees were excitable about whatever was discussed, an excited response to this 
line of questioning was not necessarily interpreted as meaning they were agitated. 
Conversely, an interviewee who had been calm throughout the interview but 
displayed great agitation in providing answers on this subject indicated something 
very important. In fact, it was not uncommon for the interviews to really come alive 
during this line of questioning. 
The following sections begin by reviewing how rank-and-file members of 
Congress reacted to information control tactics regarding their relationships with their 
legislative leaders and the trust they place in them. Then the role ideology plays in 
these feelings is worked into the discussion. Finally, how the divergent goals of 
leaders and their rank-and-file influences the effect of information control tactics 





Trust and Information Control Tactics 
The reactions of rank-and-file members of Congress and staff to their leaders 
regarding the use of information control tactics varied quite a bit, providing mixed 
evidence for the Information Control Hypothesis. Some of those interviewed found 
few problems with the use of restrictive tactics and were no more or less distrusting 
of their legislative leaders as a result. In fact some, though not many, saw no problem 
with the process, regarding information, at all:  
Rank-and-File Staffer: We had great information on the bills and the pros and 
cons actually with those who were for it and against it.140 
 
It was not uncommon for these members and staffers to express some sympathy for 
the leadership. These members did not find the way things often operated to be ideal, 
but believed their leaders had no choice but to act how they did. 
Rank-and-File Member: I was there during one of the busiest 
congresses of all. Of course, I would have liked more time to look at 
legislation, but the leadership did the best they could. … Certainly we 
were criticized for speed with the health care bill. But a lot of that was 
misinformation. Generally things were not done so quickly that I was 
uninformed.141 
 
Others provided somewhat temperate reactions. These members and staffers 
were clearly displeased with the use of information control tactics by their legislative 
leaders and their opinion of and trust in their leaders had been damaged. They often 
described the legislative process as frustrating or agitating. However, they also 
seemed resigned to believing that this was simply how the legislative process had to 
function and did not find this something worth dwelling on. 
Rank-and-File Staffer: I will say that it can be stressful in that there are 
times when we want to offer amendments or there is limited time as 
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we mentioned earlier to entirely analyze something and to offer a 
change to it, a fix to what we would want. Normally, at least our 
leadership will work with you if there is something that is really 
important to your district or to the congressmen and try to come up 
with a solution, but that’s not always the case. That can be 
frustrating.142 
 
Rank-and-File Member: I wish the party leadership was more honest 
with us because no legislation is perfect. But I also know they have 
incentives to not provide full information to the members about what 
is going on. That’s just how things work here.143 
 
Rank-and-File Member: I was skeptical of information provided by the 
party leadership. Leaders would put out information to try to get the 
response they wanted from their members. The information was 
always perfectly valid, but it was also one sided. You can play with 
language like that.144 
 
What really separated these moderated responses from some of the others was 
the lack of anger or aggravation in their voice and their body language as they 
responded to the questions. Some members were far more agitated and emphatic in 
their responses. These members and staffers found the use of restrictive informational 
tactics borderline appalling and did not hesitate to let it be known. One former 
member of Congress who had answered all the previous questions in a rather manner-
of-fact way became very lively in discussing some previous instances of information 
control: 
Rank-and-File Member: Clearly at the beginning of last year when the 
stimulus legislation was brought to the floor there was a great deal of 
detail in there that I don’t think rank-and-file members had an 
opportunity to review. I view that as problematic. … In fact I think 
that is a large abuse and it creates a situation where you are voting on 
things that literally you haven’t had time to review!145 
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A staffer for a rank-and-file member of Congress in a similar way suddenly began to 
display a great penchant for sarcasm as we began this portion of the interview: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: Not infrequently I will get copies of the bills 
from outside stakeholders or from minority offices before I get them 
from the majority committee staff. Minority committee staff may have 
a very different approach to the legislative process. I hope I’m not 
sounding too bitter about it.146 
 
Later in the interview this staffer became very blunt about how many rank-and-file 
offices feel about their leaders: 
At the end of the day, personal office staffers often feel that the 
committee staff is not trying to help us in any way, and in fact, they 
are actually working against us.147 
 
 Generally, the interviews suggest that there is significant variation in reactions 
to the use of information control. Some were not bothered by it and did not 
demonstrate that it would affect how they viewed their leadership. Others found it 
problematic and were more skeptical of their leaders as a result, but demonstrated 
some understanding about the leadership’s needs. Others still found the use of 
restrictive information control tactics to be an affront to the legislative process and 
seemed to suggest it made trusting their leaders rather difficult. As will be shown in 
the subsequent sections, the Ideology Hypothesis and the Goal Divergence 
Hypothesis shed some light onto why this variation exists. 
 
The Role of Ideology 
A clear mitigating factor in the different reactions presented above was the 
ideology of the rank-and-file member or staffer. As described above, when leaders 
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and followers hold different values it can lead to an erosion of trust. As formulated in 
the Ideology Hypothesis, this suggests that rank-and-file members of Congress further 
from their party’s ideological mainstream are going to be more likely to be distrustful 
of their legislative leaders and discontented with their actions and use of restrictive 
information control tactics. 
 To test these propositions the responses of rank-and-file members and staffers 
were coded in a few different ways. First, each interviewee was coded for whether or 
not they expressed any concern over the use of information control tactics. The 
threshold for this was for the interviewee to have indicated that they thought the use 
of these tactics was a problem in any way. Second, each was coded as to whether or 
not the interview suggested the interviewee trusted the information provided by their 
party leadership, and separately, by their committee leadership. Interviewees, at 
times, were much more ambiguous on these points. Some of them would contradict 
themselves within the interview about their level of trust in the information provided. 
Ultimately, I coded each interviewee on the basis of the clearest statements they made 
on the subject.  
Finally, each interviewee was coded for the ideological camp they resided in 
within their party caucus. To ensure that this coding was not influenced by the 
statements made during the interview, I used DW-NOMINATE scores. For current 
and former members of Congress, I used the average NOMINATE score for their 
career (through the Congress the interview was conducted). I calculated a career 
average because the former members of Congress undoubtedly gave their responses 




to limit their responses to the time period the interview was taking place. For staff, I 
took the average NOMINATE score of all the members of the House of 
Representatives they had been employed by as these individuals should be seen as 
representatives of their bosses. Not surprisingly, congressional staffers that work for 
more than one member during their careers tend to find ideologically similar bosses.  
Once these scores had been identified, members and staff were coded as 
moderate, mainstream, or extremist.148 Deciding where to create cut-points among 
these groups is unavoidably arbitrary (see, Fleischer and Bond 2004). Fleischer and 
Bond (2004) create hard DW-NOMINATE cut-points to identify groups. But since 
the ideological location of the party caucuses has changed over time (Jacobson 2000, 
Roberts and Smith 2003; Stonecash, et al 2003) using a set cut-point for this analysis 
could lead to classification errors.149 Instead, I define each group as follows: 
Moderate members and staff are defined as those whose average DW-NOMINATE 
score falls among the most liberal/conservative 20 percent of all members of the 
Republican/Democratic memberships during that individual’s career. Extremist 
members and staff are those whose average DW-NOMINATE score falls among the 
most conservative/liberal 20 percent of all members of the Republican/Democratic 
memberships during that individual careers. Mainstream members and staff are those 
who fell within the remaining 60 percent of their caucus’ membership during their 
career.150 
                                                 
148 I resist presenting the full DW-Nominate scores for any member or staffer for fear of potential 
identification of the interviewees. All interviews were conducted under the agreement of anonymity. 
See Appendix A for more details. 
149 Given that this analysis is small N, classification errors are a bigger concern than they are for 
Fleisher and Bond (2004) and other large N studies. 
150 These cut-points are obviously just as arbitrary as any, but have some logic behind them. By taking 




Table 5.1 presents the results of this analysis. Altogether twelve of the 
interviewees (a little more than one-third) were purely rank-and-file members or 
staffers. In other words, these individuals never held an identifiable leadership 
position in Congress. Of these twelve, seven were coded as mainstream and the 
remaining five as moderates.151 Generally, the mainstream members and staffers 
were more positive about the use of information control tactics. Only two of the seven 
mainstream members expressed concern over the use of these tactics. By contrast four 
of the five moderate interviewees indicated that they found the use of information 
control tactics troublesome. Similarly, trust in the information provided by the party 
leadership suggests mainstream members and staffers were more trusting. Three of 
the seven mainstream interviewees indicated they trusted the information their party 
leadership provided, while none of moderates indicated they placed much trust in that 
information. Trust in information provided by committees, however, was much less 
varied. Generally, those interviewed had trust in the information their committees 
provided: all of the seven mainstream interviewees and four of the five moderates.  
 Many of the interviewees indicated that their ideology was important in their 
statements. A common refrain from the more moderate members interviewed was that 
they felt they needed to find other ideologically similar members of Congress to lean 
on for information and advice. One very moderate member of his caucus put it well: 
Rank-and-File Member: There were 20 to 25 of us who voted alike 
and we depended on each other. One of the things you do to analyze 
another bill is you go to other members who are credible on their 
committees.152 
                                                                                                                                           
The results of the cut-points also conform to how I viewed each interviewee (in terms of their relative 
ideology) prior to conducting the interviews.  
151 No interviewee was coded as an extremist. 












Trust in Leadership  
Information 
Trust in Committee  
Information 
     
6 mainstream yes no yes 
11 mainstream no no yes 
13 moderate yes no yes 
14 moderate yes no yes 
16 mainstream yes no yes 
17 moderate yes no yes 
19 moderate yes no no 
21 mainstream no no yes 
22 moderate no no yes 
23 mainstream no yes yes 
24 mainstream yes yes yes 
28 mainstream no yes yes 
          
Source: Interviews with rank-and-file members and staff. See Appendix A. 
Note: The interviewee categorized as a rank-and-filer in Appendix A not used here is interviewee 12. 
This individual had a diverse experience in Congress. While she was a rank-and-filer most of her 
career, the experience was not pure enough to be included in this table. 
 
Another former member, though coded as mainstream here, clearly viewed himself as 
out of step with the majority of the party caucus. He provided a similar narrative: 
Rank-and-File Member: There are informal arrangements. In my case, the 
Tuesday Group, which is a moderate Republican clustering, would have 
members from the committee who could sit there and say, “I have heard that 
this is coming up and it includes X, Y, Z details that seem to have 
implications people haven’t caught up with.” There would sometimes be a 
member of the group who was actually part of the process and they’d be in a 
position to comment and either allay our fears or not. I would say, usually, 
going to the leadership, from my perspective, was low down on the priority 
list.153 
 
These responses conform well to what Kingdon (1989) identified as an important 
source of information for members of Congress—other members. However, here I 
find that this source is most important for those who see themselves as out of step 
with the leadership. Other moderate members described their skepticism with the 
                                                 




leadership as a function of their districts and their constituents. These members knew 
that the information coming from their party leadership was not going to play with 
their moderate constituencies: 
Rank-and-File Member: I was more skeptical of the information that 
came from the leadership because my district required me to be.154 
 
Rank-and-File Member: [Leadership information] was useless for 
somebody from a swing district. I couldn’t image it actually being 
useful to anyone like me. Perhaps people who were like-minded could 
use it politically, but it wasn’t good information. I would have 
preferred they made better arguments for their side. I needed 
information that attacked the other side’s argument in a cogent and 
effective way, but that’s not what they gave you.155 
 
 Mainstream members, by contrast, did not describe their trust in leadership 
information in ideological terms. Perhaps the fact that they shared more policy goals 
with the actors providing the information made discussing it unnecessary. Some 
interviewees were more likely to describe things that were considered under 
restrictive information control tactics as noncontroversial, straight forward, or not 
requiring lengthy consideration: 
Rank-and-File Member: Most of the bills that came to the floor 
quickly dealt with non-controversial issues.156 
 
These members and staffers were also more likely to describe party leadership 
information as useful in some way: 
Rank-and-File Member: The information they gave us was useful 
primarily as back-up information. But it was especially useful when 
they gave you information specific to your district.157 
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Rank-and-File Staffer: As far as paper, the whip’s office put more out 
now than they ever had, I think, which is really good. Instead of just 
saying what the schedule will be they’ll really describe the bill.158 
 
Others were skeptical about the quality of the information the leadership was 
forwarding, but generally didn’t think it was a big deal, or found they could work 
around it adequately enough: 
Rank-and-File Staffer: What the leadership would give you was 
mostly vote recommendations and talking points. Not a whole lot of 
substance. Sometimes there isn’t enough time to get all the 
information you want but you do the best you can.159 
 
Rank-and-File Member: The leadership offices or committee leaders 
do not intentionally mislead but they may omit items that do not fit 
their messaging. I wouldn’t say that our office has been misled 
because we do enough of our own independent research and we are 
very thorough about finding out the particulars of bills coming before 
us.160 
 
As mentioned, committee information was always valued more highly than 
information that came from the party leadership. All but one of the rank-and-file 
interviewees indicated they at least trusted the information that came from the 
committees they sat on. This included a number of the interviewees who were very 
skeptical of party leadership information: 
Rank-and-File Member: All of [the information] was shared. That’s 
how we operated on the Ag Committee.161 
 
Rank-and-File Staffer: Sometimes the committee will provide you 
with unsolicited information if they know it is important to your boss. 
Most of the time, however, you have to ask. But if you develop the 
right relationships with the committee staff you can get good 
information.162 
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Rank-and-File Member: I could trust the staff on my committees.163 
 
Emphasizing the higher standings committees have as sources of information for 
rank-and-file members and staff, many interviewees mentioned committee staff as 
important, unprompted. By contrast, party leaders were never spontaneously 
mentioned as a source of information in the policymaking process. 
 Generally, there is some evidence that rank-and-filers out of line with their 
party’s mainstream are going to be more distrustful of their legislative leaders, and be 
more irritated by the use of restrictive information control tactics. This is especially 
true regarding the party leadership. While the analysis done here is done on only a 
small sample of actors, the results are suggestive. Next, the divergence of goals is 
considered as another mitigating factor in the relationship between information 
control and the quality of the relationships between leaders and the rank-and-file. 
 
Goal Divergence 
The Goal Divergence Hypothesis argues that part of the reason legislative 
leaders and their rank-and-file will clash is that they prioritize different goals. 
Leaders, generally, prioritize the big picture—obtaining legislative victories and 
passing a legislative agenda; while rank-and-file members of Congress are more 
detail-oriented and focused on making sure the legislation fits with their goal of 
reelection. The interview evidence suggests that this difference in priorities does play 
a big part in the frustrations felt by both leaders and rank-and-filers, and that it often 
arises as a source of tension when restrictive information control tactics are 
employed. 
                                                 




 Both party and committee leaders during the interviews often underscored 
their focus on passing an agenda. Often they talked about obtaining results as more 
important to their job than the details produced in those results. Their statements often 
focused on results, getting things done, and securing victories: 
Leadership Staffer: One way you [get things done] is you just go and 
hammer it out in the Rules Committee. … And sometimes that gets 
you good results and sometimes that gets you bad results, but it will 
get you a result.164 
 
Leadership Staffer: [On re-writing an energy bill in the Rules 
Committee] That was backed up against the visit to energy summit. So 
you had this hard deadline. Nobody wanted to embarrass themselves 
and go on to Copenhagen and have nothing to show.165 
 
Leadership Staffer: There are times where something important will 
cause a difficult vote so you self-execute it in instead. It’s intended to 
minimize the moving parts to make it more likely that we have success 
on the floor and to make it easier for the whip to get a yes or no out of 
members. 
 
One committee staffer displayed this general attitude when she indicated she did not 
understand why a rank-and-file member of the committee would offer an amendment 
the chair opposed: 
Committee Staffer: If [the chair is] going to oppose it you need to 
know that going in because most rank-and-file members, if the 
chairman or ranking member opposes it they are not going to vote for 
it, so it’s just dead. So what’s the point of doing it?166 
 
While a rank-and-file member may have a number of reasons for offering an 
amendment even if they knew it was doomed—such as signaling to his or her 
constituents a focus on the issue or simply because they have a strong conviction in 
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the position they hold—leadership and committee staff typically did not understand 
wasting time on something that did not end in a legislative result. 
As discussed in chapter 3, legislative leaders are also concerned with holding 
a carefully crafted compromise together once it was complete. The possibility that the 
particular concerns of individual members might disrupt the balance of such a 
compromise was an unacceptable outcome: 
Committee Staffer: We’ve got our bill out there and all of a sudden 
they want to make a change which, again, upsets the balance in some 
way—it’s complicated something and we have to deal with it all at 
the last minute. 
 
One member of the party leadership described how many committee chairs feel about 
the bills they work through their committees: 
Leadership Staffer: Ninety to one hundred percent of the time the chair 
of the committee where a bill originated is going to say, “Hey, what 
came out of my committee stays.” The phrase that everyone likes to 
use is a “carefully-crafted balance” of issues and that you can’t change 
a thing or else it will all come crashing down.167 
 
It appeared to some general degree that the higher up in the leadership an 
actor was, the less the details were a concern. One committee staffer described the 
hierarchical relationship: 
Committee Staffer: I think it’s more often that the subcommittee clerk needs to 
keep the full committee clerk aware of major funding or policy issues that 
may impact the ability to pass the bill. And so the full committee is not 
imposing itself into the details, but is reliant on the subcommittees to push up 
to them the major issues to make sure everybody’s on board.168 
  
Another committee staffer corroborated this fact: 
JC: How much contact is there with Chairman [omitted] about the 
details? 
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Committee Staffer: Not a whole lot. Chairman [omitted], if there is a 
particularly politically sensitive issue for the caucus, he might get 
involved. But once the subcommittee allocations are set and once all 
the hearings are done, and he determines which subcommittees are 
going to go first in terms of mark-up in the full committee—and the 
subcommittee for that matter and the floor—he’s not very much 
personally involved in the drafting. 
JC: Is it the same kind of relationship with the party leadership? 
Committee Staffer: Yes. That’s right. 
 
One former staffer described how former Ways and Means Committee chairman Bill 
Thomas (R-CA) used the complex nature of the committee’s jurisdiction as an excuse 
for avoiding prolonged deliberation on its bills: 
Leadership Staffer: Chairman [Bill] Thomas was very much in the 
camp of—my product is perfect because I’m in the tax code and 
therefore you shouldn’t be doing anything to it. 
 
I pushed back on some leadership staffers during their interviews as to 
whether or not they thought it was fair to restrict information or feed their 
memberships tilted information about legislation. One whip staffer responded matter-
of-factly: 
Leadership Staffer: Maybe it’s intellectually dishonest or something 
but you really don’t have the benefit of time if this thing is moving 
quickly.169 
 
Another leadership staffer became quite agitated at the line of questioning and 
responded dismissively about rank-and-file complaints regarding the availability of 
information: 
Leadership Staffer: That’s a cheesy public argument; the minority 
votes against it all anyway. It’s not like they are trying to figure out if 
maybe if they knew what this was maybe they might vote for it. 
Never! 
JC: What about in the majority? 
Leadership Staffer: It’s not like the amount of information anyone has 
affects the outcomes. It’s just some people’s best political 
                                                 




argument—that things were done in a shoddy way. … It’s part of a 
political argument. Sometimes it’s true but it’s not a real argument. 
It’s not like if we gave them another two hours, or four days, or two 
weeks anything would change. I think it’s a political argument.170 
 
Basically, this leadership staffer indicated repeatedly in the interview that he did not 
think the amount of information out there made a big difference. His job, and the job 
of the party leadership in general, was to get the legislation and the agenda passed. 
This was also clear when I asked him what considerations went into deciding how the 
Rules Committee would act on a specific bill: 
What’s the best way to get the agenda passed?171 
 
Or if I was asking him about specific leadership action on specific bills: 
That was the price for getting the votes. This is the place where we 
have to figure out what we have to do to make things happen.172 
 
This interviewee best exemplified the general attitude party and committee leaders 
and their staff demonstrated towards the legislative process. They understood 
members had their particular interests and concerns, but the goal of the legislative 
process is to pass an agenda and whatever it might take to pass it was fair game, 
whether it meant rank-and-file legislators had a real voice at times or not, and 
whether the legislation that gained final approval was the best bill possible or not. 
 Rank-and-file members, however, showed a real concern for legislative details 
and their inability to understand and affect such details often was a source of 
frustration. 
Rank-and-File Member: One of the most difficult parts of being a 
member of Congress is not being able to get enough information. You 
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know information from each party is tilted but there isn’t anything you 
can do about it. There aren’t many independent sources out there.173 
 
Some rank-and-filers were very cognizant of their leadership’s bias towards 
results and away from details, but it did not make it any less frustrating: 
JC: Did you believe the majority would ever manipulate the schedule 
to get results? 
Rank-and-File Member: It was done to help a chairman. They couldn’t 
get something out of their committee if they allowed open votes and so 
it would go through the Rules Committee and invariably that has 
contributed to the breakdown of the legislative process that we see 
today.174 
 
JC: If you asked the committee staff directly something about the bill, 
would they answer your question or would they still try to obscure it? 
Rank-and-File Staffer: I don’t know what they would tell you. They’d 
probably try to side-step the answer. In a lot of cases it was because 
legislation would probably be controversial and they didn’t want to 
allow the other side, or in some cases both sides, the opportunity to 
offer unlimited amendments that would keep the committee in mark up 
for days on end and change the direction of some of the wishes that the 
chairman might have had on the legislation. I don’t know if they 
would tell you that. Probably not. They would probably tell you that 
information is made available as soon as it can be made available. 
That’s not always the case.175 
 
One former member of Congress provided an analogy illustrating how the differences 
in philosophy about the legislative process seemed to a rank-and-file member of 
Congress concerned with legislative details: 
Rank-and-File Member: It’s like going to a neurosurgeon and asking 
for brain surgery and him saying it will take 10 hours and you asking 
him if he can do it in 30 minutes!176 
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In other words, this member of Congress did not understand how his leadership could 
expect the chamber to produce major legislation so quickly when the issues being 
addressed were so complex and the political decisions were so difficult. 
To be fair, some leadership staffers were aware that their informational 
strategies and approach to the legislative process could be harmful to their 
relationships with the rank-and-file. One staffer interviewed described how the 
Appropriations Committee leadership had for years been especially protective of its 
legislation. They felt they had a special right to their turf and that no one else had the 
expertise necessary to really even comment on the bills they produced. As the staffer 
suggested this led to a situation where many rank-and-file members, and also the 
party leadership, became suspicious of the Committee’s motives. Similarly, this 
leadership staffer described how the nature of the debt negotiations between the 
White House and the House Republican leadership during the 112th Congress created 
tension within the caucus: 
JC: Can you think of an example where poor communication on the 
part of your office, whether intentional or not, created a distrustful 
atmosphere? 
Leadership Staffer: I think recently with the debt deal we had that 
problem. The nature of the negotiations with the President and the 
Senate forced us to have to often leave our members, and even 
committee chairmen, in the dark about what was going on.177 
 
This staffer made it clear however, that he didn’t think there was any way around this 
problem: 
It happens quite a bit that poor communication causes these problems. 
But really it’s unavoidable.178 
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 Altogether, the interviews suggest that the different goals held by rank-and-
file members and Congress and their legislative leaders creates a disconnect between 
them that breeds a distrustful atmosphere. Rank-and-filers cannot always trust that 
their leaders have their interests in mind and as such are often skeptical of leadership 
action. Leaders, similarly, often don’t believe the interests of their rank-and-file will 
aid the passage of an agenda. They will thus treat their followers as masses needed 
guidance on how to act and how to vote. Unfortunately for some of the rank-and-file, 
as highlighted in the previous chapters, they often do not have any other source of 
information than their leaders. As one former leadership staffer summarized the 
dilemma: 
Leadership Staffer: The complaints that are raised [by the rank-and-
file] against it are very legitimate. But, of course, the leadership 
always has their legitimate reasons for doing so. It’s just a matter of 
how much trust you put in the leadership to be doing the right thing. I 
think members on both sides now have to have that kind of delegation 
and trust in their leadership to do the right thing and protect the 
majority or get it back in the next election.179 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that the use of information control 
tactics has a generally negative affect on the relationships between legislative leaders 
and their rank-and-file in the House of Representatives though some members believe 
that such tactics are unavoidable. Many rank-and-file legislators are skeptical of their 
leaders because of their use of these kinds of tactics. This is especially true for 
legislators out of step with the ideological mainstream of their party’s caucus. 
                                                 




 That legislative leaders and the rank-and-file prioritize different goals seems 
to be a major factor in the tension created by information control tactics. If rank-and-
file members had the same overriding concern with the passage of an agenda at all 
cost, it is unlikely the use of restrictive information control tactics would be so 
irksome. But members have to be ever concerned with their reelection, and to some 
degree, this incentivizes a focus on legislative details relevant to their districts. As a 
result, leadership tactics that hurt their ability to understand and influence such details 
are a point of contention. 
 At the start of this chapter the epigraph included a quote from a congressional 
staffer about the importance of trust in the congressional policymaking process: 
If you don’t trust the information they [committees and party leaders] 
are giving you, it’s a problem.180 
 
Indeed, leadership studies highlight not only the causes of trust in organizations, but 
the consequences, as well. Generally the findings suggest that trust can lead to 
improved working relationships between leaders and followers. Specifically, when 
trust is present followers are more likely to suspend questions and doubts and follow 
their leadership unconditionally (Dirks 2000). When distrust is abundant followers 
will spend more of their time and energy trying to monitor their leaders rather than 
working towards shared goals (Mayer and Gavin 2005). When followers feel they 
have to monitor the actions of their leaders or cannot trust leaders to look out for their 
interests they will be less inclined to cooperate with their leadership’s plans (Hall, 
Blass, Ferris, and Massengale 2004). 
                                                 




 Regarding information flows and communication, Zand (1972) suggests that 
groups that do not have trust do not share information and are less effective as 
organizations. If subordinates do not trust their leaders they are not likely to openly 
share information with them (Argote, Gruenfeld, and Naquin 2001; Mayer and Gavin 
2005). Similarly, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) suggest that followers who 
find their leaders to be trustworthy will be more likely to engage in behavior that puts 
them at risk, such as sharing sensitive information with their leadership. 
 A few studies of Congress have reflected these findings. As noted at the start 
of the chapter, scholars and observers alike have noted a general decline in trust and 
civility within the U.S. Congress (Jamieson and Falk 2000). Schraufnagel (2005), 
operationalizing incivility through media reports and almanac summaries of 
legislative proceedings, shows that this decline in incivility has contributed to 
gridlock over judicial nominations in the Senate. Dodd and Schraufnagel (2007) 
suggest that while some incivility is necessary to deal with real policy problems, too 
much incivility can make policymaking unable to proceed in any form. Essentially 
there is a happy medium between too much incivility and not enough. 
 The results here suggest that information control tactics also need to be used 
in a balanced way. Leaders need to be sensitive about how they use these tactics if 
they are going to maintain good relationships with the rank-and-file and sustain 
functional cooperation within the caucus. If the trust between leaders and followers is 
strained too much it is possible that the majority would not be able to drive the 
legislative process in committee or on the floor. At the same time, leaders need to use 




control the information available and keep the minority from raising potential wedge 
issues in committee and on the floor, they may not be able to pass a legislative agenda 
or effectively run the chamber. Ultimately, the balance of maintaining trust and 
effectively leading the chamber creates difficult dilemmas for legislative leaders in 




Chapter 6:  Conclusions 
 
 
As citizens and scholars our understanding of congressional leaders is a 
confusing one. On one hand, journalistic accounts of congressional politics place a 
great importance on leaders. Leaders are expected to develop or identify good 
policies, herd the flock in support of them, and lead their party to electoral success in 
the next election. The American public views congressional leaders with similarly 
high expectations. It is not surprising that when the economy faltered in late 2008 and 
accounts of congressional politics began to focus on the inability of the legislature to 
act, public approval of leaders like Nancy Pelosi, John Boehner, and Eric Cantor 
dropped precipitously. But on the other hand, when we write and talk about 
successful leaders of the past, we often portray them in hyperbolic terms. We refer to 
Lyndon Johnson as the “Master of the Senate”; we call William Reed, “Czar Reed”; 
and we know Henry Clay as “The Great Compromiser”. We name buildings, parks, 
and streets after them; and accounts of their successes become things of legend. 
Scholarly accounts of congressional leaders minimize their importance. 
Rather than focusing on how they lead or where they derive their power, most 
scholarship focuses on how, and the degree to which that power is limited. On the 
occasion that scholars do recognize an immutable contribution from a congressional 
leader, the leader, or the act of leadership, is often identified as unique. Johnson, 
Reed, and Clay are usually described as great men who seized power where others 




ascribed to exogenous factors, such as party polarization. With a few important 
exceptions (see, for example, Peters 1997; Strahan 2007; Green 2010; Peters and 
Rosenthal 2010) the importance of leadership in Congress is undervalued and poorly 
studied. 
This dissertation aims to provide some insight into what congressional 
leadership actually comprises in the day-to-day functioning of the legislature. It 
begins by identifying information as a visible and traceable source of leadership 
power and describing how significant this power can be. Specific tactics are discussed 
in some detail showing how regularly legislative leaders in the House make use of 
this power source as they manage the legislative process. Furthermore, that these 
tactics are used strategically to obtain specific leadership goals is demonstrated on 
significant legislation considered by the House. 
Ultimately, the conclusions of this study are threefold. The first is that 
legislative leadership power in the House can be significant. Leaders are able to use 
their control over information to lead the House or their committees from numerous 
angles. This conclusion has implications for our understanding of congressional 
leaders and their place in the policymaking process. Second, the study has normative 
implications for the representativeness of the Congress. Namely, how representative 
is our most representative American institution if on some legislation of importance 
many members cannot participate and do not have a significant voice? At the same 
time, are the tradeoffs worthwhile if it leads to a more efficient and responsible form 
of two-party governance? The third conclusion is that both the use and non-use of 




Representatives functions. On one hand, the use of these tactics may alienate 
members of the majority caucus. On the other hand, the inability of leaders to control 
information may lead to an inability of the majority party to exercise any will. 
 
The Power of Legislative Leaders 
Legislative leadership influence in the House is significant. This study shows 
information to be an identifiable source of power for majority party leaders and 
committee chairs in the U.S. House of Representatives. Compared to rank-and-file 
members of Congress, leaders have far more resources appropriated to their offices 
which they can utilize to hire far more staff—and far more experienced staff—to 
read, write, and track legislation. They also have the resources and procedural power 
to regularly implement three levels of information control tactics in gathering 
intelligence from their memberships, restricting the access the rest of the chamber has 
to information about legislative language, and provide favorable messaging to try to 
keep the policy debate positive towards the leadership’s agenda. 
Chapter 3 highlights a number of specific tactics that leaders employ and 
provides some qualitative evidence of their utility. Party and committee leaders can 
continually collect intelligence from their memberships utilizing staff meetings, whip 
checks, and informal contact over email or in the hallways. They can restrict 
information by writing bills behind closed doors and then controlling the ability of the 
rank-and-file to access and analyze the legislative language. Committees can do this 
by releasing the contents of committee drafts only hours before mark-ups. Party 




rewriting them in the Rules Committee, or by using large and complex legislation as a 
legislative vehicle. At the same time, legislative leaders can provide information to 
their rank-and-file that focuses on the popular and most palatable aspects of the 
legislation, and obscures or minimizes the importance of more controversial aspects 
and provisions.  
Chapter 4 demonstrates that party leaders, at least, employ restrictive 
information control tactics strategically. Leaders cannot use these tactics on every 
bill, nor would they want to. Instead, employing a unique dataset of measures of 
information control tactics, and of issue-based measured of key independent 
variables, chapter 4 shows that leaders focus their efforts on legislation that is of a 
priority to the leadership, and on legislation that has the potential for significant 
interest group influence. In this way they usher through their priority legislation 
avoiding the influence of outside groups who may have a different agenda than the 
leadership. However, their ability to use these tactics is limited by the salience of the 
legislation with the public. Some issues and legislation capture the attention of the 
general public in such a diffuse way that it spurs typical members of Congress to 
engage and commit their limited resources and energies. On legislation like this, the 
resource and informational asymmetries between rank-and-filers and leaders will be 
reduced, and leaders will be unable to control information effectively. 
The level of control and influence over the legislative process described in 
these chapters is not typically recognized in the scholarly literature. As discussed in 
chapter 2, congressional leaders are not typically viewed as this powerful. 




ascribed some power, the discussion focuses on its limits. Leader influence is often 
described as conditional on the willingness of the rank-and-file to cede authority to 
leaders to take aggressive action (Cooper and Brady 1981; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; 
Sinclair 2007). Otherwise when leaders are viewed as powerful it is typically seen as 
exceptional, and non-systematic. Powerful leaders are either an exceptional sort of 
person, or they were in the right place at the right time (Follett 1896; Ripley 1967; 
Davidson, Hammond, and Smock 1998). 
But the implications here are that leaders in the House have a source of power 
that they can all implement, and that implementation is not necessarily tied to explicit 
cessations of power from the rank-and-file. The gathering of intelligence from their 
rank-and-file is not solely subject to external forces. Party and committee leaders 
always gather intelligence from their memberships to inform their legislative 
strategies later in the process. The same goes for the providing of information. 
Regardless of the circumstances, as long as leaders have a preference on a bill, they 
are likely to provide a message to their members to try to sell the legislation. 
Restricting information, as discussed, is determined by several factors, but only one 
of those factors works against the leadership—public salience. However, we know 
that only a small number of bills each Congress become widely salient with the 
public. Most legislation, even important legislation, passes without significant 
attention from voters. This suggests that most of the time, leaders are free to choose 
what legislation they employ restrictive tactics on. 
 In identifying information as a source of this leadership, this study provides an 




Where most studies focus on the limits of power, this study analyzes a source. 
Altogether, in showing how leaders use this power, this study suggests that leaders 
have a significant amount of influence over the House of Representatives—more 
influence than they are typically ascribed by congressional scholarship.  
 
Information Control and Congressional Representation 
The results of this study also speak to our normative evaluations of 
congressional representation. Specifically, it highlights the tension in what scholars 
and congressional observers value from congressional action. On one hand, we value 
accurate representation and deliberative politics. But at the same time we want a 
legislature that is efficient at passing legislation and a legislative agenda. 
 Regarding the quality of representation, we put a value on representative 
legislatures, like Congress, reflecting the political will of the nation, and on 
representatives reflecting the political will of their constituents. As Madison put it in 
Federalist #57, representative institutions should be built to not have “elevated the 
few on the ruins of the many” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1999, 352). Theoretically, 
scholars have long been concerned with what dyadic representation should look like 
(e.g. Mansbridge 2003, 2011; Rehfield 2011). Empirically, numerous studies have 
analyzed the degree to which legislator behavior reflects the opinions of the 
represented (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson 1978; Bartels 1991; Clinton 2006). 





We also expect the Congress to be collectively representative. Pitkin’s (1967) 
seminal study discusses one view of representation that focuses on the quality of 
representation of society as a whole. The purpose of a representative legislature, after 
all, is to represent its citizenry (see also, Weissberg 1978). While this type of 
representation has received less empirical attention (at least relating to the Congress), 
it nonetheless reinforces the normative value we place on legislatures and legislators 
accurately reflecting the opinions of the represented. 
 The results presented here are problematic for this representative ideal. 
Whether or not typical members of Congress are trying to accurately reflect the 
wishes of their constituencies, the control legislative leaders often exercise over 
information suggests it may not be possible on some legislation. When a major bill is 
available for most members of the House to analyze and assess for just hours or 
minutes before floor or committee action, the typical member will not be able to fully 
participate in the process, evaluate the implications of the bill for his or her 
constituents, or decide if the bill will more beneficial and favorable to their district 
than detrimental and unpopular. In relying on their legislative leaders for information 
regarding these considerations, they are ceding their constitutional authority as 
representatives. 
 This type of legislating only exacerbates an already well known participation 
bias in Congress. Members of Congress focus their energies and attentions on 
legislation and issues important to their legislative districts at the cost of influence 
and participation in other areas. Scholars have analyzed this systemic bias on the 




1997; Adler and Lipinski 1997; Frisch and Kelly 2006), member decisions to become 
actively involved in the early stages of legislating on a bill or issue (Hall 1996), and 
ultimately on the legislation passed into law (Ray 1980). A system of gains-from-
trade is often seen as greasing the wheels of this mutually beneficial specialization 
system allowing each self-interest coalition to pass legislation benefiting their specific 
constituencies (Ferejohn 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 
1988). This study suggests that on the issues members have not prioritized, they often 
are not even informed about what is going on. This gives more power to the self-
selected few who are deeply involved in those particular issues and to the legislative 
leaders who are almost always involved. These actors can act behind closed doors and 
withhold information about their final products. The rest of the chamber cannot assess 
the quality of the legislation being produced and veto it if it seems unpalatable—they 
often will not have enough information to make this call. 
 As detrimental as information control may be for our representational ideals, it 
is not all negative. This is because we value not only accurate representation from 
Congress, but also efficient and effective lawmaking. Scholars and political observers 
often decry legislative gridlock and do-nothing congresses. We want the House of 
Representatives, especially, to function as a majoritarian institution capable of 
passing legislation favored by a majority of elected members. The degree to which 
politics and political institutions frustrate legislative productivity has been studied 
across a variety of dimension (Mayhew 1991; Binder 1999, 2003; Howell, et al. 2000; 
Wawro and Schickler 2006). The diversity of represented opinions and the numerous 




and can be a cause of legislative gridlock. A legislative approach in which 435 
constituencies voice their concerns is necessarily going to be slow and often result in 
frustration. 
 In controlling information, legislative leaders have a solution to this problem 
of institutional design. By using information control tactics, legislative leaders can 
streamline the process and avoid gridlock. In writing bills behind closed doors, giving 
rank-and-file legislators little time to analyze and vet legislation, and selling it by 
keeping the information available on bills positive, leaders minimize competing 
voices and perspectives. In particular it can help leaders avoid particularized interests 
from altering, slowing, or derailing the passage of legislation. In a way, information 
control helps parties in the House function more like the responsible two parties 
called for by political scientists over 60 years ago (American Political Science 
Association 1950). Majority party leaders are able to identify their legislative 
priorities, write the legislation, and then usher it through the chamber with the support 
of their caucus or committee. 
The use of information control tactics, then, can be seen as partly good and 
partly bad. One who values representation and deliberation over all else will surely 
see the restriction of widespread participation as a negative, but another that values 
legislative efficiency and majoritarianism will no doubt see these tactics as all the 
more positive. Ultimately, it is difficult to decide if their use is on the balance more 






A Leadership Catch-22 
 While on any particular bill the use of information control tactics raises 
concerns about the quality of representation and participation in Congress, the long-
term, and potentially increasing, use of these tactics may have other implications. 
Most importantly, the control of information may lead to growing discontent among 
certain members of the majority caucus. 
 Chapter 5 suggests that the members of Congress who are most frustrated by 
the use of information control tactics are those who are out-of-step ideologically with 
their leaders and with the mainstream of their party. These members of the caucus 
were more likely to describe the use of restrictive informational tactics as frustrating 
and problematic. Some even decreed them as one of the biggest problems with 
Congress today. Some of the former members of Congress I talked to lamented the 
state of legislative process today as it related to its openness and pace. One, in 
particular, talked at length about the need for reform and his discussions with other 
former members of Congress still involved in the Washington community about how 
such reform could be achieved.181 These proposals typically involved encoding more 
clear and enforceable rules about the availability of bill text to members of Congress 
and guaranteeing bills move through the numerous stages of the process—from 
committee action to floor consideration—at a more deliberate and cautious pace. 
 The risk that leaders run in using these tactics is that they will frustrate too 
many members of their own caucus and motivate actors in the legislative process to 
push for reform. This is something we have seen before in Congress. In the 1960s and 
                                                 




1970s, liberal members of the Democratic Party pushed to reform the structure and 
process of the House to strip away the close control committee chairs had over 
policymaking. The policy priorities of these more liberal members were out-of-step 
with the more conservative chairmen. By the early 1970s, the size of the liberal wing 
of the party reached a critical mass allowing it to pass a series of reform intended to 
increase their voices in the process (Rohde 1991, 17-34). That reform could occur in 
the immediate future regarding information control tactics appears unlikely given the 
level of cohesion within the party caucuses. However, if a large enough contingent of 
either party found itself repeatedly out-of-step with its leadership, legislative leaders 
may risk losing power to control information and a source of their influence over the 
House of Representatives. 
But while using information control tactics may someday leave leaders 
vulnerable to a reform movement, not successfully employing these tactics can leave 
them vulnerable to losing influence in the House on a day to day basis. The 112th 
House of Representatives has demonstrated the difficulties majority party leaders can 
have trying to lead the chamber when their control over information is reduced. With 
the influx of new conservative Tea Party Republicans into the chamber, the 
leadership faced the development of a second power center within their own caucus. 
These new members quickly allied themselves with the Republican Study Committee 
(RSC), a congressional caucus of conservative Republicans with the stated goal of 
“advancing a conservative social and economic agenda in the House of 
Representatives (Republican Study Committee 2011).” Members of this caucus 




research and track legislation before the House, and become another source of 
information in the chamber. 
With the start of the 112th Congress, over 170 Republicans joined the RSC out 
of 242 total Republicans in the House. While the dues paid to the RSC are not 
publically disclosed, a number of other caucuses make these figures public including 
the Congressional Black Caucus which charges its members around $8,000 a year 
(Palmer and Allen 2011). If the RSC asks similar dues from its membership it had 
nearly $2.8 million to hire dedicated staff for the 112th Congress. This should be 
enough to hire numerous skilled and dedicated staffers that can become an alternative 
source of information for conservative Republicans.  
While the resources of the RSC pale in comparison to that of the majority 
party leadership (see Figure 2.1), select and strategic allocation of these resources 
have proven fruitful. During the first nine months of the 112th Congress, the House 
majority leadership sustained numerous public embarrassments at the hands of its 
own caucus. Several of these were driven by the RSC. The RSC and its membership 
orchestrated the defeat of numerous spending and budgetary provisions supported by 
the Republican leadership, including measures meant to avoid a government 
shutdown in April and more recently in September 2011. In the summer, the RSC was 
able to energetically drive the debate on raising the debt ceiling by uncompromisingly 
taking a stance that any change to the debt ceiling should be offset with spending 
cuts. By providing their own information, and developing their own policy 
alternatives and comparing them to the party leadership’s, the RSC created a rival 




difficult for Republican Party leaders. The voice of Speaker Boehner (R-OH) and 
Majority Leader Cantor (R-VA) are diluted by that of the rival RSC making informed 
defection from leadership proposals more likely than in the past. 
Ultimately, it appears that the use of information control tactics, in the long-
term, presents a catch-22 for legislative leaders. Leaders have to control information 
to lead the House of Representatives. Not doing so can lead to repeated 
embarrassments at the hands of the minority party or a faction of the majority caucus. 
However, controlling information may, in the long run, result in reforms that strip 
leaders of their ability to control information. In other words, utilizing powers they 
must utilize to lead their committees or the chamber, legislative leaders risk losing 
these powers altogether at some point in the future. This is a dilemma that even 
Joseph Heller would find vexing. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 Understanding the actions and influence of legislative leaders in Congress is 
an important enterprise. Majority party leaders and committee chairs conduct a 
continuous information-based leadership strategy that appears to be a major source of 
their power, and a major part of what they do as leaders every day. Leaders 
continually collect intelligence from their rank-and-file, before, while, and after bills 
are being written; and continually try to push their message on major legislation on 
which they have a position. On priority bills they can restrict the access the rank-and-
file has to information to try to aid the passage of these bills and prevent potential 




 As scholars we should not underestimate the influence of legislative leaders 
on the policymaking process, the legislation that is written, or the legislation that is 
passed. Members of Congress do not seek leadership positions out of a sense of duty 
or out of futility, but because these positions confer great power. Here, information is 
established as a major source of this power and the result of its use is to centralize 








Appendix A – Elite Interviews 
This study draws heavily upon evidence from 30 anonymous interviews with 
members of Congress and their staff, past and present. This appendix provides some 
detail on the sample of interviews, how those interviews were obtained, and how the 
interviews were conducted. These interviews were conducted with approval from the 
University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Full details on the IRB 
approval for the interviews can be obtained from the University of Maryland. The 
IRB Protocol Number for this study is 09-0718. 
Tables A-1 presents details on each of the interviewees. Only minimal 
information can be presented to protect the anonymity of these individuals, but what 
is presented demonstrates that the sample is fairly representative. The table 
demonstrates, first, that among the interviewees there were more Democrats (19) than 
Republicans (11). This is a rather common bias in qualitative studies of Congress. For 
numerous reasons, Democrats typically are more open to speaking with academics 
than Republicans. However, within both party groups—as can be seen in column 3 of 
the table—I was able to interview rank-and-filers, committee leaders and staff, and 
party leaders and staff. Therefore, even if the sample collected more Democrats than 
Republicans, the lessons drawn about each groups of actors included information 
from both Democrats and Republicans. 
 As for the general distribution of position within the chamber, the sample 





Table A-1: Details on Sample of Interviewees     
Interview # Party Position Member or Staff Current or Former 
     
1 Democrat Party Leadership Staff Former 
2 Democrat Committee Staff Current 
3 Democrat Party Leadership Staff Former 
4 Democrat Committee Staff Current 
5 Democrat Party Leadership Member Former 
6 Republican Rank-and-File Member Former 
7 Republican Committee Staff Current 
8 Democrat Committee Staff Current 
9 Republican Party Leadership Staff Former 
10 Republican Party Leadership Staff Current 
11 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Current 
12 Democrat Rank-and-File Staff Current 
13 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Former 
14 Republican Rank-and-File Member Former 
15 Republican Party Leadership Staff Current 
16 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Former 
17 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Current 
18 Democrat Party Leadership Staff Former 
19 Democrat Rank-and-File Staff Current 
20 Democrat Party Leadership Staff Current 
21 Democrat Rank-and-File Staff Current 
22 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Former 
23 Democrat Rank-and-File Member Former 
24 Democrat Rank-and-File Staff Current 
25 Republican Rank-and-File Staff Current 
26 Republican Committee Staff Current 
27 Republican Party Leadership Staff Current 
28 Democrat Rank-and-File Staff Former 
29 Republican Committee Staff Current 
30 Republican Committee Staff Current 
          
 
who were part of the committee leadership or committee staff, and 14 individuals best 
categorized as rank-and-filers. Regarding the balance of staffers and members, most 
of the individuals were staffers. Nine of the interviews were with current or former 




the interviews were conducted with individuals who were in Congress at the time of 
the interview while the remaining 12 individuals were out of Congress. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 the sample of interviews was obtained using a 
method called “cluster-sampling” or “snowball sampling”. This method was 
developed by researchers hoping to study notoriously closed-off segments of the 
population such as drug users (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Esterberg 2002, 93-94). 
Basically, a researcher hoping to gain access to a population begins with one or two 
individuals whom he or she has had some previous contact with. Because of the 
previous contact this individual is more likely to trust the researcher and agree to take 
part in the study. The researcher asks this individual then to recommend others who 
might be willing to take part, using that first individual as a reference to gain trust 
with the rest of the population. Each subsequent interview is then used to obtain more 
references. Ideally the process creates a snowball effect in which more individuals 
become open to taking part in the study. 
 Although my intention has not been to liken members and Congress and 
congressional staffers to drug users, they are perhaps as notoriously difficult to obtain 
interviews with (Goldstein 2002; Baker 2009). I used this sampling technique to gain 
as many interviews as possible. At the same time I continually cold-contacted 
congressional offices about the possibility of an interview with the member or a 
staffer. Altogether, the percentage of contacted individuals was still quite low (30 of 
the roughly 170 individuals contacted agreed to talk), but this rate is likely much 
higher because of the use of cluster-sampling than it might have otherwise been. Very 




 All individuals were contacted via email with the same message. That 
message is presented below: 
Dear Mr./Ms. X, 
 
I recently spoke with [name of reference] and he/she suggested I get in 
contact with you. I am a graduate student at the University of 
Maryland working on my Ph.D. in government and politics. I am 
currently conducting research for my dissertation about the role 
information and communication plays in decision-making in the House 
of Representatives. I would appreciate the opportunity to briefly meet 
with you to discuss the topic in an interview. 
 
Any information we discuss would of course only be used 
anonymously for my academic research and all records from the 
interview would be securely stored. I understand that you have an 
exceedingly busy schedule and promise to not take up too much of 
your time if you are willing to sit down with me. 
 
I greatly appreciate any time you may be willing to grant me. I can be 






The only change from one email to the next was the name of the references. If I did 
not have reference for that particular person the first sentence was excluded entirely. 
Nevertheless, some individuals required some reassurance. Sometimes the individual 
contacted responded with a number of questions about the purpose of the study, what 
the interview would be used for, when and how it might be published, and if anyone 
else would have access to the records. These individuals, and others, were all assured 
that only myself and my dissertation advisor would have access to the records, that 
the statements made would only be used in my academic research, and that the 





The interviews were generally semi-structured and asked primarily open-
ended questions. In conducting the interviews I had the dual goals of keeping them 
open enough that they would allow me to discover things about information control I 
had not anticipated while keeping them structured enough that one interview could be 
compared to another. This involved asking a similar set of questions of each 
individual, but required a willingness to ask follow up questions that let each 
interview go in its own direction. Each interview lasted roughly 30-40 minutes and all 
but a handful were conducted in person. The others were conducted over the phone. 
 Every interview started the same. I first gave each individual a very basic 
background about why I was talking to them and about the project. I then assured 
each individual that the interviews were anonymous and that anything discussed 
would be used only in my academic research and that he or she would only be 
identified in the most basic way: as a current or former member of Congress or staffer 
who was a rank-and-filer, a committee leader, or part of their party leadership. I then 
asked each individual if I could tape-record the interview. All but one allowed me to 
use the tape recorder. From there the interviews differed slightly on the basis of 
whether the individual was a rank-and-filer, a committee leader or staffer, or part of 
the party leadership.  
For a rank-and-file member or staffer the structured questions began with 
inquiries about how they accrued information about the legislation before the House. 
These questions started with a general inquiry like the following: 
On bills [before the committees you sit on/not before the committees 






These inquiries allowed the individuals to list sources they found most important or 
informative. I then turned to more targeted questions about whether or not they were 
able to get information specifically from the committees or their party leadership, and 
what kind of information: 
Is [committee staff/the party leadership] a source of information for 
these bills? 
How does [committee staff/the party leadership] distribute 
information? 
 
I would also have a series of questions asking them to assess the information they 
received from different groups they had mentioned, or from the party leadership or 
from the committees. These questions would look something like this: 
How substantively helpful was the information you received from the 
[committee/party leadership]? 
 
Finally, I would ask these individuals about specific actions taken by party and 
committee leaders that might limit the amount of information they had, and how that 
affected their ability to be informed. These questions looked something like this: 
When a bill [came to the floor quickly/was self-executed, etc…] how 
did this affect your ability to get the information you needed? 
 
Throughout, I ask follow up questions to each of the structured questions to dig 
deeper into the responses and opinions of the interviewees. These questions differed 
dramatically from interview to interview, but had the same goal—to understand how 
rank-and-filers became informed, and how the committees and the party leadership 
played into the process. 
Interviews with committee staffers and committee leaders differed from those 
with rank-and-filers. These individuals were asked about how they gathered, 




others. These interviews generally started with my asking how they communicated 
information about a typical bill before their committee to the members of the 
committee: 
Once a mark of the bill is finished being drafted, how do you present 
its contents to the membership of the committee? 
 
This starting question often led to a number of different paths. From this questions I 
could follow up on what information, specifically, would be provided and in what 
manner or why the information provided might be limited. I also asked questions 
about general communications with members of the committee during and after the 
drafting process. These would look something like this: 
How often do you communicate with members of the committee 
[during/after] the drafting process? 
 
How open are the communications with members of the committee 
[during/after] the drafting process? 
 
These questions often led to illuminating responses about how committee staffers 
viewed their responsibilities in communicating with members of the committee and 
how these communications were more about gathering information about what their 
membership was thinking than about any give and take about what the contents of a 
bill should include. Again, like the rank-and-file interviews, these structured 
questions led to follow ups that delved into the individual responses. 
Interviews with party leadership members and staffers were more similar to 
the committee interviews than they were to the rank-and-file interviews, but were by 
far the most variable of the bunch. The questions I asked were driven even more by 
the specific job the individual had in the party leadership—whether he or she was a 




some other role. For example, with individuals involved in the whip organization my 
questions were tailored towards understanding what their communications with 
members were like, when they began, what they asked members, and what they told 
them. With individuals in the Speaker’s office or the majority leader’s office I would 
ask questions more about the motivations to restrict information or how they would 
decide how to sell a piece of legislation to their party’s membership. Despite the 
variability, however, there were some similarities across the interviews. For example, 
I generally asked a question along the lines of: 
Can you be selective in deciding what information to tell your 
 members about X bill? 
 
With questions about motivation, I usually asked something akin to: 
On a major piece of legislation, what are the motivations of the party 
leadership to bring the bill to the floor quickly or bypass regular order? 
 
Generally, these interviews were a lot more open ended than the others and this was 







Appendix B – List of Important Legislation & Issue Content 
 Table B-1 presents the important legislation used in the analyses in this study. 
Included with the list of bills is the congress in which it was considered, the Policy 
Agendas Project issue coding, whether or not the bill is a party leadership priority bill 
based on the Speaker’s Issues measure, and the number of State of the Union 






Table B-1: Dataset of Important Legislation Analyzed, 2001-2008     
  Policy Agendas Project   
Congress Bill Issue Code Issue Title Speaker's Issue? SOTU Mentions 
107 H.R. 622 100 General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues yes 3 
107 H.R. 1836 100 General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues yes 3 
107 H.R. 7 100 General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues yes 3 
107 H. Con. Res. 83 105 National Budget and Debt yes 32 
107 H.R. 2 105 National Budget and Debt yes 32 
107 H. Con. Res. 353 105 National Budget and Debt yes 3 
107 H.R. 8 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 39 
107 H. J. Res. 36 207 Freedom of Speech & Religion no 1 
107 H.R. 4954 300 Health - General no 1 
107 H.R. 2563 302 Health insurance reform, availability, and cost no 8 
107 H.R. 2505 398 Health - Research and development no 1 
107 H.R. 2330 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
107 H.R. 2646 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
107 H.R. 2213 404 Agricultural Marketing, Research, and Promotion no 0 
107 H.R. 3090 500 Labor, Employment, and Immigration - General no 0 
107 H.R. 10 503 Employee Benefits no 1 
107 H.R. 3762 503 Employee Benefits no 5 
107 H.R. 3231 530 Immigration and Refugee Issues no 0 
107 H.R. 1 602 Elementary and Secondary Education yes 29 
107 H.R. 4 800 Energy - General yes 6 
107 H.R. 2299 1000 Transportation - General no 0 
107 H.R. 1699 1007 Maritime Issues no 0 
107 H.R. 503 1207 Child Abuse and Child Pornography no 0 
107 H.R. 6 1208 Family Issues yes 0 
107 H.R. 4737 1302 Poverty and Assistance for Low-Income Families no 2 
107 H.R. 247 1401 Housing and Community Development no 0 
107 H.R. 1088 1502 Securities and Commodities Regulation no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
107 H.R. 256 1507 Bankruptcy no 0 
107 H.R. 3763 1520 Corporate Mergers, Antitrust Regulation, and Corporate Management Issues no 0 
107 H.R. 327 1521 Small Business Issues and the Small Business Administration no 2 
107 H.R. 524 1521 Small Business Issues and the Small Business Administration no 2 
107 H.R. 3210 1523 Domestic Disaster Relief no 0 
107 H.R. 3338 1600 Defense - General no 4 
107 H.R. 2586 1600 Defense - General no 4 
107 H.R. 4546 1600 Defense - General no 2 
107 H.R. 5010 1600 Defense - General no 2 
107 H.R. 2883 1603 Military Intelligence, CIA, Espionage no 0 
107 H.R. 2904 1611 Military Installations, Construction, and Land Transfers no 0 
107 H.R. 5011 1611 Military Installations, Construction, and Land Transfers no 0 
107 H.J. Res. 114 1619 Direct War Related Issues no 0 
107 H.R. 1542 1709 Computer Industry, Computer Security , & General Issues Related to the Internet no 0 
107 H.R. 3009 1800 Foreign Trade - General no 3 
107 H.R. 3005 1802 Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements no 0 
107 H.R. 2603 1802 Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements no 0 
107 H. J. Res. 50 1802 Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements no 0 
107 H. J. Res. 51 1802 Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements no 0 
107 H.R. 3189 1803 Export Promotion and Regulation, Export-Import Bank no 2 
107 H.R. 2602 1803 Export Promotion and Regulation, Export-Import Bank no 2 
107 H.R. 1646 1900 International Affairs and Foreign Aid - General no 4 
107 H.R. 2975 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 1 
107 H.R. 3150 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 1 
107 H.R. 2926 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 1 
107 H.R. 3162 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 1 
107 H.R. 4775 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 84 
107 H.R. 5005 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 84 
107 H.R. 4547 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 84 




Table B-1: Continued… 
107 H.R. 2620 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 2216 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 5120 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 3061 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 2647 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 2506 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 5121 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 2500 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.J. Res. 124 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 2590 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
107 H.R. 3295 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 1 
107 H.R. 2356 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 1 
107 H.R. 2944 2014 District of Columbia Affairs no 0 
107 H.R. 2217 2100 Public Lands and Water Management - General no 0 
107 H.R. 5093 2100 Public Lands and Water Management - General no 0 
107 H.R. 2311 2104 Water Resources Development and Research no 0 
108 H.R. 2 103 Unemployment Rate yes 3 
108 H. Con. Res. 95 105 National Budget and Debt no 3 
108 H. Con. Res. 393 105 National Budget and Debt no 4 
108 H.R. 7 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 11 
108 H.R. 1308 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 11 
108 H.R. 3521 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 11 
108 H.R. 4520 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 13 
108 H.J. Res. 106 202 Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination no 10 
108 H.R. 760 208 Right to Privacy and Access to Government Information no 0 
108 H.R. 663 324 Medical liability, fraud and abuse yes 4 
108 H.R. 5 324 Medical liability, fraud and abuse yes 4 
108 H.R. 1 335 Prescription drug coverage and costs yes 2 




Table B-1: Continued… 
108 H.R. 4766 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
108 H.R. 3108 503 Employee Benefits no 0 
108 H.R. 1000 503 Employee Benefits no 0 
108 H.R. 2210 603 Education of Underprivileged Students no 0 
108 H.R. 6 800 Energy - General yes 1 
108 H.R. 3550 1000 Transportation - General no 0 
108 H.R. 2115 1003 Airports, Airlines, Air Traffic Control and Safety no 0 
108 H.R. 5107 1200 Law, Crime, and Family Issues - General no 0 
108 H.R. 3214 1200 Law, Crime, and Family Issues - General no 0 
108 H.R. 1997 1207 Child Abuse and Child Pornography no 0 
108 H.R. 1036 1209 Police, Fire, and Weapons Control no 0 
108 H.R. 1115 1210 Criminal and Civil Code no 0 
108 H.R. 4 1300 Social Welfare - General yes 0 
108 H.R. 2622 1504 Consumer Finance, Mortgages, and Credit Cards no 0 
108 H.R. 975 1507 Bankruptcy no 0 
108 H.R. 2658 1600 Defense - General no 0 
108 H.R. 1588 1600 Defense - General no 0 
108 H.R. 4613 1600 Defense - General no 2 
108 H.R. 4200 1600 Defense - General no 2 
108 H.R. 2559 1611 Military Installations, Construction, and Land Transfers no 0 
108 H.R. 4567 1615 Civil Defense & Homeland Security no 0 
108 H.R. 2555 1615 Civil Defense & Homeland Security no 0 
108 H.R. 3289 1619 Direct War Related Issues no 16 
108 H.R. 1559 1619 Direct War Related Issues no 16 
108 H.R. 3717 1707 Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV, Cable, Radio) no 0 
108 H.R. 49 1709 Computer Industry, Computer Security , & General Issues Related to the Internet no 0 
108 H.R. 1298 1905 Developing Countries Issues no 3 
108 H.R. 10 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 22 
108 H.R. 2800 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
108 H.R. 2657 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 5006 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2765 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2673 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 4837 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 5025 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2660 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2861 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 4755 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2799 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 4754 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 2989 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
108 H.R. 4850 2014 District of Columbia Affairs no 0 
108 H.R. 2691 2100 Public Lands and Water Management - General no 0 
108 H.R. 4568 2100 Public Lands and Water Management - General no 0 
108 H.R. 2754 2104 Water Resources Development and Research no 0 
108 H.R. 4614 2104 Water Resources Development and Research no 0 
109 H. Con. Res. 95 105 National Budget and Debt no 5 
109 H.R. 4241 105 National Budget and Debt no 5 
109 H. Con. Res. 376 105 National Budget and Debt no 4 
109 H.R. 8 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 4 
109 H.R. 5638 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 6 
109 H.R. 4297 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 4 
109 H.R. 5970 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform yes 6 
109 H.R. 4128 200 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties - General no 0 
109 H.R. 4772 200 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties - General no 0 
109 H.J. Res. 39 202 Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination no 2 
109 H.R. 9 206 Voting Rights and Issues yes 0 
109 H.R. 6111 300 Health - General no 0 
109 H.R. 6143 331 Prevention, communicable diseases and health promotion no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
109 H.R. 810 398 Health - Research and development no 5 
109 H.R. 2744 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
109 H.R. 5384 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
109 H.R. 27 502 Employment Training and Workforce Development no 1 
109 H.R. 2830 503 Employee Benefits yes 0 
109 H.R. 6 800 Energy - General yes 3 
109 H.R. 5253 803 Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas) no 1 
109 H.R. 4761 803 Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas) no 1 
109 H.R. 3 1000 Transportation - General yes 0 
109 H.R. 748 1208 Family Issues no 0 
109 H.R. 1461 1406 Low and Middle Income Housing Programs and Needs no 0 
109 H.R. 5385 1600 Defense - General no 0 
109 H.R. 5122 1600 Defense - General no 0 
109 H.R. 1815 1600 Defense - General no 0 
109 H.R. 5631 1600 Defense - General no 0 
109 H.R. 5682 1605 Arms Control and Nuclear Nonproliferation no 0 
109 H.R. 2528 1609 VA Issues no 0 
109 H.R. 2360 1615 Civil Defense & Homeland Security no 0 
109 H.R. 5441 1615 Civil Defense & Homeland Security no 0 
109 H.R. 5252 1706 Telephone and Telecommunication Regulation no 0 
109 H.R. 310 1707 Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV, Cable, Radio) no 0 
109 H.R. 3045 1802 Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements no 0 
109 H.R. 3199 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 15 
109 H.R. 4437 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 15 
109 H.R. 4954 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 44 
109 H.R. 5825 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking no 44 
109 H.R. 4939 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 3010 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 2863 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 3058 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
109 H.R. 5672 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 3057 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 2862 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 2985 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 2361 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 5576 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H.R. 5386 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
109 H. Res. 1000 2007 Government Procurement, Procurement Fraud and Contractor Management no 0 
109 H.R. 4890 2011 Federal Government Branch Relations and Administrative Issues, Congressional Operations no 2 
109 H. Res. 648 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 4 
109 H.R. 513 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 0 
109 H.R. 4975 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 4 
109 H.R. 5254 2103 Natural Resources, Public Lands , and Forest Management no 0 
109 H.R. 2419 2104 Water Resources Development and Research no 0 
110 H.R. 5140 100 General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues no 24 
110 H. Con. Res. 312 105 National Budget and Debt no 3 
110 H. Con. Res. 99 105 National Budget and Debt no 7 
110 H.R. 7005 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform no 6 
110 H.R. 3996 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform no 0 
110 H.R. 6275 107 Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform no 6 
110 H.R. 493 205 Handicap or Disease Discrimination no 0 
110 H.R. 6331 301 Comprehensive health care reform no 0 
110 H.R. 3162 301 Comprehensive health care reform no 4 
110 H.R. 2900 321 Regulation of drug industry, medical devices, and clinical labs no 0 
110 H.R. 976 332 Infants and children no 0 
110 H.R. 4 335 Prescription drug coverage and costs yes 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
110 H.R. 3 398 Health - Research and development yes 0 
110 H.R. 5813 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
110 H.R. 3161 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
110 H.R. 2419 400 Agriculture - General no 0 
110 H.R. 5749 503 Employee Benefits no 0 
110 H.R. 800 504 Employee Relations and Labor Unions no 0 
110 H.R. 2 505 Fair Labor Standards yes 0 
110 H.R. 5 601 Higher Education yes 0 
110 H.R. 5715 601 Higher Education yes 3 
110 H.R. 2669 601 Higher Education yes 0 
110 H.R. 4137 601 Higher Education yes 0 
110 H.R. 1429 603 Education of Underprivileged Students no 0 
110 H.R. 5351 800 Energy - General yes 0 
110 H.R. 6049 800 Energy - General yes 0 
110 H.R. 2776 800 Energy - General yes 1 
110 H.R. 6 800 Energy - General yes 1 
110 H.R. 6899 803 Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas) no 0 
110 H.R. 7060 807 Energy Conservation no 0 
110 H.R. 1592 1210 Criminal and Civil Code no 0 
110 H.R. 3195 1304 Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped no 0 
110 H.R. 3221 1400 Community Development and Housing Issues - General no 0 
110 H.R. 5818 1401 Housing and Community Development no 0 
110 H.R. 1852 1401 Housing and Community Development no 0 
110 H.R. 6377 1502 Securities and Commodities Regulation no 0 
110 H.R. 6604 1502 Securities and Commodities Regulation no 0 
110 H.R. 3915 1504 Consumer Finance, Mortgages, and Credit Cards no 0 
110 H.R. 1908 1522 Copyrights and Patents no 0 
110 H.R. 4040 1525 Consumer Safety and Consumer Fraud no 0 
110 H.R. 1585 1600 Defense - General no 0 
110 H.R. 3222 1600 Defense - General no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
110 H.R. 5658 1600 Defense - General no 0 
110 H.R. 2082 1603 Military Intelligence, CIA, Espionage no 0 
110 H.R. 7081 1605 Arms Control and Nuclear Nonproliferation no 0 
110 H.R. 6599 1611 Military Installations, Construction, and Land Transfers no 0 
110 H.R. 1684 1615 Civil Defense & Homeland Security no 0 
110 H.R. 4156 1619 Direct War Related Issues no 50 
110 H.R. 5501 1905 Developing Countries Issues no 0 
110 H.R. 5104 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 38 
110 H.R. 6304 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 38 
110 H.R. 3773 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 57 
110 H.R. 556 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 57 
110 H.R. 5349 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 38 
110 H.R. 1 1927 Terrorism, Hijacking yes 57 
110 H.R. 3093 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 3074 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2638 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2771 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 3043 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 7110 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 1591 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2643 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.J. Res. 20 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 1424 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 6124 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.J. Res. 52 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2764 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2642 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2829 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 
110 H.R. 2206 2000 Government Operations - budget requests omnibus appropriations  no 0 




Table B-1: Continued… 
110 H.R. 2317 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 0 
110 H.R. 2316 2012 Regulation of Political Campaigns, Political Advertising, PAC regulation, Voter Registration, Government Ethics no 0 
110 H.R. 1905 2014 District of Columbia Affairs no 0 
110 H.R. 2641 2104 Water Resources Development and Research no 0 







Appendix C – Matching of Interest Group Industries to Issue Coding 
 Table C-1 shows the matching of each of the Center for Responsive Politics’ 
issue industry sectors to each of the Policy Agendas Project’s major issue areas. Most 
issue industries were coded to just one issue area, while a minority were coded to 
two. 
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Table C-1: Matching the Policy Agendas Project's Issue Coding to the Center for Responsive 
Politics' Issue Industries 
Center for Responsive 
Politics Industry Sector 
Policy Agendas Project 
Issue Topic #1 Issue Topic #2 
   
Agricultural Services & 
Products Agriculture  
Crop Production & Basic 
Processing Agriculture  
Dairy Agriculture  Food Processing & Sales Agriculture  
Forestry & Forest Products Agriculture Public Lands & Water Management 
Livestock Agriculture  Poultry & Eggs Agriculture  Tobacco Agriculture  Misc. Agriculture Agriculture  Building Materials & 
Equipment 
Banking, Finance, & Domestic 
Commerce Foreign Trade 
Construction Services Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
General Contractors Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Special Trade Contractors Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Accountants Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce  
Commercial Banks Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Credit Unions Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce  
Finance / Credit Companies Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Insurance Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce  
Real Estate Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce  
Savings & Loans Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce  
Securities & Investment Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 




Table C-1: Continued… 
 
Beer, Wine & Liquor Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Business Associations Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Business Services Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Casinos / Gambling Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Chemical & Related 
Manufacturing 
Banking, Finance, & Domestic 
Commerce Foreign Trade 
Food & Beverage Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Lodging / Tourism Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Misc. Manufacturing & 
Distributing 
Banking, Finance, & Domestic 
Commerce Foreign Trade 
Miscellaneous Services Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Recreation / Live 
Entertainment 
Banking, Finance, & Domestic 
Commerce Foreign Trade 
Retail Sales Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Steel Production Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Textiles Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Misc. Business Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce Foreign Trade 
Abortion Policy/Pro-Choice Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties  
Abortion Policy/Pro-Life Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties  
Gun Rights Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties  
Women's Issues Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties  
Clergy & Religious 
Organizations 
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil 
Liberties  
Home Builders Community Development & Housing Issues  
Defense Aerospace Defense  Defense Electronics Defense  Miscellaneous Defense Defense  Education Education  Electric Utilities Energy  
Fisheries & Wildlife Energy Public Lands & Water Management 
Mining Energy Public Lands & Water Management 
Oil & Gas Energy  Environmental 
Svcs/Equipment Energy Environment 




Table C-1: Continued… 
 
Misc Energy Energy  Environment Environment  Civil Servants/Public 
Officials Government Operations  
Health Professionals Health  Health Services/HMOs Health  Hospitals & Nursing Homes Health  Pharmaceuticals / Health 
Products Health  
Misc. Health Health  Foreign & Defense Policy International Affairs & Foreign Aid Defense 
Pro-Israel International Affairs & Foreign Aid  Building Trade Unions Labor, Employment, & Immigration  Industrial Unions Labor, Employment, & Immigration  Misc. Unions Labor, Employment, & Immigration  Public Sector Unions Labor, Employment, & Immigration  Teacher's Union Labor, Employment, & Immigration Education 
Postal Union Labor, Employment, & Immigration Government Operations 
Transportation Unions Labor, Employment, & Immigration Transportation 
Gun Control Law, Crime, and Family Issues  
Computers/Internet Science, Space, Tech, & Communications  
Printing & Publishing Science, Space, Tech, & Communications  
Telecom Services & 
Equipment 
Science, Space, Tech, & 
Communications  
Telephone Utilities Science, Space, Tech, & Communications  
TV / Movies / Music Science, Space, Tech, & Communications  
Electronics Mfg & Services Science, Space, Tech, & Communications  
Misc. 
Communications/Electronics 
Science, Space, Tech, & 
Communications  
Human Rights Social Welfare  Air Transport Transporation  Automotive Transporation  Railroads Transporation  Sea Transport Transporation  
Trucking Transporation International Affairs & Foreign Aid 
Misc. Transport Transporation  Lawyers / Law Firms -none-  Lobbyists -none-  Democratic/Liberal -none-  Republican/Conservative -none-  Misc. Issues -none-  Non-Profit Institutions -none-  Other -none-  





Appendix D – Tests of the Proportional Hazards Assumption 
Cox Proportional Hazards models, like the ones presented in Table 4.1 require 
that the proportional hazards assumption is met. Briefly, this assumption requires that 
the impact of covariates do not vary over time. Violations of the proportional hazards 
assumption can result in inaccurate estimates—often in the form of overestimation 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 132). There are three primary ways to test this 
assumption. Here, results of these tests are presented for Model #1 in Table 4.1. The 
results of the tests for Model #2 are nearly identical and therefore not shown. 
The first test is the link test method. This test evaluates the model as a whole. 
The link test generates the linear prediction from the model (analogous to ŷ), and then 
re-estimates the model where the response variable is treated as a function of ŷ2. If the 
proportional hazards assumption holds ŷ2 will be equivalent to zero. The results of the 
test are ŷ2 = 0.079 (0.155); p=0.610. Because the ŷ2 value is not statistically different 
from zero, it confirms that the proportional hazards assumption is met. 
The second test is the Harrel’s ρ test. Harrell’s ρ regresses the Schoenfeld 
residuals on log(t). When the proportional hazards assumption holds, the resultant 
slope of the regression should be equal to zero. Such a slope would indicate that the 
effect of the covariate is not systematically increasing or decreasing over time. We 
should expect to see that none of the predicted slops are statistically different from 
zero. The Harrell’s ρ for each covariate, as well as a global test, are presented in 
Table D-1. The results show that none of the variables have a slope that is statistically 
different from zero. The global test is also equivalent to zero. Altogether these tests 





Table D-1: Harrel’s ρ Test of the Proportional Hazards Assumption 
variable ρ χ2 df p-value 
Speaker's Issues -0.0046 0.01 1 0.9383 
Presidential priority - unified gov. 0.0061 0.01 1 0.9152 
Presidential priority - divided gov. 0.0155 0.06 1 0.8007 
Lobbying potential -0.0218 0.12 1 0.7267 
Public salience -0.0167 0.08 1 0.7740 
Passed under suspension -0.1087 3.77 1 0.0521 
Vote margin 0.0287 0.25 1 0.6194 
Party vote 0.0015 0.00 1 0.9794 
Appropriations bill -0.0025 0.00 1 0.9654 
Sept. 11 bill 0.0142 0.06 1 0.8120 
2nd session -0.0214 0.13 1 0.7200 
108th Congress 0.0376 0.42 1 0.5153 
109th Congress -0.0029 0.00 1 0.9603 
110th Congress 0.0118 0.04 1 0.8414 
     
Global test  5.22 14 0.9825 
 
 The final way to evaluate the proportional hazards assumption is to visually 
evaluate plots of the Schoenfeld residuals for each covariate. If the trend over time 
deviates in a systematic way from zero, we may be concerned that the proportional 
hazards assumption is violated. Figure D-1 presents the plots for each variable. None 
of the trends lines appear to deviate in any significant or systematic way from zero. 
This test, once again confirms that the proportional hazards assumption is not being 
violated. 
 Combined these three should provide adequate assurance that the proportional 
hazards assumption is not being violated, and that the model estimates can be 
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